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THE CIVIL WAR AND
THE CONSTITUTION

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THE AMERICAN HISTORY SERIES

THE CIVIL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION

1859-1865

BY

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THE CIVIL WAR

CHAPTER XII

THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS

Preparation of the Expedition—The Confederate Defences—Plan of Action of the Federals—The Passing of the Forts—The Destruction of the Confederate Fleet—The Occupation of New Orleans—Farragut at Baton Rouge and Natchez—New Mexico Relieved from Confederate Possession.

DURING the month of January, 1862, the Washington authorities had been secretly preparing an expedition against New Orleans. The naval force of some forty-six vessels, carrying about ^{Preparation of the expedition.} three hundred cannons and mortars, was placed under the command of Captain David G. Farragut, and the land force, consisting of about twelve thousand New Englanders was recruited and led by General B. F. Butler.

Farragut's fleet sailed in the first days of February, and the transports with Butler's army left the Chesapeake on the 25th. Butler arrived at Ship Island about the 24th of March and found Farragut, who had been waiting for him around the mouths of the Mississippi for nearly a month.

To meet this powerful combination of land and naval forces, the Confederates had a small army of some three or four thousand men, and some eight or ten

armored vessels. The troops were commanded by General Mansfield Lovell, and the fleet by Captain J. K.

The Confed-
erate defences. Mitchell, who acted under the nominal superiority of Commodore Whipple. Lovell had collected a much larger force than this at New Orleans, but had been obliged, by orders from Richmond, to send the most and best of it to Beauregard at Corinth, as we have seen. It was thought by the Confederate Administration, and by the authorities at New Orleans, that the city was sufficiently defended against any approach from the Gulf up the river by the two strong forts on opposite banks some sixty miles below, and against any approach through Lakes Borgne and Pontchartrain by the shallow water, the marshes, and the fortifications with which Lovell had surrounded the city on that side. They were correct in the idea that the city could not be reached by the route through the lakes, and they had equal confidence that Farragut's wooden vessels would never be able to pass the batteries of the forts, containing more than one hundred guns, and directed by one of the ablest artillerists in the Confederate service, General J. K. Duncan.

Farragut was further delayed in his operations after Butler's arrival by the mud in the mouths of the river, and by want of coal. It was the 17th of

Plan of ac-
tion of the
Federals. April before these difficulties were surmounted. The fleet now passed safely through the shallows, and anchored in deep water some ten miles below the forts, and Butler, with about ten thousand troops, was present and in readiness to land at the proper moment and when the proper place should be reached. The Confederate position had been reconnoitred some two weeks before, and Farragut's plan of action was fully matured. At the points where the forts were located, the course of the river was almost

due eastward. About one mile below them it bends due southward. The south and west bank of the river around this bend was covered with a dense forest, which hid the river immediately below the bend from Fort Jackson, on the same bank, entirely, and from Fort St. Philip, on the opposite bank, partially. Farragut placed his mortar boats, commanded by Captain David D. Porter, just behind this forest, and on the morning of the 18th of April began the bombardment of Fort Jackson.

For six days the terrible fire was kept up until the fort was almost a ruin, and the garrison nearly exhausted. The guns of the fort had indeed answered the attack in a spirited manner, The passing of the forts. but could not be aimed with any precision on account of the concealment of the exact position of the boats behind the forest. Some of the boats had exposed themselves a little, and one had been struck and sunk. Few men had been killed or wounded upon either side. But the Confederates were greatly fatigued, and were wading about in the water which the destruction of the fort had let in from the river, while the Federals were comfortably quartered in their boats and comparatively fresh. On the evening of the 23d, Farragut resolved, without further delay, to run past the forts. The Confederates had obstructed the river just below the forts by a chain stretched across it, held up by the hulls of eleven old vessels with their rigging floating about them. Already on the 20th Farragut had succeeded in opening a passage through this barrier by means of two of his gun-boats. In the early morning of the 24th, the fleet moved up the river in two columns. The left column, consisting of nine vessels, was commanded by Farragut in person, and was to brave the guns of Fort Jackson. The right column, consist-

ing of eight vessels, was intrusted to the immediate command of Captain Theodorus Bailey, and had the task of dealing with the batteries of Fort St. Philip. The mortar boats were ordered to keep their station below, and to throw shells into the forts in case the Confederates should discover the passing vessels and attack them.

The two columns, moving very slowly, on account of the darkness and the current and the obstacles through which they were seeking passage, were soon discovered, and the guns of the forts began to hurl red-hot shot at them. The mortar boats answered effectively, and the two columns pressed on. Two of the vessels got entangled in the barrier, and one was disabled by a cannon ball, but fourteen out of the seventeen steamed by the forts, pouring grape shot into their embrasures, and when daylight broke this powerful fleet anchored above the forts safely beyond the reach of their guns.

The Federal vessels now encountered the Confederate fleet, which had come down too late to attack the Federal

boats when the battle between these and the forts was in progress. Duncan had besought Mitchell in vain to come to his aid, but Mitchell had delayed until it was too late. Only the ram *Manassas* had taken any part in the contest when the Federal fleet was receiving the fire of the forts. Now that the Federal vessels had passed that danger they made short work with the Confederate boats. In less than an hour they had destroyed most of them, and the way to New Orleans was entirely open.

Bailey now steamed up the river to the Quarantine Station, and dispersed a little body of Confederates there.

This opened a way through a bayou to the Gulf waters only a few miles eastward. Farragut requested Butler to bring his troops through this waterway into the rear of the forts.

The destruction of the Confederate fleet.

The occupation of New Orleans.

Leaving the reduction of the forts now to Butler and Porter, Farragut proceeded with most of his fleet to New Orleans. He quickly silenced the Chalmette batteries just below the city, and at a little past noon on the 25th of April, he anchored his fleet along its water front. Every Confederate soldier had been sent by Lovell either to Vicksburg or to Camp Moore beyond Lake Pontchartrain. He himself was still in the city laboring to get his material of war away.

Soon after the fleet cast anchor, the Federal Commander demanded the surrender of the city. Thereupon General Lovell turned over his authority to the Mayor, Mr. Monroe, who had astuteness enough to prolong the negotiations about the surrender a sufficient time to allow Lovell to get away with most of his arms, ammunition and other military property. Monroe knew that Farragut had no sufficient land force immediately with him to take and hold the city, and he not only prolonged the correspondence inordinately, but even defied the Federals by keeping the "State" flag floating over the public buildings.

Meanwhile Butler had made his way around to the rear of Fort St. Philip, and had invested both forts completely. When the garrisons became aware of their helpless situation, they refused to make a useless sacrifice of themselves, and spiked their guns. General Duncan now yielded and surrendered the forts, on the 28th, to Captain Porter.

Butler now left General John W. Phelps with a detachment of troops to hold the forts, and proceeded with the remainder of his army to New Orleans. On the 1st day of May, his transports arrived at the wharves, and his troops were landed and bivouacked in the squares of the city.

Farragut now left the occupation and control of the

city to Butler, and proceeded up the river with his fleet. On the 9th of May, he occupied Baton Rouge. On the 12th, Natchez. And on the 18th, he appeared before Vicksburg. Here he found the guns sent by Lovell from New Orleans planted in tiers on the bank so as to sweep the course of the river, and manned by Lovell's trained artillerists. He quickly decided to make no rash experiments in the face of such formidable obstacles. For the moment the Federal advance was at last halted.

Farragut at
Baton Rouge
and Natchez.

The Confederate fortunes in the West and South-west seemed now everywhere broken. Even the promising attempts of their capable General Henry H. Sibley, with his splendid Texan soldiery, to seize New Mexico had, despite his victories over the Federal General Canby at Valverde Farms and Apache Pass, on the 21st of February and the 26th of March, and despite his occupation of Santa Fé and Albuquerque, come to grief. Canby so placed himself in Sibley's rear as to force retreat or surrender. By the 1st of May Sibley's forces had all returned to Texas, and New Mexico was in the undisputed possession of the Federals.

New Mexico
relieved from
Confederate
possession.

The Confederacy was certainly tottering to its fall, and if the Army of the East should strike such a blow as that of the West had done, the work would be ended. There was little doubt felt that it would. It was supposed that the Army of the East was far superior to that of the West, and was led by more capable commanders, and it was known that it was much better armed, equipped and disciplined. The time had now come for it to prove its strength, capacity and valor.

CHAPTER XIII

McCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST RICHMOND

The Army of the Potomac—The Confederate Army in Virginia—The Illness of McClellan—The Capture of Roanoke Island—The President and McClellan in Conflict Concerning the Route of Advance against Richmond—The *Merrimac* and the *Monitor*—The Evacuation of Manassas by the Confederates—Changes of the Federal Route—Confederate Retreat to Richmond—McDowell's Corps Withdrawn from McClellan—Battle of Kernstown—McClellan's Advance up the Peninsula—The First Fight on the 16th—The Siege of Yorktown—The Battle at Williamsburg—The Battle at Eltham's Landing—The Destruction of the *Virginia*—The Federal Fleet in the James—The President's Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley—Mr. Davis's Plan to Meet the Federals in the Shenandoah—The Battle at Winchester—The Scare in Washington—Jackson's Escape—Seven Pines and Fair Oaks—The Defeat of the Confederates—The Investment of Richmond—Robert E. Lee and the New Plan of the Confederates to Rout the Federals—The Skirmish at Oak Grove—Jackson in Richmond—The Plan of Retreat to the James—The Battle of Mechanicsville—Jackson's March to White House—The Battle of Gaines's Mill—McClellan's Entire Army South of the Chickahominy—March of the Federals to the James—The Battle of Frazier's Farm—The Battle of Glendale—The Battle of Malvern Hill—The Losses—The Withdrawal of the Federals to Harrison's Landing—The Eastern Début of General John Pope—Halleck Called to Washington and Made Commander-in-Chief of all the Armies—Halleck at Harrison's.

THE grand army gathered around Washington in the beginning of the year 1862 must have numbered two hundred thousand men, well ^{The Army of the Poto-}armed, equipped and disciplined, and anxious to revenge the defeats at Bull Run and Ball's Bluff.

The Confederates could not, at that time, have opposed them with more than seventy-five thousand men.

The Con-
federate army
in Virginia. Not quite fifty thousand of these were at Manassas. About ten thousand were along the lower Potomac and on York peninsula, and about fifteen thousand were in the Valley under Stonewall Jackson.

General Johnston, commanding at Manassas, was convinced that he would be obliged to withdraw his forces from that position when the spring should open. He kept his secret within his own bosom, however, impressing McClellan with an exaggerated account of his strength, and all the while sending his material and stores southward.

During the first half of the month of January, McClellan lay ill with typhoid fever. The President bore The illness
of McClellan. the delay in movements caused by this with something less than his accustomed patience, and the restlessness of the politicians and the people was somewhat appeased by sending out the expedition against Roanoke Island.

This expedition, consisting of a fleet of twenty-nine gun-boats, commanded by Commodore Goldsborough, and an army corps of sixteen thousand men The capture
of Roanoke
Island. on transports, commanded by General Ambrose E. Burnside, set out on the 12th of January from Hampton Roads for Hatteras Inlet. They got into Pamlico Sound on the 24th, and found seven Confederate gun-boats in the channel between Roanoke Island and the mainland, and a land force in the fortifications on the island of about six thousand men commanded by General H. A. Wise.

In the morning of the 7th of February Goldsborough attacked the Confederate fleet and water batteries. He soon disabled two of their vessels and drove the rest

back into Albemarle Sound. Three brigades of infantry were landed on the island in the afternoon, and while two of them engaged the Confederates by a front attack upon their works, the other, commanded by General J. L. Reno, worked through the swamp which covered the Confederate right and attacked them in flank. The Confederates were taken by surprise, and fled in every direction open to them. Wise got away with about three thousand men. The remainder of his force, some twenty-eight hundred to three thousand men, were killed, wounded or captured. The victory was decisive, with a trifling loss to the Federals, and by the 15th of the month the entire coast of Albemarle Sound was in possession of the Federals, and the Confederate war-vessels in these waters were all destroyed.

McClellan had by this time recovered from his illness, and was urging his plan of advance *via* Urbana on the Rappahannock. The President preferred the route *via* Harper's Ferry and the Shenandoah. He at last yielded to McClellan, on condition that he would first restore the communication between Washington and the West over the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and relieve the commerce of the lower Potomac, by destroying the Confederate batteries on the west bank. McClellan, therefore, reoccupied Harper's Ferry and the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad about the 1st of March. The opening of the lower Potomac, however, came in another way.

In the afternoon of the 8th of March, a queer looking object was seen coming out of the mouth of Elizabeth River, and making for the two Federal war-vessels anchored off Newport News, the *Congress* and the *Cumberland*. The thing looked like a floating Mansard roof. The Federals were

The President and McClellan in conflict concerning the route of advance against Richmond.

The *Merri-mac* and the *Monitor*.

not long in discovering that it was the ironclad which the Confederates had constructed at Norfolk out of the United States vessel, named the *Merrimac*, caught there when the Confederates, or rather the Virginians, seized Gosport Navy Yard. Rumors of the dangerous character of this vessel had reached Washington, and her appearance among the wooden ships of the Federal navy was much feared.

She now bore right down on the two Federal vessels, passing contemptuously by the *Congress* in order to attack the *Cumberland* first, the latter carrying the larger guns. If these could make no impression upon the armor of the *Virginia*, as the Confederates called her, she had nothing more to fear.

To the dismay of the Federals, the balls from the *Cumberland's* heaviest guns rebounded from the sides of the *Virginia* as if made of rubber. The *Virginia* was also provided with a steel beak, and she now rammed the *Cumberland* with such force as to sink her in a few moments. The *Congress* lay in too shallow water for the *Virginia* to reach her with the steel prow, but she was so raked by the guns of the *Virginia* that she surrendered, and the Confederate Commander, Buchanan, ordered her destroyed by fire.

By this time the steam frigate *Minnesota* had come down from Fortress Monroe to aid the Federal vessels. The *Virginia* now attacked her, but night approached, and the Confederates drew off until light should return. They had not the slightest doubt that the *Minnesota* would share the fate of the *Congress* and the *Cumberland* so soon as the *Virginia* could get at her.

When the morning of the 9th broke, the *Minnesota* still lay stranded in the mud. The *Virginia* steamed around to her rear, and just as the Confederate gunners were about to open fire, they descried a much stranger

looking craft than their own moving out from the side of the *Minnesota*, and placing itself directly in the path of the *Virginia*. They called it "a cheese box on a raft." It was the now famous Ericsson *Monitor*, which, during the night of the 8th, had arrived from New York alongside of the *Minnesota*. It had been completed on the same day that the *Virginia* had received her final touches, and sent, under the command of Lieutenant John Worden, to the Potomac. Worden had got into the waters of the Chesapeake in the afternoon of the 8th, in time to hear the firing, and the pilot whom he took up told him something of the disaster to the Federal vessels. He immediately resolved to go to the scene of action upon his own responsibility. The *Monitor* consisted of a cylindrical, armored, revolving turret, twenty feet in diameter, containing two eleven-inch Dahlgren guns, set upon a shallow flat hull one hundred and seventy-two feet long and forty-one feet wide, with an overhanging armored deck protecting the propeller and the rudder. Worden did not know, of course, how this strange craft would behave itself in action, but he fearlessly put her across the course of the terrible Confederate ironclad.

The battle began at once and lasted for about four hours. The balls from neither of them made much impression on the armor of the other. The *Monitor*, however, could move more quickly, and the *Virginia* was thus eluded when she attempted to make use of her prow. At last a ball from the *Monitor* struck the *Virginia* near the water line and opened a dangerous leak. Her engines were also about to give out from the strain of the two days of battle upon them. She now gave up the fight and drew off in the direction of Norfolk. The *Monitor* did not follow, but laid by the vessels which she had so successfully protected. Both Buchanan and

Worden had been wounded, the first by a ball from the rifle of a sharpshooter on the land, and the other by splinters from the steel ingots which formed his outlook. Nobody was killed, however, on either of the two vessels.

The work done by the *Monitor* cannot be overestimated. Except for it nothing could have prevented the *Virginia* from destroying the entire Federal fleet, and steaming up the Potomac to the capital itself. It was long feared that the *Virginia* might, after making her repairs and remedying her defects, come out of her hiding place and offer battle again, but she never did.

The Confederates now evacuated Manassas, and also abandoned their positions along the lower Potomac. With this water communication between Washington and the North was re-established, and McClellan could embark his army at Alexandria in place of Annapolis. On the 11th of March, the Federal troops occupied Manassas. On the same day President Lincoln, as we have seen, issued an order confining McClellan's commandership to the Army of the Potomac. There may have been political reasons for this. There certainly were good military reasons. McClellan's attention would be absorbed by the great campaign upon which he was now about to enter, and the Western generals had proved, by actual successes, that they were better able to manage their own movements than was McClellan, or anybody else in Washington.

McClellan now resolved to land his troops at Fortress Monroe instead of Urbana, in order to avoid being compelled to cross the York River on his march to Richmond, and in order to put himself in a better position to capture Yorktown, a thing which he considered necessary to the success of future operations. Between the middle of March and

The evacuation of Manassas by the Confederates.

Change of the Federal route.

the middle of April the Grand Army, with its arms, munitions, and supplies, was successfully transported from Alexandria to Fortress Monroe and made ready for its great movement up the York peninsula to Richmond.

After the evacuation of Manassas the Confederates had fallen back to the line of the Rappahannock, their right resting on Fredericksburg, and their left in the rear of the Rapidan. Here John-
Confederate
retreat to
Richmond.
 ston waited for the development of McClellan's plans. He discovered what they were before McClellan was able to advance from around Fortress Monroe, and, abandoning North-eastern Virginia, he put his army in motion to foil them.

McClellan had left Alexandria with the idea that the army which he should carry with him to the peninsula would number at least one hundred and fifty thousand men. But to his surprise and dis-
McDowell's
corps with-
drawn from
McClellan.
 concertion, the President detained McDowell's corps, containing about thirty-five thousand men, for the defence of Washington. The cause of this act on the part of the President is to be found in the events then occurring in the Shenandoah Valley. When McClellan went to the front the plan was that Banks's corps should protect Washington against Jackson's army. One division of it was to hold Manassas, and the other, commanded by Shields, was to be posted at Winchester. In execution of this plan Shields, who had been pursuing Jackson up the Valley and had gone as far as Strasburg, was called back to Winchester. Shields was a hot-blooded, belligerent Celt. He wanted a brush with Jackson terribly. He made up his mind, as he could not, under his orders from Washington, pursue Jackson any farther, to induce Jackson to pursue him, and to thus draw Jackson into an engagement. So when he turned back from Strasburg to Winchester, he went

rattling down the Valley in hot haste as if in precipitate retreat, expecting that the Confederate sympathizers along his route would report the same to Jackson. He had rightly calculated. Jackson was immediately informed of the movement and returned in eager

Battle of Kernstown. Shields drew him on, and near Kernstown.

Kernstown, a village a little south of Winchester, turned upon him and gave him battle. Shields's forces succeeded in driving the Confederates back and holding the field, but it was no easy victory, and the Federals lost more in killed and wounded than the Confederates. This little battle occurred on the 23d of March. It gave them quite a scare at Washington, and the President now thought it necessary to have the whole of Banks's corps at Winchester in order to protect Washington against an advance from the Valley by way of Harper's Ferry. Other troops must therefore be placed at Manassas, and the President selected McDowell's fine corps for this position. It numbered three times as many men as were needed, but the President did not know this at the time. The authorities in Washington had an exaggerated opinion of Jackson's strength, and were greatly impressed by his energy and daring.

On the 6th day of April McClellan began his movement up the peninsula. On the 7th his advance arrived

McClellan's advance up the peninsula. in front of the fortifications around Yorktown and across the peninsula at this point.

The Confederate line was defended by about eleven thousand men, under the command of General J. B. Magruder. Magruder placed them so skilfully that McClellan thought they were the skirmish line of a large army hidden in the forests behind. At the moment McClellan had not heard of the detention of McDowell's corps, and supposed it was on the march

from Fredericksburg to York River. Instead of attacking at once in front, he, therefore, resolved to wait for McDowell to threaten the Confederates in their rear. A few hours later, he learned of the new disposition of McDowell's troops, and at the same time of the withdrawal of the naval force which was to co-operate with him in opening York River, and its return to Hampton Roads for the purpose of watching the *Virginia* and keeping her out of the Potomac. This news was certainly very disturbing, and it seemed to demoralize McClellan completely. He simply sat down in front of the Confederate line for nearly ten days, while Johnston, now fully aware of McClellan's plans, and entirely safe from pursuit by McDowell, drew his army back into the neighborhood of Richmond, and sent a strong division of ten thousand men to reinforce Magruder. This able and daring commander had improved his time in strengthening his line of defence, and when at last, on the 15th, McClellan resolved to make some move, Magruder had twenty thousand trained and hardy soldiers behind his fortifications ready to receive the Federal advance.

On the morning of the 16th, McClellan ordered a cannonade of the whole Confederate line from Yorktown on the north to Lee's Mills on the south, and an assault from a point on the Federal left. ^{The first fight on the 16th.} The plan was well conceived, but the execution of it was a miserable failure, because the assaulting column was not sufficiently supported. For this there was absolutely no excuse, since there were tens of thousands of troops on the spot that could have been used, and ought to have been used, for the purpose. The Federal commanders had blundered dreadfully, and the confidence of the soldiers in their leaders was greatly shaken. A gloom of discouragement began to spread

over the Grand Army, as it settled down into the toilsome monotony of a regular siege.

For three weeks now the spade took the place of the bayonet, and the Confederates were given time to move all their war material from Norfolk and the lower course of the James back to Richmond. ^{The siege of Yorktown.} Johnston was also enabled so to reinforce Magruder as to make his retreat safe, whenever he could no longer hold the Federals at bay. At length McClellan was ready to begin the bombardment. The orders were issued on the 3d of May to open fire on the morning of the 5th. But when the morning of the 4th broke, it was discovered that the Confederates had abandoned their works during the preceding night, and were already several miles away on the road to Williamsburg.

McClellan immediately ordered Franklin's division which had, at last, been sent him from McDowell's corps, and three other divisions, to proceed ^{The battle at Williamsburg.} on transports up York River and debark at a point where they could throw themselves in the rear of the retreating Confederates. At the same time the six strong divisions, commanded by Stoneman, Hooker, Kearney, Smith, Couch and Casey, were sent in pursuit.

About one mile and a half east of Williamsburg, the peninsula is cut nearly in two by two creeks, the one, called College Creek, emptying into the James, and the other, called Queen's Creek, emptying into the York. The roads up the peninsula then traversed the narrow pass, hardly a mile wide, between the sources of the two creeks, since the banks of both were impassable swamps. In the pass stood Fort Magruder, and here the Confederates established their second line of defence.

The Federal commander tried hard to force the Confederates to battle on the east side of this pass, but

Longstreet, who led the rear guard, succeeded in effecting the passage of the whole army under the protection of the guns of Fort Magruder. The Confederates now made a stand behind their new line, and prepared to give the Federals such a check as would enable them to continue their retreat unmolested.

On the morning of the 5th, Hooker began the attack on Fort Magruder, but, after five or six hours of fruitless endeavor, drew off. Meanwhile Hancock's brigade of Smith's division found a passage across Queen's Creek, and ran against the left flank of the Confederate army. Kearney's division now reinforced Hooker and the attack in front was renewed, while Hancock held his position on the west side of the creek against every effort of the Confederates to dislodge him. Night now came on, and gave the Confederates the opportunity to resume their retreat. They improved it well, and when the day broke they had again escaped the clutches of the Federals. The battle of Williamsburg had been rather sanguinary. About three thousand men were placed *hors de combat* on each side, and something like six hundred prisoners were captured by each side. It was not a distinct victory for either party, but the Federals were checked, and the Confederates were able to continue successfully their retreat. The Federals were obliged to remain several days at Williamsburg to reorganize.

The four divisions that ought to have reached the Confederate rear by way of the York River were still on board the transports in Yorktown Harbor while the battle of the 5th was in progress. During the night of the 5th the boats carrying Franklin's division steamed up the river to Eltham's Landing, and in the early morning of the 7th the single brigade, that commanded by General Newton, which had got ashore, was furiously attacked by the heads

The battle
at Eltham's
Landing.

of the Confederate columns as they reached this place in their retreat from Williamsburg. It was a critical moment for the Federals. It looked for a time as if they would be annihilated by the greatly superior force of the Confederates. But Franklin at last succeeded in landing and placing some of his artillery, and, by a well-directed fire from his guns, in repelling the assault. The Confederates now passed on, however, unmolested, and the flanking movement up the York thus ended in failure. The retreat of the Confederates had been ably conducted, and if retreats can ever be termed successes, it had been so far a decided success. On the 10th and 11th the Federals advanced from Williamsburg to Eltham's Landing, and made this place their base for further operations.

At the same time an event happened in the mouth of the James which was very advantageous to the Federals, and contained a hint which, if followed, might have brought success out of the peninsula campaign. Three days after the battle at Williamsburg, Commander Tatnall of the dreaded iron-clad, the *Virginia*, undertook, on account of the evacuation of Norfolk, to take his vessel up the James. He found that he must land his guns to get her over the bar, and after he had thus disarmed her, the pilot told him that the heavy west wind then blowing would still prevent her from crossing the bar. Thus unarmed and exposed to attack by the Federal navy in Hampton Roads, Tatnall resolved to destroy her. He burned her immediately, and the James was now open to the Federal fleet.

Goldsborough immediately went up the James nearly to Drury's Bluff, only a few miles below Richmond. The people of Richmond were stricken with terror at the proximity of the Federal war-vessels. The Confed-

erate Congress and many private citizens fled from the city. A prompt movement, at this juncture, of the Grand Army and the fleet in unison ought to have been successful. McClellan did con-
 ceive it, and conferred with Goldsborough about it. But the President wanted McClellan to keep between Richmond and Washington in his further move-
 ments, and again promised him McDowell's corps on the condition that he would do so. McClellan yielded to the President's wishes, and fixed his base at White House on the Pamunkey.

The Federal fleet in the James.

The President and the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, now conceived a plan of their own for re-establishing Federal jurisdiction over North-eastern Virginia. They ordered McDowell to advance from Manassas to the line of the
 Rappahannock, leaving garrisons everywhere, commanded Shields to join McDowell with his division, and sent Banks up the Shenandoah Valley in pursuit of Jackson. Frémont's army was at Moorefield and Franklin, places about thirty miles west of Strasburg and Harrisonburg respectively. The President and Mr. Stanton designed to crush Jackson between the forces of Banks and Frémont. Frémont, Banks and McDowell had no connection with each other except through Washington. The President and Mr. Stanton were now in a position to conduct a little campaign of their own.

The President's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley.

The Confederate President, who was even greater as a soldier than as a civilian, was fully appraised of the situation in North-eastern Virginia and in the Valley, and he rightly divined just what the political generals in Washington would do. He now developed the most brilliant piece of strategy in the history of the Civil War. He confided

Mr. Davis's plan to meet the Federals in the Shenandoah.

his plan at first only to Jackson, who was to execute it, and who, we may be sure, readily concurred in it. We will now follow the steps in its unfolding.

Mr. Davis sent Ewell's division and Johnston's brigade to Jackson, and with these Jackson had about twenty thousand splendid soldiers. Staunton was his natural base of operations. Sending Ewell down the Valley to find Banks, Jackson himself moved toward Franklin to surprise Frémont. He met two of Frémont's brigades, commanded by Schenck and Milroy, in the mountain passes between Staunton and Franklin. He immediately attacked them, drove them back to and through Franklin, and took possession of the town. Frémont and the remainder of his force retired with them to Moorefield.

Having thus broken the direct line of communication between Frémont and Banks, Jackson was now ready to carry out the second movement of the plan, viz., to join Ewell and crush Banks. When he joined Ewell, he learned that Banks was retiring in the direction of Strasburg.

Instead of following Banks down the Valley along the same roads over which the latter was retreating, Jackson crossed over the ridges which separate the Valley into two parts here, and then turned his column down the east branch of the Shenandoah to Front Royal, a town where the two branches of the river join their waters, situated about twelve miles almost due east from Strasburg, and just opposite Manassas Gap in the Blue Ridge. On the 23d of May, Jackson surprised and captured the garrison of about one thousand men at Front Royal. Banks was now at Strasburg, and Jackson at Front Royal was directly between Banks and Washington City. The two armies were also about equally distant from Winchester, the point toward

which Banks must continue his retreat in order to escape, and protect Maryland against invasion by way of Harper's Ferry. In the race to Winchester, Banks had, by a few hours, the advantage, and reached there first with but little loss. He was, however, so closely pressed that he was obliged to turn ^{The battle at Winchester.} and fight just south of the town. In this little battle of the morning of the 25th the Confederates were victorious, but they were too badly crippled and too much fatigued to continue, at once, the pursuit. Banks reached Williamsport on the Potomac during the evening of the 25th. His material losses had not been very great, about one thousand men killed, wounded and captured. But these losses were no measure of the advantage which the Confederates had won by their daring movement.

The authorities at Washington were made to feel that they could no longer trust Banks to protect the capital from the ubiquitous Jackson, and their whole attention was turned toward him in- ^{The scare in Washington.} stead of toward Johnston at Richmond. They ordered Shields's division, which had, as we have seen, just joined McDowell in order to enable McDowell to advance toward McClellan, to march to Front Royal through Manassas Gap, and Frémont's army to advance from Moorefield to Strasburg. They calculated that these threatening movements in Jackson's rear would cause him to retreat, and they instructed Banks to turn and pursue upon the first signs of this effect.

The President and Mr. Stanton appeared really to believe that they now had Jackson in a trap. On the 26th they ordered McDowell to send another division of his corp to Front Royal, and on the 27th to go there himself with still another. This simply meant that McClellan was not to have McDowell's troops with him

at all in the campaign before Richmond. This was just what Davis and Jackson were manœuvring for. McDowell saw it, and warned the President against it, but the warning went unheeded.

Shields reached Front Royal on the 30th, but Jackson, who had had hourly information of the movements of the Jackson's Federals, and who had now accomplished his escape. purpose of scattering McDowell's forces through North-eastern Virginia, had gone from Winchester to Strasburg in time to elude Shields and to reach Strasburg ahead of Frémont. On the 31st he passed completely out of the trap which the political strategists at Washington thought they had so securely set for him, and was ready to enter upon the accomplishment of the final move in the plan which Mr. Davis had so ingeniously thought out. This was to push rapidly up the Valley to Port Republic, then through Brown's Gap in the Blue Ridge to Gordonsville, and then follow the railroad to Richmond, thus not only preventing McDowell from reinforcing McClellan, but bringing to the aid of the Confederate army at Richmond the very troops which McDowell's scattered forces were hunting for in the mountains far to the north. This was the most daring part of the entire manœuvre; but, as we shall see a little farther on, it was, on account of the blundering management at Washington, altogether feasible and brilliantly successful.

While the movements just described were in progress, McClellan had advanced to Bottom's Bridge and the railroad bridge just above it on the Chickahominy. The advance of McClellan to the Chickahominy. The corps commanded by Keyes and Heintzelman had been thrown across the river and were posted along the turnpike from Bottom's Bridge to a place called Seven Pines in the direction of Richmond. These two corps composed the left wing of

the Grand Army. The centre and right wing remained on the north side of the river. The centre, commanded by General E. V. Sumner, was located around Dispatch Station, the nearest station on the railroad to the river. The divisions of Fitz John Porter and Franklin were at Gaines's Mill and Mechanicsville, and composed the right wing. McClellan had fixed his own head-quarters at Gaines's Mill. He had pushed his right wing thus far westward in order to effect the junction with McDowell, when the latter should come down from Fredericksburg.

The Confederate President had placed General Anderson with a division of troops at Bowling Green, a town some twenty-five miles south of Fredericksburg on the railroad to Richmond, for the purpose of hindering any movement of Federal troops over that line toward McClellan, and he had placed Branch's division between the Chickahominy and Hanover Court House to maintain communication between Anderson and Richmond. McClellan sought, by extending his right, to cut the railroad communication between Hanover Court House and Richmond. On the day that he expected McDowell to start from Fredericksburg, he sent Stoneman's cavalry to destroy the railroad between the Chickahominy and Hanover Station and threaten the rear of the Confederate divisions at Bowling Green and Hanover Court House. This was the 25th of May. To his surprise and almost consternation, he received in the evening of that day a telegram from President Lincoln informing him of the intention of the Government to send McDowell's troops to Front Royal. The President's telegram also contained the instruction to bring the Army of the Potomac back to Washington, if in the opinion of its commander it was not strong enough to attack Richmond without further reinforcement.

Naturally McClellan was puzzled what to do next. He had been trying to preserve the railroad bridges over the South Anna in order to enable McDowell to advance. It seemed now, however, necessary to destroy them in order to prevent reinforcements going from Richmond to Jackson. The Washington authorities felt that very keenly, and directed McClellan to effect it. McClellan sent Porter with ten thousand men, on the 27th, to do the work. By the 29th Porter had accomplished it, and had destroyed Branch's brigade in addition, and was back in his position at Gaines's Mill.

Meanwhile the Confederates had been drawing their troops from many directions to Richmond. They came from Roanoke Island, Newberne, Fort Macon and Norfolk ; and, after McDowell went to Front Royal, Anderson's division, twelve thousand strong, retired successfully from Bowling Green. With these reinforcements Johnston had an army of fully sixty thousand men with which to defend the Confederate capital against McClellan. McClellan estimated it at eighty or ninety thousand.

Johnston clearly perceived the peril of the Federal position, with the left wing of the Grand Army on the south side of the Chickahominy, and the centre and right on the north side, and stretching out far to the north-westward. He determined to take the offensive and concentrate his forces against McClellan's left wing before communication across the Chickahominy could be made easy by the completion of the new bridges, and before the right wing could be brought back from the extreme position which it had occupied in order to keep the way open for McDowell to come down from Fredericksburg.

In the evening of the 30th of May Johnston issued his order of battle to his division commanders. D. H. Hill

The Confederate strength at Richmond.

Seven Pines and Fair Oaks.

was ordered to march out on the Williamsburg turnpike toward Bottom's Bridge and attack the Federals in front. Longstreet was instructed to support Hill. G. W. Smith was ordered to advance along the Cold Harbor road to Old Tavern, a point which lay directly between the left wing and centre of the Federal army, and prevent Sumner from reinforcing the left wing by way of his two new bridges, nearly completed, over the river. And General Huger was ordered to proceed down the Charles City road to the south of the White Oak Swamp, which covered the flank of the Federal left, and forcing his way through the passes of the swamp, to fall upon this flank at the same moment when Hill should attack in front. It was a well-planned battle, and it seemed almost certain that it would be a victory.

Torrents of rain fell during the night of the 30th, but Johnston considered this in his favor. He calculated that the rain would raise the Chickahominy, and that the swollen waters would sweep away Sumner's bridges, and prevent his troops from crossing.

In the forenoon of the 31st the movement began. Hill attacked Casey's division about midday, and the battle was soon raging with great fury in front of Seven Pines and along the cross-road The battle. from this point to Fair Oaks station on the railroad. The Federal troops were forced slowly, but surely, back, Longstreet supporting Hill in the attack and Couch's division supporting Casey in the defence. The Confederate commanders were waiting to hear Huger's guns at the passes of White Oak Swamp, when they intended to make their charge. But Huger failed to do his part, and without him Hill and Longstreet could not rout the Federal divisions.

Johnston had gone with Smith's division to Old Tavern, three or four miles north-westward from where

the battle was in progress. A strong west wind was blowing at the time, and he did not hear the sounds of the conflict. It was nearly four o'clock before he learned the state of affairs at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. When he did, he immediately put Smith's division in motion for the scene of action, calculating to strike the right flank of the Federals, and throw them into such a state of confusion as to make victory easy.

Meanwhile Kearney's division had come forward to the support of Casey and Couch, and had checked the advance of Hill and Longstreet, but just at the moment when the Federals were about to succeed in re-establishing their lines, Smith's troops coming from Old Tavern struck them in their right flank and drove them away from both Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. With the exception of Hooker's division, which was guarding the passes of White Oak Swamp, all of the Federal troops on the south side of the Chickahominy were now in action. The three divisions engaged did not number over twenty-five thousand men. When Smith arrived on the field, the Confederates engaged must have numbered forty thousand. The Federals were now on the point of being overwhelmed, when suddenly, about six o'clock, the heads of Sumner's columns rushed upon the battlefield, striking Smith's division of the Confederates almost in their rear. The old war horse had scented the battle from afar, and had, upon his own responsibility, pushed his troops across his new bridges, fairly floating on the swollen waters, and had arrived in the nick of time to save the left wing of the Grand Army. The scales were immediately turned. The Confederates were thrown into the greatest confusion. Johnston himself was severely wounded in the carnage which followed, and was carried from the field. Night now

The defeat
of the Confed-
erates.

put an end to the battle and possibly saved the Confederate army from complete annihilation.

The Confederate commanders were convinced that McClellan's entire army was now upon them, and they immediately ordered the retreat to Richmond. Huger's fresh troops came up in time to cover the retreat. The Federals pursued a short distance. The impetuous brigadiers, Sickles and Meagher, attacked the Confederate rear, but they were not sufficiently supported to attempt to enter Richmond with the retreating army. McClellan remained supine on the north side of the Chickahominy with about half his army, and lost what certainly now appears to have been the grand opportunity for bringing his campaign to a successful close. There is now no sort of doubt that he could have entered Richmond on the morning of June 1st. Sickles and Meagher were within three miles of the city, when they were called back, instead of being supported by twenty-five thousand fresh troops, as they might have been.

The authorities at Washington do not appear to have regarded the battle as a great victory. Despite the repulse and demoralization of the Confederates, the Federals had lost six thousand of the ten thousand men killed and wounded, and in their advance upon the city, they had received a check from which they never recovered. The Army of the Potomac had, however, behaved nobly, and had wiped out the Bull Run reproach. The President, though disappointed at the failure to enter Richmond, now ordered the garrison at Fortress Monroe, some eight or ten thousand men, to join McClellan, and again promised to send McDowell's corps. Why the President renewed this promise is to some extent speculation. Most probably it was for the purpose of holding McClellan back from marching his army

to the James River below Richmond, a movement for which the way was entirely unobstructed for several days after the battle of Fair Oaks, and a movement which ought by all means to have been made.

McClellan now settled down to the investment of Richmond with White House on the York River as his base of supplies, and the railroad from White House to Richmond as his line of communication. He wanted McDowell's corps sent to him by transports to White House, but the President would only allow one division, McCall's, to go that way, and insisted on the other divisions marching overland in order to protect Washington. McClellan was thus obliged to keep his right wing on the north side of the Chickahominy, stretched out some twenty miles to the north-west of the left wing at Fair Oaks, in order to cover McDowell's march.

Meanwhile General Robert E. Lee had been put in command of the Confederates at Richmond instead of the suffering Johnston. He immediately saw the perilous position of the Federal army, as Johnston had seen it. But instead of making another attack upon its left wing, he finally gave his approval to Mr. Davis's plan of having Jackson march by way of Gordonsville into McClellan's rear, and strike White House and the railroad between White House and the Chickahominy.

In order to effect this movement, the Washington authorities must be again put in fear of an advance by Jackson upon Washington by way of Harper's Ferry or Manassas Gap, so as to prevent them from sending McDowell's two divisions to hinder Jackson's real movement by way of Gordonsville and Hanover Court House into McClellan's rear. With this in view, Lee, on the 11th of June, sent Whiting's division by cars *via* Lynch-

The invest-
ment of Rich-
mond.

Robert E.
Lee and the
new plan of
the Confeder-
ates to rout
the Federals.

burg and Charlottesville to Staunton. He made sure that this movement should be discovered by the Federals and reported at Washington. So soon as he was certain that it had had its effect, and that Jackson's march would be unobstructed by McDowell, he ordered Whiting to return quickly to Charlottesville and join Jackson, who had passed through Brown's Gap, and was on his way to Gordonsville.

At the same time he sent General J. E. B. Stuart with a thousand picked cavalymen entirely around McClellan's army to see if Jackson would be obliged to encounter any fortification on his march from Hanover Court House to White House. This was a daring movement, but it was successful and effective. It occupied the attention of the Federals for three or four days, at a time when it was most important to delay their advance on Richmond. It raised the courage and hopes of the Confederates. And it caused surprise, if not consternation, among the Federals to find that communication with their base of supplies was subject to such perils.

For ten days more now McClellan remained quiet. On the 25th, he advanced his left wing along the turnpike toward Richmond to a little beyond Seven Pines. Hooker's division was leading when, at a point called Oak Grove, some four or five miles from Richmond, the Confederates disputed farther advance. The Confederates were, however, repulsed, and Hooker remained master of the ground. He could now see the spires of the city, and was impatient to move onward. But he was not destined to go any nearer.

On that very day, in the early morning, a solitary horseman had ridden into Richmond from the northwest, and had gone directly to head-quarters. It was

The skirmish at Oak Grove.

Jackson himself, who had come to inform Mr. Davis and General Lee that his troops were only about twenty-five miles away, and to arrange with them the bold plan for crushing McClellan's right wing, seizing his base of supplies, cutting off his line of retreat, and capturing his entire army. In the evening of the same day Jackson was back again at the head of his columns now nearing Hanover Court House.

McClellan had, on the 24th, been made aware of Jackson's march eastward from the Valley, but believed that Frémont, Banks and McDowell would be able to check him. On the morning of the 26th, news was brought to the Federal commander that Jackson's cavalry were already at Hanover Court House, that is, that they were almost directly in the rear of his right wing. He knew then that he must fight both Lee and Jackson, and that he was in most imminent peril. This was the final outcome of the little campaign made under the immediate direction of the President and the Secretary of War. McClellan now understood perfectly that the salvation of his army depended upon his own capacity and energy, and that he could expect no aid from the authorities at Washington. He, therefore, determined to meet the great responsibility in his own way.

McClellan rightly divined that Lee's plan was to attack the Federal right wing at Mechanicsville and Gaines's Mill, and while thus occupying the troops in this position to have Jackson pass across from Hanover Court House to White House, and cut off the Federal line of retreat to York River. Lee had no doubt that if McClellan were forced to retreat, he would undertake to go back by the line over which he had advanced.

The quick mind of McClellan instantly comprehended that his escape depended upon the maintenance of this idea in the calculations of his adversaries, while he him-

self should adopt a very different course. He comprehended that so long as they believed he would retreat to York River, Jackson would not attack his right wing at the same moment with Lee, ^{The plan of retreat to the James.} but would march on eastward in order to get into the rear of his left wing, and he saw that he must not consider for a moment a retreat to York River. His ingenious and masterful plan was formed almost in the twinkling of an eye. He would give battle to Lee at Mechanicsville and Gaines's Mill, and cripple him. He would let Jackson push on toward White House, and get as far away as possible. And then, while one of his adversaries was recovering from the battle and the other was too distant to strike him, he would lead his own army across the passes of White Oak Swamp and make for James River, where, in conjunction with the fleet, he might establish a new and better base for his operations against Richmond.

Preparatory to the execution of this plan, McClellan sent all of his sick and wounded back to White House, ordered all the stores at White House to be re-shipped on the transports, loaded his wagons with eight days' rations and plenty of ammunition, and collected a vast drove of beef cattle. By the morning of the 26th these preparations were nearly completed and McClellan could give his attention to the Confederates now crossing the Chickahominy on his right.

The Federal division at Mechanicsville, McCall's, was drawn back across a stream which runs into the Chickahominy a little east of the village, called Beaver Dam Creek. Some fortifications had ^{The battle of Mechanicsville.} been thrown up on the east bank, and behind these the Federals awaited the attack. The Confederates had thrown three of their divisions across the Chickahominy at, and above, Mechanicsville, and now

confident of crushing McCall, D. H. Hill's division rushed at the works on Beaver Dam Creek. They were, however, repulsed again and again by McCall's well-placed and well-served artillery, supported by his superb regiments of infantry. The Confederates lost about three thousand men in their rash charge upon the Federal intrenchments, while the Federals lost only about three hundred.

Jackson had heard the cannon at Beaver Dam Creek, but he judged it best, as McClellan calculated he would, to press on toward White House. Had he suspected McClellan's intention of abandoning the line to White House and marching forward to the James, he would certainly have turned and attacked McCall in the right flank and have destroyed his division.

In the early morning of the 27th, McClellan drew McCall's division farther back toward the new bridges over the Chickahominy, and posted the entire corps comprising the right wing of the army in a tolerably strong position just behind Gaines's Mill. Fitz John Porter was now in command of the corps, and it was composed of the divisions of McCall, Morell and Sykes.

About one o'clock in the afternoon, the head of Hill's advancing columns struck the Federal line, and the bloody battle of Gaines's Mill began. The Confederates were received with a destructive fire from the Federal batteries, and repulsed with severe loss.

Lee now arrived on the field and discovered at once that he had an entire Federal army corps in front of him instead of a single division, as on the preceding day. He resolved to call Jackson to his aid. He sent a courier with a request to Jackson to turn his columns southward, and fall upon the right flank of the Federals. It

was between five and six o'clock when Jackson, in response to Lee's directions, approached the extreme right of the Federal position. Porter sent to McClellan for reinforcements, but only a brigade or two recrossed the Chickahominy in answer to his request. The Federal right wing must now keep the Confederate divisions in front and Jackson's army on the flank at bay until darkness should cover the retreat across the river. With great steadiness and valor the exhausted soldiers stood their ground. The well-planted batteries, strongly supported by the splendid infantry, made havoc with the advancing columns of the Confederates, which pushed with the greatest bravery and determination right on over the dead and wounded up to the mouths of the Federal cannon. Except for the appearance, at this critical moment, of the first two brigades sent back across the river, led by French and Meagher, the Federal line would have been broken. With their aid the Confederate advance was momentarily checked. Night had now also come, and the Federal right wing was saved. The forces under Lee which had taken part in the battle were so crippled that they could not pursue. Jackson, still ignorant of McClellan's purpose, prepared to resume his march toward White House. And Magruder and Huger with only about twenty-five thousand men had the duty of protecting Richmond against the Federal forces on the south side of the Chickahominy, and almost in sight of the city. McClellan's way to the James was now open. He had lost about seven thousand men in the battle of Gaines's Mill, but the Confederates had lost even more, and were still in the dark concerning his intended movements.

He now marched his right wing safely across the river, and on the morning of the 28th he had his whole

army practically united, while the forces of his adversaries were scattered. Most of the Confederate forces were on the north side of the river, and only about twenty-five thousand Confederates stood between the Grand Army and Richmond. The Confederate capital was, however, safe. McClellan had no idea of attacking it.

McClellan's
entire army
south of the
Chickahominy.

In the evening of the 27th, Keyes's corps, which rested on the borders of White Oak Swamp, moved around to Glendale on the south side of the swamp, and on the 28th occupied Frazier's Farm, from which point his artillery commanded the bridge over the swamp. McClellan had now two lines of march to Glendale, one around the head of the swamp, and the other over the bridge across the swamp about midway its course. Glendale was his first objective point, since here the three main roads from Richmond running eastward between White Oak Swamp and the James River were intersected by the road from White Oak bridge across the swamp to Haxall's Landing on the James, the place on the river to which he intended to lead his army.

March of
the Federals
to the James.

The other divisions of the army did not move until the evening of the 28th, on account of the necessity of first sending forward the three hundred and fifty cannon, four thousand wagons, five hundred ambulances and twenty-five hundred head of live cattle.

During the course of the day Magruder, at Richmond, began to suspect that the Federals were abandoning their positions in front of him, and in the afternoon he threw out a skirmish line to feel of them. He found that he was too hasty. His troops met with a decided repulse. He tried again later and was again repulsed, but this time the movement of the Federals

The discovery of the movement, and disposition of Lee's forces to meet it.

was revealed to him. Information was at once sent to Lee, who now saw that McClellan's retreat would not be to White House, and that in order to intercept the Federal army he must seize Glendale, and Malvern Hill which lay about midway between Glendale and the James. He immediately ordered Hill, Longstreet and Jackson to cross the Chickahominy. Jackson was directed to follow the Federals that were marching between the Chickahominy and White Oak Swamp to White Oak bridge and across this bridge to Glendale. Hill and Longstreet were commanded to cross above Mechanicsville, go direct to Richmond, and then march down the roads from Richmond to Glendale; while Wise, who was on the south side of the James, some ten miles below Richmond, was instructed to cross over and occupy Malvern Hill. Huger was already out from Richmond two or three miles on the roads to Glendale, and Magruder was in position to march thither so soon as the Federal columns should turn their faces away from Richmond.

The morning of the 29th was dark and foggy, and, therefore, favorable to the Federals in the task of abandoning their works in front of Magruder. The troops who had fought the battle at Gaines's Mill were sent forward first. Averill's cavalry division kept Huger at bay, and in the afternoon these troops arrived at Glendale, making with Keyes's corps a large army at this important point. Sumner's corps covered the retreat. Magruder attacked Sumner in the afternoon before he had left his position at Savage Station, but was promptly repulsed. Jackson finished his bridge in the evening of the same day, and crossed over the Chickahominy. During the night the entire Federal army continued its movement around and across White Oak Swamp. Sumner crossed the swamp at White Oak bridge

with Jackson closely following him. He succeeded however in destroying the bridge, and Keyes's artillery was so placed at Frazier's Farm as to prevent its restoration.

On the morning of the 30th, McClellan saw that he must probably give battle at three points, viz., White Oak bridge, Glendale and Malvern Hill. Jackson made his appearance on the north side of the swamp at this point about noon. Hill and Longstreet, supported by Huger and Magruder, were approaching Glendale from Richmond, and Wise had crossed the James and was marching for Malvern Hill. McClellan now made his dispositions for battle. He moved Keyes's corps on to a position between Malvern Hill and the James, and placed Franklin's corps at Frazier's Farm, with the duty of preventing Jackson from crossing White Oak Swamp. Sumner and Heintzelman were ordered to hold Glendale, and Porter was assigned to the task of defending Malvern Hill. The line from White Oak bridge to Haxall's Landing was a little more than ten miles long, and McClellan must defend this line successfully during the 30th in order to bring his great train of artillery, wagons, ambulances and live stock safely to Haxall's.

The battle began at Frazier's Farm so soon as Jackson made his appearance on the north side of the swamp opposite this point. The Confederates were at least thirty thousand strong, and sure, in their own minds, of an easy success. But Franklin's artillery was well posted and skilfully handled, and his infantry supported the guns with great steadiness. With about half Jackson's numbers, Franklin kept the impetuous and redoubtable Confederates at bay during the entire afternoon, while McClellan's material of war and supplies were being brought safely to the new base on the James.

About two o'clock in the afternoon, the forces of

Hill and Longstreet attacked the Federals in front of Glendale. The battle raged here with great fury all the afternoon. Both President Davis and General Lee were with the Confederates, and ^{The battle of Glendale.} were deeply disappointed that Jackson was stopped at White Oak bridge and that Huger and Magruder could not be brought up to the support of Hill and Longstreet. The Confederates fought with great valor and determination. They knew that they must break the Federal line here if at all. They were resolved to destroy the whole Federal army, and fully believed that they could do so. When now they met with such resistance from the two Federal corps posted about Glendale, their courage was driven almost to desperation. The Federal forces were indeed worsted in the struggle, but they were not routed. They held their ground, and finally withdrew slowly after everything behind them had passed on toward the James.

The attack by Wise's troops on Malvern Hill was no more successful. Porter and Keyes repulsed him easily, and kept the way open along the lower end of the line of retreat. By the ^{First attack on Malvern Hill.} late evening of the 30th, the vast train of ammunition and supplies was safely parked at Haxall's, and the artillery was being put in position on Malvern plateau for the great struggle which the next day was to bring forth. The entire army had also reached this last strategic point in its march to the James.

During the forenoon of the next day, July 1st, McClellan placed his army in position for battle. His left wing, composed of Porter's corps and Couch's division of Keyes's corps, faced toward Richmond. ^{The battle of Malvern Hill.} The centre, composed of the troops led by Sumner, Heintzelman and Franklin,

looked toward Glendale. The right wing, commanded by Keyes, was so placed as to prevent the Confederates coming from Glendale from turning Malvern Hill by the right flank.

The Confederate attack was expected from two points, viz., down the road from Richmond running between Malvern Hill and the James, and along the roads leading from Glendale to Haxall's. McClellan planted his artillery so as to cover the approaches of these roads to his positions.

Finding that Franklin's troops had been withdrawn from their position commanding the passage of White Oak Swamp, Jackson crossed over at daybreak of the 1st of July and moved forward to Glendale. He was ordered to advance directly upon Malvern Hill with Longstreet and Hill supporting him; while Magruder and Huger were commanded to make a circuit toward the James and fall upon the Federal left wing.

About three o'clock in the afternoon, Jackson began cannonading the Federal centre, in order to draw the attention of the Federal commander from his real point of attack. Having accomplished this, as he supposed, he undertook to pierce the Federal line with his infantry at the point of junction of the left wing with the centre. But he found himself at this point rather unexpectedly in front of Couch's splendid division, and suffered a severe repulse.

About four o'clock Magruder, who had now reached Porter's front, opened with his artillery upon this part of the Federal line, and his infantry rushed up the slopes of the hill, but Porter's artillery mowed them mercilessly down, and beat the survivors back. The attack was repeated again and again but with the same result.

The Confederates were working under the great dis-

advantage of lack of concert. Their cavalry, which had gone down the peninsula between the York River and the Chickahominy, on the supposition that McClellan would be obliged to retreat to Yorktown, had not returned. The Confederate army was thus without its "very eyes" in its manœuvres in the forest around the base of Malvern Hill, while the Federals, on the plateau, were able to observe all of the Confederate movements. The Confederates were thus necessitated to rely upon sounds from the guns as signals for movements, and, as all soldiers well know, these are very likely to convey false impressions.

About six o'clock, D. H. Hill thought that he heard sounds upon his right intended as a signal for him to make another attempt to separate the Federal centre from the left wing. He ordered his troops to charge vigorously at this point. But instead of Couch's division alone, they now found Kearney's fine soldiers also in front of them. The valor and enthusiasm of the Confederates were expended in vain. Broken and bleeding and decimated, their columns were repulsed again and again, until they finally gave up further attempts.

It was near nine o'clock in the evening before they accepted defeat all along their line, and then they retired slowly and sullenly from the field, with their hope of destroying the Federal army, which had been raised so high as to appear to them a certainty, dashed to the ground.

The great movement of the Federal army from the Chickahominy to the James was now successfully accomplished, and the Army of the Potomac was saved. The losses had been great in men, but not in material. About two thousand men had been killed, eight thousand wounded, and six thou-

The losses.

sand had been captured or had disappeared. In all, the loss in men had been about sixteen thousand from the opening of the battle at Mechanicsville to the close of the battle at Malvern Hill. The Confederates had suffered even more severely. Their losses were calculated at nearly, if not quite, twenty thousand men.

Although the Federals were victorious at Malvern and occupied a very strong position, McClellan felt that he must locate the army at a point on the James where the river was broad enough to protect his transports from the attack of batteries on the south bank. For this reason he withdrew his forces, during the night of the 1st and the forenoon of the 2d, to Harrison's Landing about eight miles below Malvern. The Confederates were, however, so badly crippled that they gave up further pursuit, and soon withdrew to their old position around Richmond.

On the 4th of July, McClellan still found himself at the head of a great army, an army which numbered nearly ninety thousand men. He was in a secure position, and in possession of the best possible line of communication with the sources of his supplies and reinforcements, a line which the navy could always keep open without any help from the army. He was only about twenty miles away from Richmond on an air line, and was located rightly to move upon the city from the rear.

It is true that the troops of the Army of the Potomac were greatly fatigued by their almost superhuman exertions, but it was also true that the Confederates were equally exhausted, and had neither the power nor the inclination for any further immediate enterprises. There is no doubt that the true plan for the Federals was to rest the army for a while at Harrison's, and then

resume the campaign against Richmond, this time by way of Petersburg. Such was undoubtedly McClellan's idea and purpose. And there is also no doubt that this plan received the approval of the President during his visit to Harrison's, July 7th. But ideas were growing in Washington which were destined to change this plan, and to cause the adoption of a very different one.

The success of the western armies had naturally created the feeling that the leadership of these armies was superior to that of the eastern armies. The capture of New Madrid and Island No. 10, with slight loss to the Federals engaged in that campaign, was regarded as so far about the most brilliant achievement of the war. Naturally, therefore, the general commanding this expedition, General John Pope, was held in high favor. Pope was a brave man, and a fairly good general of a division. He had the knack also of appropriating the glory of everything done by his subordinates to himself, and of advertising all that he did for all that it was worth. The Confederates called him "Proclamation Pope."

In the latter half of June, while McClellan was operating against Richmond from the Chickahominy, and Jackson was raiding up and down the Shenandoah Valley eluding Banks, Frémont and McDowell, and keeping Washington in a state of panic, the Washington authorities called Pope to the capital and put him in superior command of the three corps of Banks, Frémont and McDowell, entitling the new army thus formed the Army of Virginia. Frémont immediately declined to serve under Pope, and General Franz Sigel was put in his place. Then, on the 11th of July, Halleck was called to Washington to take general command of all the armies of the Union. When Halleck

The eastern
début of Gen-
eral John
Pope.

Halleck
called to
Washington
and made
commander-
in-chief of all
the armies.

arrived in the capital Pope was already there, and the two generals immediately began to argue with the President against the further prosecution of McClellan's plan of campaign. The plan which they developed and favored was to bring the Army of the Potomac back to the line of the Rappahannock, give the larger part of it to Pope, occupy the other part of it with the defence of Washington, and let Pope operate against the main army of the Confederates by the direct overland route from Washington to Richmond. The President resisted these proposed changes for several days, but at last yielded.

On the 25th of July, Halleck went to Harrison's Landing to confer personally with McClellan. He ^{Halleck at Harrison's.} seems to have told McClellan nothing of the impending changes in the plan of operations, but discussed with him the resumption of the movement against Richmond from the base on the James. McClellan still held to his plan of approaching Richmond by way of Petersburg, but Halleck was opposed to the transfer of the army to the south side of the river. At last he directed McClellan to move back toward the old positions in front of Richmond on the north side, promising to reinforce the army with twenty thousand men for the execution of the plan. He told McClellan, finally, that if he was unwilling to undertake the capture of Richmond by this route and with this additional force, he must join Pope on the Rappahannock. McClellan hesitatingly consented to follow Halleck's plan. The next day, however, he wrote Halleck, who had returned to Washington, suggesting that some fifteen thousand more troops might be loaned him from the Western armies for a short time. The Washington authorities seem to have interpreted this suggestion as a notification from McClellan that he

despaired of success without a reinforcement of thirty-five thousand men instead of the twenty thousand promised. That McClellan himself did not attach this meaning to his suggestion is quite evident from the fact that he had put his columns in motion before receiving any reply to his letter to Halleck. Hooker's division drove a small force of Confederates from Malvern Hill on the 4th of August and re-occupied this position, and every preparation was made for the advance by the roads on the north side of the river. In the evening of the same day the definite order from Halleck reached McClellan to abandon the peninsula and bring his army, by way of Fortress Monroe, to Aquia Creek.

CHAPTER XIV

POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN NORTH-EASTERN VIRGINIA

Pope's Campaign in North-eastern Virginia—The Strength of the Armies in North-eastern Virginia—Jackson's Advance against Pope — The Battle of Cedar Mountain—The Losses — The Effect of the Battle on the Further Movements of the Army of the Potomac—The Withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from Harrison's—Pope's Marching and Counter-marching—The Approach of the Army of the Potomac, and the Scattered Condition of the Federals—The Manœuvres of the Two Armies —The Capture of Manassas Junction—The Skirmish at the Railroad Bridge over Bull Run — Pope's Attempt to Crush Jackson's Army—Jackson Reinforced—The Battle at Groveton—The Battle of Manassas—The Battle at Chantilly—The Restoration of McClellan—The Losses.

POPE's operations on the line of the Rappahannock had already begun. His first objective point was Gordonsville, the junction of the railroad from Staunton, *via* Charlottesville, to Richmond, with the railroad from Alexandria, *via* Manassas, to Richmond. His purpose was to prevent the Confederates from going back again into the Shenandoah Valley and threatening Washington again by way of Harper's Ferry. Pope's own base was Manassas Junction, and some of his troops were as far forward as Culpeper Court House. On the 14th of July, he ordered Banks to advance from Culpeper on Gordonsville. The Confederates had, however, anticipated the movement, and when, on the 16th, Banks neared Gordonsville, he found

Pope's campaign in North-eastern Virginia.

Jackson already there. He withdrew at once to Culpeper.

Pope arrived in person at Culpeper on the 29th of July, and during the first days of August he placed his troops in position along the road from Culpeper to Sperryville, a place some fifteen miles north-west from Culpeper, at the foot of the Blue Ridge. The position was of no great strategic importance. It was simply the ground which the Confederates would be obliged to traverse in going around the unfordable waters of the lower Rappahannock in order to advance toward Washington, unless they should go from Gordonsville to Staunton and pass down behind the walls of the Blue Ridge.

Pope had, at this moment, about forty-five thousand men, double as many as Jackson had at Gordonsville, and so long as McClellan threatened Richmond, Lee could send Jackson no reinforcements. In some way or other, about the last of July, Lee became convinced that McClellan's army would be recalled from the James, and he sent A. P. Hill's corps to Jackson. This made Jackson's force nearly equal to Pope's.

On the very day that McClellan received the order to abandon his position on the James, Lee was informed of the movements of the troops both at Harrison's and Fortress Monroe, and he immediately ordered Jackson to strike Pope before reinforcements could reach the latter. On the 7th of August Jackson put his columns in motion from Orange Court House for the attack on Pope. The next day he encountered Pope's cavalry on the borders of the Rapidan, and pushed them back across the stream. During the evening he crossed the Rapidan with his entire force, and on the morning of the 9th advanced toward Culpeper.

The strength
of the armies
in North-east-
ern Virginia.

Jackson's
advance
against Pope.

Pope had gathered his army about Culpeper, and had thrown Banks's corps forward toward Cedar Mountain, some eight miles southward from Culpeper. Banks had about eight thousand men, but Ricketts's division was close behind him, and Sigel's corps was close behind Ricketts. Banks had reached a good position on elevated ground, when, about four o'clock in the afternoon of the 9th, Jackson's advance came into view. The Confederates, it appears, began the attack. Banks, however, angered and chagrined at the way in which Jackson had out-maneuvred him in the Shenandoah, was eager for the fight. He did not even wait for Ricketts and Sigel to come up, but with his single corps of eight thousand men brought Jackson's entire army to a halt and engaged fully the half of it in a fierce contest, driving it back until Jackson himself arrived with reinforcements and restored the Confederate lines. Pope also appeared on the battle-field at about the same time, but brought no troops with him. At nightfall the battle ceased. Ricketts came up early in the evening, and placed his division in position to confront Jackson on the next morning. But the Confederates had had enough of it, and were not inclined to fight a new battle against fresh troops. They retired during the night to the south side of the Rapidan.

For the number of soldiers engaged the battle of Cedar Mountain was a sanguinary struggle. The Federals lost in killed and wounded about one-fourth of their troops brought into action, and the Confederate loss, though not so great absolutely or relatively, approached the number of fifteen hundred men.

The effect of this encounter upon the minds of the authorities at Washington in determining the future

movements of the campaign seems to have been quite decisive. They seem to have been fully convinced by it that the next great battle was to take place on the upper Rappahannock and its tributaries. They, therefore, urged McClellan to make all haste in bringing his army to Aquia Creek, from which point he could most easily reinforce Pope and protect Washington. Burnside's corps from Fortress Monroe had already arrived at Aquia Creek on the day before the battle of Cedar Mountain, and during the battle the divisions of Reno and Stephens were marching toward Culpeper.

The effect of the battle on the further movements of the Army of the Potomac.

On the 14th of August the march of the Army of the Potomac from Harrison's Landing began, and on the 16th McClellan and the last of the troops turned their backs upon Richmond. The line of march was from Harrison's to Williamsburg, crossing the Chickahominy at Barnett's Ferry, and from Williamsburg to Yorktown and Fortress Monroe by the roads over which the army had advanced three months before. By the 20th the army was encamped at Yorktown, Newport News and Fortress Monroe, awaiting transportation by water to Aquia Creek and Alexandria. Lee had let the grand army go unmolested. He was bending all his energies to reinforce Jackson, and crush Pope before the latter could receive the aid intended for him from Aquia Creek. The day before McClellan began his march from Harrison's, both Longstreet and Hood were ordered to leave their positions north-east of Richmond, from which they could have greatly harassed the retreating army, and go to Jackson at Gordonsville.

The withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from Harrison's.

On the 20th, Jackson, Hill and Longstreet with their combined forces crossed the Rapidan and attempted to surprise Pope. By this time Reno's division was with

Pope, and had swelled his numbers to about fifty thousand men. The Confederates, however, still outnumbered him by about twenty thousand men,

Pope's
marching and
counter-march-
ing.

and Pope decided to retire to the north bank of the Rappahannock, and make his stand with the river in his front. He placed his left wing, under the command of Reno, at Kelly's Ford, from which position he expected to keep open his communications with Aquia Creek. The centre, under McDowell, was located around Rappahannock Station in front of the railroad bridges across the river. Sigel's corps, forming the right wing, was posted farther up the stream.

Lee himself had now joined the forces operating against Pope, and on the 21st his advance appeared on the south side of the river. He soon reached the conclusion that he could not cross in the face of the Federal positions, and on the 22d he sent Jackson up the river to turn the Federal right wing. The Federals discovered the movement, and sent a couple of brigades across to attack Jackson's rear. They were, however, rather severely repulsed, and Jackson proceeded, without further molestation, up to Sulphur Springs Bridge, a place some five miles beyond the position of Pope's right wing. Jackson took possession of the bridge and sent Early's brigade across the river in the direction of Warrenton, in Pope's rear.

The idea seems now to have seized Pope that by allowing Jackson to proceed to Warrenton, he could suddenly turn upon him, strike him in the flank, and destroy him before Lee could come to his assistance. During the 22d, while Jackson was going to Sulphur Springs Bridge, Pope was, therefore, moving troops from his centre and left back into the rear of his right.

In the late evening a new idea took possession of him. This time it was that Longstreet was weaker than Jack-

son, and that by suddenly crossing the river and falling on Longstreet, he could crush the latter, and then be in Jackson's rear, and thus annihilate the whole of Lee's army. He, therefore, ordered his weary soldiers back to the positions which they had left twelve hours before, and sent some of those who had remained during the day on the bank of the river across to the south side. Torrents of rain fell throughout the night of the 22d, and on the morning of the 23d the bridges were in great danger. Pope now felt compelled to recall the troops who had crossed in order to avoid the danger of having his army divided by the swollen waters of a bridgeless river. Jackson's force was in the same danger. Early's brigade was separated by the river from the rest of the army, and the Sulphur Springs Bridge was swept away on the morning of the 23d.

Pope now received his third inspiration. He resolved to throw the larger part of his army on Early's single brigade and capture it before Jackson could succor him. He, therefore, marched his exhausted soldiers back from his left and centre to the rear of his right again, and began the search for Early. The wily Confederate had sent Stuart's cavalry into the Federal rear, and, at the moment when Pope was searching for him in the direction of Warrenton and having no anxiety at all about his own communications, Stuart appeared at Catlett's Station, some ten miles in the direct rear of the Federal army, and, for a few hours, severed the communication between Pope and his base of supplies at Manassas Junction. The Confederate cavalry was easily driven away, but they carried with them Pope's private papers, and their exploit excited a feeling of confusion and distress among the soldiers of Pope's army.

Naturally Early succeeded in eluding Pope's scattered,

exhausted and dispirited troops, while Jackson made good use of the time thus gained in rebuilding the bridge across the river. Before the morning of the 24th broke it was passable, and in a few hours Early had safely rejoined Jackson on the other side.

By these useless marches and counter-marches Pope's army was as much used up as if it had fought a good battle, and it had lost confidence in its commander in a degree not much less than that usually caused by a pronounced defeat. On the other hand, the larger part of Lee's army had had nearly forty-eight hours of good rest, and was in prime condition to begin operations so soon as the weather would permit.

There was nothing now for Pope to do but wait for reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac. Reynolds's division and Porter's corps, which had debarked at Aquia Creek on the 21st and 22d, were marching up the Rappahannock toward Kelly's Ford, where it was supposed Pope's left wing was still resting, and Heintzelman's corps, which had landed at Alexandria, was marching toward Manassas Junction. McClellan himself arrived at Aquia Creek on the 24th. Sumner's corps debarked there a day or two afterward. Franklin's corps was on transports going up the Potomac, while Keyes's corps was still on the peninsula.

Pope's army was also somewhat scattered. Sigel's corps, in the attempt to trap Early, had marched up to Waterloo Bridge, three miles above Sulphur Springs Bridge. The troops of Reno and Banks were distributed along the river between these two points, while McDowell's corps was at Warrenton. Nobody seemed to know just where anybody else was, and General Halleck at Washington could not tell anybody where General Pope was.

The approach of the army of the Potomac and the scattered condition of the Federals.

Naturally General Lee was not slow in seizing the opportunity which this situation offered him. He sent Jackson still farther up the river to Hinson's Ford, five miles above the extreme Federal right. Here Jackson crossed over without difficulty, and pushed on rapidly to the little village of Orleans. By this movement he placed his forces so that Bull Run mountain lay between them and Pope's army, and so that he could therefore advance north-eastward without exposing his flank to the Federals. His objective point was Thoroughfare Gap, the gorge through which the railroad from Manassas Junction to Front Royal and Strasburg passed. The gap was about twenty miles distant from Orleans, while Pope's troops at Warrenton were not over a dozen miles away, and those at Manassas Junction were only about twenty miles away with a railroad the entire distance. Jackson knew, therefore, that he must move silently and swiftly.

The manœuvres of the two armies.

Pope was informed that something was brewing from the moment that Jackson started up the river, but he does not seem to have divined Jackson's purpose at all. He seems to have thought that Lee's whole army was endeavoring to get into the Shenandoah Valley in order to pass into Maryland. Whatever may have been the working of his mind upon the situation he did not make any movement for his own protection. In the early morning of the 26th Jackson took possession of the pass without any difficulty, and marched through, and straight on toward Manassas Junction, while Pope was sending his troops from Warrenton and the points along the railroad up the river in pursuit.

In the evening of the 26th, Jackson's cavalry reached Bristoe Station on the Alexandria railroad, and cut Pope's communications with Manassas and Washington. That night Jackson him-

The capture of Manassas Junction.

self arrived with the infantry and established his forces along the railroad in Pope's rear. In the morning of the 27th he captured Manassas Junction with the immense stores gathered there.

The interruption of communication, in the evening of the 26th, seems to have given Pope and the Washington authorities the first reliable information as to the whereabouts of Jackson. It produced great anxiety at the capital. Most of the garrison had been sent forward to Pope, but happily Franklin's corps of the Army of the Potomac arrived at Alexandria on the 26th. All but one brigade of it was immediately placed in the intrenchments, while that brigade, Taylor's, was sent forward, on the morning of the 27th, to make a reconnoissance. It advanced to the railroad bridge over Bull Run, crossed the stream, and came upon the Confederates in full force. The Confederates charged it vigorously and drove it back to Centreville with great slaughter.

So soon as Pope realized the situation, he resolved to throw himself upon Jackson and crush him before Lee could come to his relief. On the morning of the 27th he ordered McDowell to move toward Gainesville in order to cut Jackson's line of retreat toward Thoroughfare Gap, and prevent any reinforcements reaching Jackson by way of the Gap. McDowell had with him, besides his own corps, Sigel's corps and Reynolds's division, some twenty-five thousand men, a force almost, if not quite, equal to Jackson's. Moreover, Reno's division was within supporting distance, and Kearney's division of Heintzelman's corps was not far away to the east. Pope also, at the same time, ordered Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps, which had been following the railroad from Alexandria to Rappahannock Station, to return toward Manassas Junction.

The skirmish at the railroad bridge over Bull Run.

Pope's attempt to crush Jackson's army.

Banks's corps was directed to support Hooker, and, lastly, Porter's corps was faced for Warrenton Junction.

In the evening of the 27th McDowell took possession of Gainesville and blocked the way between Jackson's forces and Thoroughfare Gap. Reno and Kearney were within supporting distance.

In moving to his position Hooker came into contact with Ewell's division near Catlett's Station, and drove it back toward Manassas with great vigor and success. Otherwise the movements of the 27th were executed without the precipitation of battle.

In the evening of the 27th, Pope, supposing Jackson was still at Manassas, and eager to pounce upon him, ordered the different detachments of his army to move immediately upon Manassas. This was a great mistake. It uncovered Thoroughfare Gap, and opened the way of retreat or reinforcement for Jackson, as the case might be. McDowell saw it, and when he started for Manassas on the morning of the 28th, he, on his own responsibility, left Ricketts's division behind to hold the Gap as long as possible.

Jackson kept well informed of all these movements, and so soon as he felt entirely sure that Pope was making the blunder of concentrating all of his troops upon Manassas and leaving Thoroughfare Gap uncovered, he evacuated Manassas and moved his forces to Groveton and Sudley Springs, some seven or eight miles northward from Manassas. In this position Jackson was nearer Thoroughfare Gap than when at Manassas, and the purpose of his manœuvre was to bring Pope's army to the south and south-east of his own, and thus open communication between Lee and himself through Thoroughfare Gap. He, therefore, sent Hill's division farther eastward toward Centreville, calculating to draw the Federals after it.

About noon on the 28th, Pope arrived at Manassas Junction with the divisions of Hooker, Kearney and Reno. Nothing could be seen of Jackson's army, except Hill's rear-guard proceeding toward Centreville. Pope immediately conceived the idea that Jackson's whole army was retreating *via* Centreville to Aldie Gap, a pass in the Bull Run mountains some fifteen miles north of Thoroughfare. He, therefore, ordered McDowell, whose troops had reached a point about midway between Gainesville and Manassas, to turn his columns north-eastward and march toward Centreville, while he himself undertook the pursuit of Hill's forces. His advance overtook Hill's rear-guard just as it was leaving Centreville. To Pope's surprise Hill had taken the road leading from Centreville due westward to Sudley Springs, instead of the road leading north-westward to Aldie. Even then Pope does not seem to have realized the full import of the manœuvre. It was now about sunset, and the grand result of the movements of the 28th was that the whole of Pope's army, except Ricketts's division, was south and east of Jackson's army, and farther away from Thoroughfare Gap than Jackson's army.

Almost at the very moment when these relative positions were being occupied by the two armies, the head of Longstreet's columns appeared in the de-
Jackson re-
inforced. files of Thoroughfare Gap. Ricketts's force kept the advancing Confederates at bay for a little while in his immediate front. He was, however, soon surprised by an attack upon his right flank, which even threatened his rear. A large detachment of Lee's troops had marched through a gorge a few miles north of Thoroughfare, which was either entirely unknown to the Federals or considered by them so difficult a passage as not to require defence. Ricketts saw at once that he must abandon his position and retreat to Manassas.

During the entire night of the 28th Lee's army was pouring through Thoroughfare Gap and hastening on to Gainesville, from which point the connection with Jackson's right at Groveton was to be made.

In executing his new movement, McDowell's left touched Jackson's right about six o'clock in the afternoon of the 28th, on the Warrenton turnpike, near Groveton. A short but sanguinary battle took place here between two of Jackson's divisions and one of McDowell's. The Confederates were repulsed, and General Ewell himself was severely wounded, but as the main body of McDowell's corps had passed on toward Centreville, the division engaged, King's, was left unsupported, and withdrew in the darkness to join the division farther forward.

The battle
at Groveton.

Pope was still, on the morning of the 29th, unaware that Longstreet had passed through Thoroughfare Gap, and was pushing on to Gainesville. He was still calculating to crush Jackson before Longstreet could come up. He now ordered McDowell to move back toward Gainesville with the purpose of attacking and turning Jackson's right; commanded Porter to support McDowell; directed Sigel and Reynolds to advance against Jackson's front near Groveton; and instructed Hooker, Kearney and Reno to march from Centreville *via* Stone Bridge over Bull Run, against Jackson's left. The Federal line of battle, as thus formed, was a curve stretching from Bull Run to near Gainesville, a distance of about ten miles, while Jackson's line was considerably shorter, being almost straight, and it was also protected by the embankment of an unfinished railroad. Sigel quickly struck the Confederate centre, and before nine o'clock in the forenoon began the battle. It was, however, at least an hour later before the wings of the Federal army could get into position; and when Mc-

Dowell approached Gainesville, he found that Longstreet had anticipated him, and was even then establishing the connection with Jackson's right. Sigel now received some support from Reynolds and the divisions composing the Federal right wing, and forced Jackson momentarily backward. But Longstreet now appeared on the other side, and by the beginning of the afternoon the whole of Lee's army confronted the Federals in battle array.

Pope was still ignorant that Longstreet was east of Gainesville, and supposed that McDowell and Porter were turning Jackson's right, while, in fact, they were facing Longstreet. Pope calculated that they would be able to strike Jackson's flank about noon, and when that hour arrived, he ordered Hooker to charge the Confederate front. Hooker's troops succeeded in reaching the railroad embankment behind which the Confederates were posted, but with no amount of exertion were they able to clear it. They were finally forced to retreat with great loss. Kearney's division now made the effort, but with the same disastrous results. The turning of Jackson's right flank by McDowell was the necessary condition for the success of the charge in front, and that had failed, as we have seen, through the appearance of Longstreet on Jackson's right.

When McDowell realized that the movement against Jackson's flank could not be executed, and heard the sounds of the battle at the centre, he left Porter in front of Longstreet, and turned the head of his own columns in the direction of the battle-field. It was now the middle of the afternoon and the aspect of affairs was most serious to the Federals. Pope sent another order to the troops on his left to attack, and, after waiting until he thought the attack could have begun, he commanded Kearney and Reno to charge Jackson's front again. They again

reached the railroad embankment, but the carnage in their ranks caused by the well-directed fire of the Confederate artillery forced them to yield again.

At this moment McDowell's corps reached the scene of action, and would probably have turned the battle against the Confederates except for the fact that Longstreet, quickly perceiving the departure of McDowell from his front, and emboldened by Porter's inactivity, had sent Hood's strong division to Jackson. Porter either did not receive Pope's order, sent to him in the middle of the afternoon to attack, or he paid no attention to it. He claimed that he did not receive it until after night-fall, and we must accept his word. The fact, however, remains the same that Longstreet was left unmolested by Porter and was thus enabled to offset McDowell with Hood at the critical moment of the battle. McDowell threw his troops into the conflict, but they were met and repulsed by the fresh troops upon the other side. Darkness now intervened, and the Federals were compelled to acknowledge to themselves that they had been outmanœuvred and repulsed.

Pope, however, was unwilling to acknowledge defeat. He now knew that the whole of Lee's army was in front of him, and that his own army was fatigued and decimated and in great need of supplies. The battle of Manassas. But he boldly and rashly resolved to renew the battle on the coming day. When light appeared the Confederates did not manifest any desire to reopen the conflict. Pope seems to have conjectured that they were preparing to retreat. He concluded from this conjecture that they would be weakest on their left. He, therefore, massed his own troops on his right, and early in the afternoon ordered Porter to charge the Confederate line at a point between their centre and right. These brave soldiers rushed forward at the word of command, but soon found

themselves under the murderous fire of Longstreet's artillery, which had been most judiciously posted, and was very skilfully handled. They were driven back with great loss and in great confusion.

The Confederates now seized this opportunity to advance their entire line. They also swung their right wing around the Federal left, which had been weakened in carrying out Pope's plan of massing on his own right. The danger which at this juncture threatened the Federal army was that the Confederate right wing would seize some of the heights commanding the stone bridge over Bull Run, and thus block the Federal line of retreat to Centreville. It was now apparent that Longstreet was making his way toward the noted Henry Hill. At this most critical moment, Buchanan's brigade of regulars, belonging to Porter's corps, checked Longstreet's advance. Buchanan was soon joined by the divisions of Reynolds and Ricketts, and together they held the plateau of Henry Hill until the army crossed Bull Run in safety.

On the morning of the 31st the defeated army arrived at Centreville, where it was met by Franklin's corps from Alexandria, and where it found munitions and supplies. It was not, however, to find the much-needed rest here. Lee had resolved to make another effort to cut it off from Washington and force its surrender.

On the morning of the 31st Jackson moved around Centreville on the north to the road leading from Aldie to Fairfax Court House. In the evening of the 31st he reached Chantilly on that road, and was therefore nearer to Fairfax Court House than the Federals at Centreville were. While Jackson was thus getting into the Federal rear again, Longstreet was crossing Bull Run in front of Centreville, and putting his troops in position to attack when Jackson should strike the road from Centreville to Fairfax at Germantown.

The battle at
Chantilly.

In the early morning of September 1st, Pope learned of the presence of Jackson at Chantilly. He immediately drew his army from Centreville back to Germantown, and placed it across the two roads just in front of their intersection at Germantown. The right wing, composed of the divisions of Hooker, Reno and Kearney, commanded the road from Chantilly, while the left wing, composed of the corps of Porter, Sigel and Sumner, commanded the road from Centreville. McDowell and Franklin were in reserve on the right, and Banks's troops were ordered to protect the train of munitions and supplies on its way to Alexandria.

Late in the afternoon, Jackson's troops began the attack on the Federal right. They were at first repulsed, but flushed with the victory of the day before, and strongly reinforced, they finally forced the Federals to retire after losing the gallant Kearney, who seemed on the point of restoring the battle to the Federals when he fell. On the morning of the 2d the Federal army continued its retreat toward Washington.

Dismayed by the results of Pope's blunders and misfortunes, President Lincoln restored McClellan, by a formal order of September 2d, to "the command of all the troops for the defence of the capital," and personally directed him to go forward to meet the retreating army, and take command of it, and place it in such positions as would best enable it to repulse the advance of the Confederates and protect the city. He was welcomed with open arms by his old soldiers, who felt their courage revived by having again a commander in whom they felt confidence. In a very few days McClellan re-established the defences around the city so strongly that the Confederates gave up all idea of making an attack upon it, if indeed they had ever entertained the plan.

The restoration of McClellan.

The losses suffered by the Federal army in this ten days' campaign were very great. Besides the capture and destruction of supplies and material of war, fully fifteen thousand men had been killed, wounded and captured, and the entire army had become more or less demoralized. The Confederates had also suffered. Some ten thousand of their men had been put *hors de combat*, but they were flushed with victory, full of courage, and inspired with confidence in their own power, and in the ability of their leaders.

It was certainly a heavy burden and a vast responsibility which McClellan was now again called upon to assume in taking command of this routed army at the very gates of the capital, reorganizing it in the very face of the victorious Confederates, and defending the capital with it against their further advance. And it certainly was greatly to his honor as a soldier and a man that he not only accepted the demands imposed upon him and made the capital secure, but that he re-established the organization and morale of the army, and turned the tide of victory once more in favor of the Union arms.

CHAPTER XV

BRAGG'S INVASION OF KENTUCKY

The Plans of Bragg—Halleck's Attempt to Occupy Chattanooga—Partisan War in Buell's Rear—Morgan's First Raid—Forrest—Morgan Again—The Disposition of Buell's Forces—Nelson Sent Back into Kentucky, and Kirby Smith's Invasion—The Battle at Richmond, Kentucky—The Confederate Advance after the Battle at Richmond—Bragg's Advance—The Capture of Munfordville—Discouragement at the North.

THE abandonment of the peninsula by the Army of the Potomac, and the victories of Jackson and Lee over Pope naturally encouraged the Confederates in the West to make a strong effort to repair the disasters of the Donelson-Shiloh campaign. Their new commander-in-chief, General Braxton Bragg, had rightly concluded that he must make sure of three points, Vicksburg and Port Hudson on the Mississippi, and Chattanooga on the Tennessee. By holding the first two he would maintain the territorial connection of the parts of the Confederacy east and west of the Mississippi, and by holding the latter he would maintain the direct connection by rail between Richmond and the South-west, prevent the Unionists of East Tennessee from obtaining the protection of the Federal army, and establish a base of operations for the recovery of Middle Tennessee and Southern Kentucky by the Confederate arms.

General Halleck had also discerned the importance of these points, especially of Chattanooga, and had formed the plan of anticipating the Confederates in regard to

its occupation. Mitchell's division of Buell's army, which, as we have seen, was sent by way of Murfreesborough into Northern Alabama, at the time that the main body went to Pittsburg Landing, was during the month of June in possession of the country north of the Tennessee River from Decatur to Bridgeport. His head-quarters were at Huntsville, and he once came very near seizing Chattanooga.

During the first days of June the place was held by a small detachment of Kirby Smith's East Tennessee army. Bragg now sent the divisions of Hardee and Polk from Tupelo in Mississippi to Chattanooga, while Van Dorn occupied Vicksburg and Port Hudson with his troops.

It was the 10th of June when Halleck instructed Buell to begin operations against Chattanooga. Buell's first division set out from Corinth on the next day, but it was the first week in July before his entire force had arrived in the country between Huntsville and Bridgeport. The delay was caused by the direction from Halleck to repair the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as he went, in order to draw his supplies over it from Memphis. Buell soon found, however, that this line was too much exposed to sudden attack by the Confederates to answer for any such purpose, and in the latter part of June he began to repair the roads from Nashville to Decatur and to Chattanooga, for the purpose of establishing railroad communication with Nashville and Louisville. Delayed by this work, Buell found, when he arrived within striking distance of Chattanooga, that Bragg's forces had won the race and were already established in this highly important position.

Bragg now developed and put into execution his plans for forcing the Federals out of Alabama, Middle Ten-

nessee and Kentucky. During July and the larger part of August, while the Confederates were gathering at Chattanooga, and preparing for the main advance, a partisan warfare was inaugurated ^{Partisan war in Buell's rear.} and prosecuted in Buell's rear, which so interrupted his communications and demoralized his whole army as to render Bragg the greatest aid in the campaign upon which he was about to enter.

About the 4th of July the noted cavalry chief, John H. Morgan, with a thousand picked men, left Knoxville in East Tennessee, and rode straight for the ^{Morgan's first raid.} Louisville and Nashville Railroad at a point just beyond Glasgow. He reached this point almost without resistance, and burned the railroad bridge across Salt River. He then turned the head of his column toward Lebanon, and pursued his march through Lebanon, Springfield, Harrodsburg, Lawrenceburg, Versailles and Georgetown to Cynthiana, a place only about fifty miles south of Cincinnati. He easily overcame every obstacle in his course, and spread consternation throughout the whole of Central Kentucky. General J. T. Boyle, the Federal commander at Louisville, seems to have been terror-stricken and almost paralyzed. His frantic despatches to Buell, Halleck and Secretary Stanton, full of exaggerations and crying for aid, manifested utter demoralization and helplessness. At Cincinnati they were not so excited, and Morgan properly concluded that his best course was to make his escape before the Federals should sufficiently recover their senses to entrap him. He captured Cynthiana on the 17th, and on the 18th he turned his face southward again. He took his way through Paris, Winchester, Richmond, Crab Orchard, Somerset and Monticello, and on the 28th was back at Livingston in Tennessee, having entered nearly a score of towns, and captured more than a

thousand prisoners, besides destroying a vast amount of military stores.

A few days after Morgan started from Knoxville, another noted Confederate cavalry officer, N. B. Forrest, set out from Chattanooga with some two thousand men, and, proceeding by way of Altamont and McMinnville, surprised the garrison of about a thousand men, commanded by General T. T. Crittenden, at Murfreesborough, and after a few hours of fighting captured the whole force.

Buell's direct connection with Nashville was thus broken, and his projected advance upon Chattanooga was thus delayed and ultimately frustrated. It was a fortnight before the railroad was sufficiently repaired to allow Buell to think of resuming the forward movement. During this time the Confederates at Chattanooga were daily receiving accessions to their ranks, and were making everything ready for an offensive campaign on their part.

Forrest, who had retreated to McMinnville a few days after the capture of Murfreesborough, was back again on the 21st of July to within five miles of Nashville, destroying railroad bridges. Buell had sent General Nelson with his division from Northern Alabama to Murfreesborough to drive Forrest away from the line of communication with Nashville. The arrival of Nelson's forces in Murfreesborough protected the line from Nashville south. But Morgan now appeared again on the line between Nashville and Louisville. On the 12th of August, he captured the garrison of two hundred men at Gallatin, thirty miles from Nashville, on the railroad to Louisville; destroyed the railroad bridges, and blocked the long tunnel near the place; and on the 21st he met the force sent out to chastise him at Hartsville, and completely annihilated it.



Field of Operations in 1862



tucky and Tennessee.



About the same time the garrison at Clarksville, fifty miles below Nashville on the Cumberland, was captured by a band of Confederate partisans, who afterward raided through Western Kentucky, and even crossed the Ohio into Indiana.

The whole country in the rear of Buell's long line seemed to be again in a state of insurrection. This line extended nominally from Corinth to Cumberland Gap, a distance of three hundred miles, with its lines of communication with the North reaching back two to three hundred miles. Really, however, Buell had no troops west of Tusculum in Alabama, or east of McMinnville in Tennessee, until Cumberland Gap was reached, where General G. W. Morgan was posted with a force of some twelve thousand men.

At McMinnville, which was occupied by General Nelson on August 3d, there were only a few thousand soldiers, until Thomas arrived there with his division, about the 16th. When Thomas relieved Nelson here, the latter was sent back into Kentucky, unaccompanied by his troops, to take command of that whole district and organize a new force in it for the protection of the country generally, and of Buell's lines of communication in particular.

President Lincoln had, on July 1st preceding, called for three hundred thousand new troops; and from among these chiefly Nelson was to construct a new army for the purpose mentioned. Nelson had hardly arrived in Kentucky, however, when he learned that Kirby Smith had succeeded in crossing the Cumberland Mountains from Knoxville, through the defiles west of Cumberland Gap, with about ten thousand men. The right flank of the Federal force at Cumberland Gap was thus

The disposition of Buell's forces.

Nelson sent back into Kentucky, and Kirby Smith's invasion.

turned, to the great surprise of the Federals there and elsewhere. About the 26th of August the Confederates arrived at Barboursville, which place lay directly between Cumberland Gap and the base of supplies of the army there, which was Lexington. Smith left the garrison at Cumberland Gap, however, for future attention, and marched on toward Cincinnati. He found no Federal troops in his way until he approached Richmond, a place thirty miles south of Lexington. Some seven thousand Federal soldiers, mostly raw recruits, were posted here under the command of General M. D. Manson.

General Nelson's head-quarters were, at the moment, in Lexington, and he was subject to the superior command of General H. G. Wright, the commander-in-chief of the newly created Department of the Ohio, whose head-quarters were at Cincinnati. Wright had instructed Nelson not to risk a battle at Richmond unless
The battle at Richmond, Kentucky. sure of success, and had suggested that he retire the troops at Richmond behind the Kentucky River in case of the Confederate advance. At half-past two in the morning of the 30th, Nelson was informed by Manson that the Confederates were on his front, and that he expected an engagement. Nelson immediately sent orders to Manson not to fight, but to retreat westward toward Lancaster, where he expected to mass his entire force consisting of about sixteen thousand men. Nelson himself followed his courier to Manson in order to attend in person to the movement of the troops from Richmond.

When he arrived within a few miles of Richmond he heard the sounds of battle, and pressing on he reached the scene of action about two o'clock in the afternoon. He found that before his order to retreat had reached Manson, the Confederates had delivered their attack

upon the little force at Richmond, and had at first turned the Federal left and then their right, and had driven the routed soldiers back into the town in great disorder. Nelson came up just at this moment and undertook to rally the fleeing troops. His splendid presence and courage checked them momentarily, but they soon gave way again, thoroughly panic-stricken and demoralized, and left their brave General almost alone. Only about a thousand men of the entire Federal force escaped. About two hundred were killed, nearly nine hundred were wounded, and over four thousand were captured. Manson was taken prisoner and Nelson himself was wounded, but escaped capture. The Confederate commander reported his loss at some five hundred killed and wounded.

All the Federal forces now retired to Louisville and Covington, and the Confederates advanced to Lexington, Frankfort, and Cynthiana without op-
position. They did not however venture The Confederate advance after the battle at Richmond. to attack either Louisville or Covington.

Through the energy of General Lew Wallace, principally, Covington was placed in such a state of defence, that when the Confederate General Heth approached it on the 15th of September, he found that he had no prospect of taking the town, but that his own safety required a hasty retreat. He retired to Frankfort, where another detachment of Kirby Smith's army was now awaiting the advance of Bragg.

By the middle of August, General Buell had about given up the hope of capturing Chattanooga. He estimated the Confederate force in and around Bragg's advance. the place at sixty thousand, against which he could not bring more than forty thousand. His chief thought now was to prevent the Confederates from taking the offensive, and crossing the Cumberland

Mountains into Middle Tennessee. He thought that Bragg would cross the mountains to Dechard, and place himself between the two wings of the Federal army, the one at Huntsville and the other at McMinnville, and enable himself thus to fight each separately. General Thomas, in command at McMinnville, thought, on the other hand, that after crossing the first ridge of the mountains, Bragg would go up the Sequatchie Valley, turn the Federal left wing at McMinnville, and thus oblige the Federal troops to abandon North Alabama and Middle Tennessee and fall back into Kentucky without a battle.

Buell also recognized the possibility of such a movement. In view of all the exigencies, he determined finally to advance from Battle Creek up the Sequatchie Valley, prevent the Confederates from crossing Walden Ridge into the Valley, if possible, and if Bragg should, nevertheless, succeed in getting into the Valley, at least be in a position himself to retire across the main range of the mountains to Altamont, where he could form a junction with Thomas coming from McMinnville.

On the 20th of August Buell ordered McCook to proceed up the Valley with his division, and directed Crittenden to follow within supporting distance. McCook started at once, but before reaching the point in the Valley where the road to Altamont branches off, he received information from scouts which led him to conclude that the Confederates would be able to cross Walden Ridge and come down to the Altamont road before he could reach it. He, therefore, fell back to another road lower down the Valley which also led to Altamont, but on reaching it found that he could not pass his artillery over it. He finally went nearly back to Battle Creek, and crossed the main range of the Cumberland by a road leading up from the east bank of

Battle Creek. Buell, who was, at the moment, at Dechard, now ordered McCook to march toward Altamont so as to meet Thomas. Thomas reached Altamont on the 25th, but found no sign of the Confederates. Lack of water compelled him to return to McMinnville. McCook arrived at Altamont on the 29th, but there were still no signs of the Confederates, and he also was obliged to draw back nearer to the depots of supplies.

It was now August 30th and Buell still did not know where Bragg was, or whither he was going. His own stores were running low, and the railroad between Louisville and Nashville, over which they chiefly came, was so far destroyed as to be practically useless. The Confederates were simply waiting for the exhaustion of supplies to force the retreat of Buell's army. They did not cross Walden Ridge into the Sequatchie Valley until the 28th. When they arrived in the Valley they marched up it, as Thomas had predicted, to Pikeville, and then took the road to Sparta around the Federal left wing at McMinnville.

Buell at last saw that Bragg was going around his left to join Kirby Smith in Kentucky, and strike for Louisville and Covington. He at once sent orders to all the divisions of his army to fall back upon Murfreesborough. On the 5th of September the entire Federal army was at and above Murfreesborough. From there Buell drew back to Nashville, and waited to learn that the Confederates had crossed the upper Cumberland. He received this information on the 7th, and the race for Louisville began. The Confederates were headed for Glasgow, a place near the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and about thirty miles beyond Bowling Green from Nashville. The Confederates were only fifty miles away from their objective, while Buell, at Nashville, was ninety-five miles away from it. On the 15th, Buell's

entire army, except the garrison left at Nashville, was in Bowling Green, and at the same moment Bragg's rear-guard was leaving Glasgow. On the next day Bragg captured the Federal post at

The capture
of Munford-
ville.

Munfordville on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. He took four thousand prisoners, and was in possession of a most important point on the railroad between Buell's army and Louisville. It seemed now as if nothing could prevent him from entering Louisville. A large number of raw troops were congregated there, indeed, but Bragg could not have considered them a match for his veteran army flushed with success. Nevertheless he turned away from this rich prize, and on the 20th started his columns toward Bardstown, and left the road to Louisville open for Buell's troops. Bragg's explanation of his strange movement was that his supplies were exhausted and that he must get nearer to Lexington, where Kirby Smith had established new depots. He seemed also to think that a junction with Smith was necessary to a successful attack on Louisville, and that this could not be effected without moving his own forces toward Lexington. He instructed Smith to send supplies from Lexington to Bardstown, and to move the troops from Lexington to Shelbyville for co-operation with him against Louisville. But Smith had, before receiving Bragg's instructions, sent the larger part of his troops eastward in search of the Federal General G. W. Morgan and his division of twelve thousand men, who had been compelled by hunger to abandon Cumberland Gap, and were marching toward the Ohio. This delayed, according to Bragg's statement, the junction of his forces with those of Smith in front of Louisville so long that Buell's army arrived in the city before the assault upon it could be made. On the 29th Buell's entire army was

in Louisville and the place was entirely secure against the approach of the Confederates. Smith's pursuit of Morgan was also fruitless. Morgan eluded him and reached the Ohio safely in the first days of October.

The last days of August and the first days of September constituted thus a period of great discouragement to the Union cause and the Union arms.

General Grant still held the Corinth and Memphis line and was master of West Ten-

Discouragement at the North.

nessee. General Butler maintained a firm grasp upon New Orleans and a large part of Louisiana. The points along the Atlantic Coast which had been occupied were also kept in possession, and Nashville remained an isolated point in Federal hands. But beyond these advantages, the Federals had lost nearly everything which they had gained by their tremendous exertions in the campaign of the winter, spring and summer of 1862.

It was under these deeply depressing circumstances that the people of the North, and Congress and the President at Washington, were constrained to review the situation, and reflect upon the question of organizing the friends of the Union in greater and more compact power, and upon the question of using that power against the most vulnerable point of the Confederacy. Down to that time the conflict had been waged for the maintenance of the Union simply without regard to the cause of disunion. It was now, however, clear to the minds of all far-seeing men, especially to the mind of President Lincoln, that this deep cause must be attacked and eradicated before victory could be won, union vindicated and peace restored. It was during these dark days that the President came to his resolution to make the war against disunion a war against the prime cause of disunion as well.

CHAPTER XVI

EMANCIPATION

The Republican Party's Original Creed in Reference to Slavery—Mr. Lincoln's Attitude in 1861 toward Slavery—The Confiscation Act of August 6, 1861—Mr. Lincoln's Attitude toward this Act—Frémont's Proclamation of August 30, 1861—Mr. Lincoln's Disavowal of Frémont's Proclamation and the Effects—Mr. Lincoln on Slavery in His First Annual Message—Development of Anti-Slavery Purposes in Congress—The President's Recommendation of Compensated Emancipation—Conference between the President and the Members of Congress from the Border "Slaveholding States"—The Consideration of the President's Recommendation, and the Bill for the Abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia by Congress—Mr. Sumner's Resolutions of February 11, 1862—Passage of the President's Resolution and of the Bill Abolishing Slavery in the District of Columbia—Hunter's Emancipation Proclamation—The President's Repudiation of Hunter's Proclamation—The Act Prohibiting Slavery in the Territories Present and Future—Reply of the Members of Congress from the Border "States" to the President's Plan for Compensated Emancipation—The President's Idea of Emancipation by Military Order—The Second Confiscation Act—The Preparation of the Emancipation Proclamation—The Cabinet and the Proclamation—The Delay in Issuing the Proclamation.

It must always be remembered that the Republican party was not originally an Abolition party, but an Anti-slavery-extension party, and became gradually an Abolition party through the experiences and necessities of war—of war waged at the outset for the preservation of the Union against the attempt of the slaveholders to destroy it.

The Republican party's original creed in reference to slavery.

The Chicago platform of 1860, upon which Mr. Lincoln was elected President, guaranteed the exclusive rights of the "States" in regard to their domestic institutions, and impliedly, if not expressly, classed slavery within the States as a domestic institution.

In his inaugural address, Mr. Lincoln declared: "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so. Those who nominated and elected me did so with full knowledge that I had made this and many similar declarations, and had never recanted them." He also declared, in this same address, that he had no objection to the proposition which had just passed both Houses of Congress to so amend the Constitution of the United States as to prohibit Congress from ever interfering with the domestic institutions, slavery expressly included, of the States, and as to make this amendment irrevocable and unchangeable, except by the consent of every "State," since he considered that this prohibition was already by implication in the Constitution.

Mr. Lincoln's
attitude in
1861 toward
slavery.

In his special message of July 4th (1861), he declared that the issue of the conflict forced upon the country by the secessionists was "immediate dissolution or blood." It was simply and solely a war for the maintenance of the Union which he was waging, not a war against slavery where it existed. To make this plain he said: "Lest there be some uneasiness in the minds of candid men as to what is to be the course of the Government toward the Southern States *after* the rebellion shall have been suppressed, the Executive deems it proper to say it will be his purpose then, as ever, to be guided by the Constitution and the laws, and that he probably will have no different understanding of the powers and

duties of the Federal Government relatively to the rights of the States and the people under the Constitution than that expressed in the inaugural address." The status of the country had been changed from peace to war, between the dates of these two utterances, but it is evident that the President had not worked out in his own mind any change of attitude toward the question of slavery under the changed conditions. He did, however, in his cautious way, leave himself an opportunity. He said, it will be observed, that he would *probably* have no other understanding about the powers and duties of the Government over against the rights of the States than that which he had expressed in the inaugural. It is possible, indeed, that he had begun already to feel the necessity for some modification of his original views, but it is far more likely that the qualifying word was used from instinctive caution than any definite reflection.

There is no question that the great mass of the party coincided in opinion with the President upon this all-important subject. After the defeat at Bull Run, both Houses of Congress passed, by an almost unanimous vote, a concurrent resolution, offered by Mr. John J. Crittenden in the House of Representatives, and by Mr. Andrew Johnson in the Senate, which declared: "That the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon the country by the disunionists of the Southern States now in revolt against the constitutional Government, and in arms around the capital; that in this national emergency Congress, banishing all feelings of mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole country; that this war is not waged on their part in any spirit of oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of those

States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired ; that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."

At the very time, however, when Congress voted this resolution, the end of July, the Houses were maturing the Confiscation Act of the 6th of August (1861), which presaged, if it did not distinctly announce, the approaching change of view concerning the relations of the war to slavery. The fourth section of this Act pronounced the forfeiture of property in any slave who should be required or permitted by his master, or his master's lawful agent, to bear arms against the United States, or to do any labor in or upon "any fort, navy-yard, dock, armory, ship, intrenchment," or "any military or naval service whatever, against the Government and lawful authority of the United States."

The Confiscation Act of August 6, 1861.

This section was not in the bill when reported from the Judiciary committee to the Senate, but was placed in it as an amendment, because of the discovery, after the battle of Bull Run, that the Confederates were making use of negro slaves to construct their fortifications, drive their wagons, do their cooking, etc. These slaves were thus being made a munition of war, so to speak, and Congress now affirmed as to such slaves General Butler's doctrine that they were "contraband of war." It is certainly true that Congress did not intend this as an emancipation measure, although the Republicans were accused of entertaining this purpose. Mr. Lincoln himself was not pleased with the measure, although he felt constrained to sign it. He greatly feared that it would alienate the border "slaveholding States" from his administration, a

Mr. Lincoln's attitude toward this act.

result which he was at this time making most strenuous efforts to avoid. He wanted Congress to refrain from meddling with the slavery question, and trust him, as having the more commanding point of view, to fix the attitude of the Government toward the subject.

Entertaining such ideas and moved by such feelings, it must have been highly disturbing to the President's mind that one of his military subordinates, General Frémont, then in command of the Department of the West, should assume, on August 30th (1861), to issue a proclamation declaring the property of all persons in the "State" of Missouri who should take up arms against the United States or take an active part with the enemies of the United States in the field to be confiscated, and their slaves, if they held any, to be emancipated. It will be remembered that, at that time, Frémont's command had suffered severe reverses in South-western Missouri, and that Frémont was an ambitious politician as well as a soldier. Some of Mr. Lincoln's closest friends thought that Frémont had a double purpose in issuing this manifesto, viz., to efface from the public mind the impressions of his military failure, and to make himself the leader of the more pronounced anti-slavery wing of the Republican party. Whether Mr. Lincoln himself shared this view, we do not know. From what he said and wrote about it at the time, it would seem that he was thinking only of the effect of it upon his plans for holding the border slaveholding Commonwealths loyal to the Union. He wrote to General Frémont himself under date of September 2d: "I think there is great danger that the closing paragraph, in relation to the confiscation of property and liberating slaves of traitorous owners, will alarm our Southern Union friends and turn them against us; perhaps ruin our rather fair

Frémont's
proclamation
of August 30,
1861.

prospect for Kentucky. Allow me, therefore, to ask that you will, as of your own motion, modify that paragraph so as to conform to the first and fourth sections of the Act of Congress entitled 'An Act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes,' approved August 6, 1861, and a copy of which I herewith send you." This language does not reveal any suspicion on the part of Mr. Lincoln that Frémont was endeavoring to cover up military failures with political pronouncements, or any jealousy of Frémont as a possible political rival, and had Frémont listened to the kind admonition, and yielded to the courteous request, it is probable that his proclamation would have been attributed to hasty and imprudent zeal; but he refused the President's request, and required the President to disavow and repudiate the proclamation by an order of his own. This the President did with promptness and decision by an order issued September 11th (1861), in which Frémont was commanded to so modify and construe his proclamation "as to conform to, and not to transcend, the provisions on the same subject," in the Confiscation Act of August 6th.

The effect of this episode was not only to make the Abolitionists more hostile toward the President, but to excite some of the President's own party friends to criticise the action of their chief. But Mr. Lincoln saw correctly that the time had not yet come for a pronounced anti-slavery policy on the part of the Government. Moreover he was still under the influence of the assurances given both by himself and Congress that the war was waged solely for the preservation of the Union, and was not a war against slavery. Both political prudence and sense of honor prompted his attitude at this juncture, even though many of his party friends were beginning

Mr. Lincoln's disavowal of Frémont's proclamation and its effects.

to feel that a war for the Union must be at the same time a war against slavery.

In his first annual message, that of December 3d, 1861, the President advocated the recognition of the independence of Hayti and Liberia, referred to

the successful efforts which the Government was making for the suppression of the African slave-trade, and recommended that Congress should make provision for the colonization of slaves made free by the operation of the Confiscation Act of August 6th, preceding, and of such other like measures as might be passed by Congress, or the legislatures of the Commonwealths. He said, however, that he had "thought it proper to keep the integrity of the Union prominent as the primary object of the contest," on the part of the Administration, "leaving all questions which are not of vital military importance to the more deliberate action of the Legislature," *i.e.*, Congress.

Whether the members of Congress were incited by this language to assume a more hostile attitude toward slavery or not would be only a conjecture,

but it is historical fact that some of them began almost immediately to develop an anti-slavery program. During the month of December, bills were introduced for the repeal or modification of the Fugitive Slave Law, and for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

Before, however, much discussion upon these propositions had taken place, the President sent in to Congress

his noted message of March 6, 1862, recommending a measure of compensated emancipation in the "Slave States." The President did not assume the power to be either in the Executive or in Congress to proceed in this matter independently of the "States" concerned. He

Mr. Lincoln on slavery in his first annual message.

Development of anti-slavery purposes in Congress.

The President's recommendation of compensated emancipation.

put his recommendation into the form of a resolution himself, in order to avoid any misconception upon this point. It read as follows: "Resolved: That the United States ought to co-operate with any State which may adopt gradual abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to be used by such State, in its discretion, to compensate for the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such change of system."

Although this language was so general as to apply to all the "slaveholding States," yet from what follows in the message it is evident that the object in the mind of the President was the abolition of slavery in the border "slaveholding States," those which had not passed secession ordinances, and that the main purpose which had occasioned the making of this proposition was the extinguishment of the hope, entertained by the Confederates, that the interest in the perpetuation of slavery would at last bring these border "slaveholding States" into the Confederacy. The President said, "to deprive them of this hope substantially ends the rebellion; and the initiation of emancipation deprives them of it as to all the States initiating it." The President made it thus evident that he was beginning to understand that the permanent loyalty of the border "slaveholding States" would depend upon the abolition of slavery in them, and that the overthrow of the Southern Confederacy would depend upon the same thing. Down to that time he had appeared to think that by sparing slavery in the "border States," he would keep them loyal, but now he manifestly saw deeper, and had been convinced by experience that his first principle, enunciated nearly four years back, was correct and necessary, namely, that the Union in order to be permanent must be either all slave or all free. The re-enlivening of this thought in his mind presaged

the turning of the war against slavery as the root of disunion.

Four days subsequent to the sending in of this message, the President called the members of Congress from the "border slaveholding States" to the Executive Mansion for the purpose of conferring with them in reference to the subject of the message. He told them how deeply embarrassed his Administration was by the necessary contact of the army in the field with slaves in these "States." He said that the slaves would continually come into the camps, and raise the question, at every point and moment, as to what should be done with them, and that whatever way the question was determined, a large number of the loyal people of the Union were offended and irritated. He also repeated the argument, contained in the message, that emancipation in the "border slaveholding States" would strike down the hope of the Confederates of some time attaching those "States" to their Confederacy, and would thus contribute most largely to a speedy termination of the war in favor of the Union. He, furthermore, declared, in answer to a question, that he thought there was no power anywhere, except in the "States" themselves, to carry out his scheme of emancipation.

Without revealing at all their feelings in regard to the proposition, but assuring the President that they would consider respectfully the important suggestions he had made, the gentlemen withdrew from his presence.

The debate in Congress upon the President's proposition proceeded at the same time with the consideration of the bill for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. The President's proposition was evidently somewhat prejudiced by the bill. Mr. Willey, one of the senators from Virginia, declared that the bill was

Conference
between the
President and
the members
of Congress
from the bor-
der "slave-
holding
States."

one of a series of measures, which looked to "the universal abolition of slavery by Congress." He designated as the other measures of the series Mr. Trumbull's bill, of January 15th preceding, to confiscate the property and free the slaves of rebels, and Mr. Sumner's proposed resolution of February 11th "declaratory of the relations between the United States and the territory once occupied by certain States and now usurped by pretended governments, without constitutional or legal right."

The consideration of the President's recommendation, and the bill for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia by Congress.

These resolutions maintained that by passing ordinances of secession, and undertaking their forcible execution, local governmental autonomy, "State" organization, was, in the political system of the United States, extinguished, and the territorial condition under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress was restored. This is certainly sound political science, and if Mr. Sumner had based upon this doctrine the constitutional power of Congress to abolish slavery by an ordinary statute in those parts of the territory of the United States where secession ordinances had been passed and sustained by force, it would have been very difficult indeed to meet successfully his contention. But he went beyond this, and asserted that the termination of the "State" organization within a given part of the territory of the United States "necessarily causes the termination of those peculiar local institutions which, having no origin in the Constitution or in natural rights, are upheld by the sole and exclusive authority of the State." In other words, he asked Congress to declare that slavery had been already abolished in that part of the territory of the Union where secession ordinances had been passed and forcibly sustained, and by virtue of these very acts. Congress was

Mr. Sumner's resolutions of February 11, 1862.

not prepared to accept the first part of his proposition ; and the second part was out of the question.

Despite these and all other obstacles and objections, however, both the President's resolution and the bill

Passage of the President's resolution and of the bill abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia. abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia were passed by both Houses of Congress before the middle of April. The latter act contained provisions for the compensation of loyal owners at the maximum rate

of three hundred dollars for each slave, and for the colonization in Hayti and Liberia of such emancipated slaves as might desire to go to either of these places, at a cost of not more than one hundred dollars for each person. The President signed this act on the 16th of April, but not with entire cordiality. He suggested a few amendments to it, which were immediately adopted by Congress, but he still felt that it might affect unfavorably his policy in regard to the border slaveholding Commonwealths.

Disturbed in mind, as the President evidently was, over the whole subject, it is not at all surprising that he should have manifested some impatience, not

Hunter's emancipation proclamation. to say anger, when, in the middle of May, news reached him that General David Hun-

ter, the commanding General of what was called the Department of the South, the district about Port Royal in South Carolina and Georgia, had issued a proclamation declaring the incompatibility of the martial law of the United States with slavery, and the consequent emancipation of the persons theretofore held as slaves in South Carolina, Georgia and Florida. There was, no doubt, much justification for this act of the General. He had some ten thousand negroes in his Department, who had been deserted by their masters, and who were practically dependent upon the United States Govern-

ment for employment and support. By the act of March 13th preceding, Congress had forbidden the officers of the army and navy, and all other persons in either, to return escaped slaves to their masters. This certainly covered the case of slaves left within the lines of the United States army by disloyal masters fleeing before the approach of the army. General Hunter could not thus send these negroes beyond his lines to their former masters. He could not hold them as the property of the United States, because the laws of the United States did not allow any such property to be held by the United States. They were, as a fact, free men, and the General was only announcing a fact when he proclaimed them to be such.

But the President, despite the solicitations of some of his advisers to let the order of General Hunter stand, revoked and repudiated it. In doing so, however, the President sounded a note of warning to the slaveholders both in the Southern Confederacy and in the border slaveholding Commonwealths. He said, in his proclamation, "I further make it known that whether it be competent for me, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, to declare the slaves of any State or States free, and whether at any time, in any case, it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the Government to exercise such a supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field." He concluded by urging the people of the border slaveholding Commonwealths not to be blind to the signs of the time, but to consider calmly and impartially the resolution of Congress proposing the co-operation of the Government in the emancipation of the slaves in these Commonwealths.

The President's repudiation of Hunter's proclamation.

The Congressional members from these Commonwealths still, however, remained silent in regard to the proposition, despite the fact that the signs referred to by the President continued to multiply.

In the following month (June) the great step was taken by the Government of prohibiting slavery in all the Territories of the United States, and in all territory which might be acquired by the United States in the future. This important act, approved June 19th, was the realization of the prime article of the creed of the Republican party.

On the 12th of July, Mr. Lincoln, in anticipation of the adjournment of Congress, caused the members from the border slaveholding Commonwealths to assemble at the Executive Mansion, and in the most solemn and impressive words and manner urged upon them to consider earnestly the message and resolution in regard to compensated emancipation, and to commend the propositions contained therein to the consideration of their constituents. Four written replies were received by the President to this address. One signed by twenty of the persons addressed, one signed by seven, one signed by Mr. Horace Maynard of Tennessee alone, and one signed by Mr. John B. Henderson of Missouri alone. The last three contained expressions of strong sympathy with the President's plan, and generous promises of cordial co-operation. The first, on the other hand, presented an opinion in regard to the causes of the continuation of the rebellion, and a proposition that Congress should provide the necessary funds, and place them at the disposal of the President, to carry out its resolution concerning compensated emancipation, as a condition precedent to the consideration of the

The Act prohibiting slavery in the Territories present and future.

Reply of the members of Congress from the border "States" to the President's plan for compensated emancipation.

President's project by themselves and their constituents.

This happened on the 14th of July, and from this moment forward it was evident to the President that the plan developed in his March message must be abandoned. In fact the President had already anticipated this result, and, the day before he received this reply, had imparted to two members of his Cabinet, Mr. Seward and Mr. Welles, his thought of a military proclamation of emancipation.

The President's idea of emancipation by military order.

On the 17th of July, the President signed the second Confiscation Act, which provided, among other things, for the emancipation of the slaves of traitors and rebels against the United States and of those of their abettors, and for the employment of such freedmen in the suppression of the rebellion as the President might order and direct.

The second confiscation act.

Four days after this, the President called the Cabinet together to consider some military orders in regard to the employment of freedmen, in the service of the United States, as authorized and provided in the Confiscation Act. The discussion of the subject lasted through the meeting and was resumed the next day. It was at this juncture that the President drew forth and read to the Cabinet the famous first draft of the Emancipation Proclamation. It began with a warning to all persons participating in the rebellion to desist forthwith "on pain of the forfeitures and seizures" provided in the Confiscation Act. It then gave notice of the intention of the President to again recommend to Congress a practical measure for co-operating with the Commonwealths in effecting compensated emancipation, and it closed with the declaration that "as a fit and necessary military measure for effect-

The preparation of the emancipation proclamation.

ing this object" (the restoration of the constitutional relations between the general Government and the Commonwealths) "I, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, do order and declare that on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or States wherein the constitutional authority of the United States shall not then be practically recognized, submitted to, and maintained, shall then, thenceforward, and forever be free."

With the exception of the two members to whom the President had indicated his intention the preceding week, the Cabinet officers were taken by surprise. They thought that Mr. Lincoln had committed himself, in his different acts and expressions, to a policy which practically ignored the existence of slavery in the struggle for the maintenance of the Union, and to the doctrine that when, incidentally, slavery had to be dealt with in principle, the power to deal with it belonged to Congress. They were, doubtless, still laboring under the impressions made upon them by the inaugural message and by the correspondence with Frémont. They had not sufficiently observed that during the three months immediately preceding, the President had been working out in his own mind the principle and the extent of the war powers of the Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the Union. The proposition may, indeed, be hazarded that Mr. Lincoln himself did not appreciate the scope of these powers until taught by the actual necessities of the disastrous campaign of McClellan in front of Richmond.

At first only two members of the Cabinet approved his purpose, Bates and Stanton. The others raised objections. The considerations which they urged against

it had, however, been already anticipated in the mind of the President, and disposed of to his own satisfaction. At last Seward declared that he approved of the plan in principle, but thought that the proclamation would be effective only after a victory in the field. Lincoln, who was so often preserved against unwise action and words by his keen sense of the ridiculous, detected at once the soundness of Seward's advice, and concluded to defer the issue of the proclamation until a military success would give it the proper weight.

He gave out only that part of it which related to the warning of those in rebellion to desist, on pain of the forfeitures and seizures provided in the recent Confiscation Act. This was done on the 25th of July, and the President was doomed to pass through many anxious days before the proper psychological moment was reached for announcing the other part of his great project.

The Cabinet
and the Proclamation.

The delay in
issuing the
proclamation.

The month of August wore away, as we have seen, under conditions of great discouragement. And the first days of September gave no promise that the great deed contemplated by the President was approaching execution. The Confederates were actually crossing the Potomac and pushing the war into loyal territory. The issue of the Emancipation Proclamation, at such a moment, would certainly have been considered, as Mr. Seward said, "the last shriek of retreat."

But the dawn of a better day was approaching, despite the oppressive darkness which enveloped the souls of loyal men. McClellan had been restored to the command of the Army of the Potomac, and was again devoting his great genius for organization to putting it in shape for another trial of strength. Recruits and material were being sent forward from all points to

the front. And before the first half of the month had passed, a vast host of more than one hundred thousand well-armed, well-drilled and well-provisioned men were ready to advance against the invaders of the loyal North.

CHAPTER XVII

ANTIETAM

The Confederate Invasion of Maryland—The Federal Pursuit—Lee's Order for the Campaign—McClellan's Plan—The Battle at Crampton's Pass, and Turner's Gap or South Mountain—The Capture of Harper's Ferry by the Confederates—McClellan's Advance to Antietam—The Battle Delayed by McClellan—McClellan's Plan of Battle—The Battle of Antietam—The Losses—Retreat of the Confederates.

MCCLELLAN immediately upon resuming command made such a strong disposition of the troops in front of Washington that the Confederates abandoned all idea of attack, if they had ever entertained any, and on the third of the month (September) turned the heads of their victorious columns up the Potomac. McClellan at once divined their purpose of crossing by the upper fords of the river, and invading Western Maryland and Pennsylvania. He, therefore, after making the necessary arrangements for the defence of the capital, and placing the command of the garrison in the hands of General Banks, began moving the main body of his army up the north bank of the river toward Frederick. McClellan left Washington himself on the 7th. He knew then that the Confederates had passed up the south side of the river to Leesburg, and that some detachments of them had already crossed over into Maryland. He did not know, however, whether their immediate purpose was to strike at Washington or at

The Confederate invasion of Maryland.

The Federal pursuit.

Baltimore, or to advance into Pennsylvania. He felt, therefore, obliged to move his army in such a way as to cover both Washington and Baltimore, that is, while keeping his left near the river, to throw his right well back to the eastward. He operated under this uncertainty until the 13th, when a copy of General Lee's order for the campaign fell into his hands, and enabled him to make disposition of his forces with some certainty as to the plans of his enemy.

The order was dated from the head-quarters of Lee's army near Frederick, September 9th, and it directed General T. J. Jackson to go to Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac just back of that place, advance on Martinsburg, seize the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at that place, and shut the Union forces at Harper's Ferry off from escape in that direction. It directed General McLaws to go, *via* Middletown, to Maryland Heights, and from this point to attack Harper's Ferry. It directed General Walker to cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, and occupy Loudoun Heights overhanging Harper's Ferry on the south side of the river, simultaneously with the movement of McLaws. It directed General Longstreet, with the main body of the Confederate army, to go to Boonsboro, and halt there. It directed General D. H. Hill to follow Longstreet as the rear-guard. And finally, it directed Jackson, McLaws and Walker, after the capture of Harper's Ferry, to join the main body at Boonsboro or Hagerstown.

McClellan now knew that Lee had divided his army into two very nearly equal parts, and had separated them widely from each other, and had subdivided one of these parts into three parts, and had separated each of these from the others. He saw that he could now throw his whole force of near one hundred thousand

men against Longstreet and Hill, and crush them before the others could join them.

McClellan immediately sent the whole of Burnside's command, and the corps of Sumner, Hooker and Mansfield after the enemy at Boonsboro, and ordered Franklin's corps, supported by Couch's ^{McClellan's plan.} division, to advance through Jefferson and Burkittsville against the rear of McLaws's troops to relieve Harper's Ferry. In execution of these movements, Franklin, who had reached Burkittsville, in front of Crampton's Pass through the Blue Ridge, about noon of the 14th, found himself confronted ^{The battles at Crampton's Pass and Turner's Gap or South Mountain.} by a strong force of Confederates, who disputed his further advance. In a brilliant action of some three hours' length, Franklin carried the position, with a loss of something over five hundred men.

At the same time the main body of the army, led by Burnside and Reno, met the enemy at Turner's Gap in the Blue Ridge, some six or seven miles north of Crampton's. The Confederates fought with great energy to hold the Pass, but in a severe battle, lasting from the middle of the afternoon until about nine o'clock in the evening, the Union forces inflicted such a blow upon them as to cause the Confederates to abandon the Pass during the night. This is called the battle of South Mountain in the reports. In it the Union loss was about sixteen hundred men killed and wounded. The loss of the Confederates was, perhaps, a little less.

It seemed now that McClellan would be able to attain his purpose of liberating the garrison at Harper's Ferry, and then crushing Longstreet and Hill before Jackson, McLaws and Walker ^{The capture of Harper's Ferry by the Confederates.} could join them. Franklin was now within six or seven miles of Harper's Ferry, and the garrison

could easily hear the sound of his cannon. There is little doubt that if the garrison had been commanded by a capable officer, it would have held out until relief came, but Colonel Dixon S. Miles, the officer in command, while brave was not capable. Instead of concentrating his entire command on Maryland Heights, the point on the north side of the Potomac which Franklin was approaching, he allowed this most strategic point to be abandoned in the afternoon of the 13th to the enemy, and thus permitted his own forces to be shut up in Harper's Ferry with the Confederates occupying the eminences all around him. On the morning of the 15th, with succor within a few miles of him, he caused the white flag to be raised, and surrendered his troops and ammunitions to the Confederates. Colonel Miles was mortally wounded by a stray shot before the surrender was executed, and the command devolved upon General Julius White, who had been driven by General Jackson from Martinsburg back upon Harper's Ferry a few days earlier. Nearly thirteen thousand men and a large quantity of arms and ammunition fell into the hands of the Confederates.

McClellan still had the opportunity, however, to crush Longstreet before the troops who had captured

Harper's Ferry could rejoin their comrades at Boonsboro. He ordered his army to advance in the early morning after the battles at Crampton's Pass and South Mountain. Franklin soon came upon the Confederates in considerable force at Brownsville, and the corps of Sumner, Hooker and Mansfield found the main body of them in position on the heights along the west side of Antietam Creek. At the moment, they could not have numbered over thirty thousand men, while Sumner, Hooker and Mansfield had forty thousand or more, and there

McClellan's
advance to Antietam.

were other corps in reserve. It does seem as if they should have attacked at once. But it must be remembered that it takes time to place an army of forty thousand men in position for battle when advancing along two or three roads in columns a few feet in breadth, and many miles in length, and also that part of the troops were wearied by the battles of the 14th, and all of them by long marching.

Moreover, McClellan had given orders that if the Confederates should be found in strong force in position, the pursuing columns should not attack immediately, but should take position and await his own arrival on the scene. The Union commanders, therefore, delayed the attack until McClellan himself arrived. The afternoon was much advanced when he came up, and although he ^{The battle delayed by McClellan.} was aware that Harper's Ferry had been captured in the forenoon, and that, consequently, Jackson and the others were free to move toward Longstreet's position, yet he decided, after examining the ground, not to begin the battle until the next morning.

When the morning of the 16th broke, it was found that the Confederates had changed their position somewhat, requiring a somewhat different disposition of the Union forces. The Confederate line now stretched from the Potomac above Sharpsburg on their left to Antietam Creek below Sharpsburg on their right, and lay along the crest of the hills which hid all their operations in the rear of their front. It was a very strong position, and McClellan employed the whole of the forenoon of the 16th in examining the Confederate position, and in finding places and means for crossing Antietam Creek. He reported that he was also obliged to await the arrival of his ammunition trains.

According to McClellan's own statement, his plan of

battle was to attack the Confederate left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's corps, and by Franklin's, if necessary, and, so soon ^{McClellan's} _{plan of battle.} as the attack began to appear successful, to move Burnside's troops against the extreme right of the Confederate line, lying on the ridge southward from Sharpsburg, carry this position, and then turn Burnside's columns northward along the crest toward the Union right, and finally upon the success of these flank movements, or of either of them, to advance the centre of the Union line with all the disposable forces. It was a good plan, and it ought to have succeeded entirely. It probably would have succeeded much more fully than it did, had it been executed at once.

But it was past the middle of the afternoon before Hooker crossed the Antietam, and, in the skirmish with ^{The battle} _{of Antietam.} the front of the Confederate line commanded by Hood, he did not have the support of either Sumner or Mansfield. Nightfall arrived before they came up, and although partially successful Hooker was unable to break the Confederate line.

During the night Mansfield succeeded in crossing his troops ; but Jackson and Ewell arrived at the same time, bringing large reinforcements to the Confederate left. By delaying the battle until the 17th, McClellan had thus lost his opportunity of fighting the two parts of the Confederate army separately. Still A. P. Hill's division had not yet come up from Harper's Ferry. It was approaching the point of the Confederate line opposite Burnside's command on the Union left. If Burnside could only drive in the Confederate right before Hill could arrive to support it, the victory might still be decisive. This was McClellan's plan. According to his own statement, he sent the order to Burnside to advance across the bridge in front of the Union left at eight o'clock in the

morning of the 17th. At that moment the battle was raging between the Union right and the Confederate left, and the Confederate right had to be weakened in order to aid their left against the onslaught from the corps of Hooker, Mansfield and Sumner. Burnside averred in his report, that, on the morning of the 17th, he received an order from McClellan to make his dispositions for the attack on the bridge, but to await further orders before making it, and that the order to attack came to him about ten o'clock. Burnside's report coincides, however, with McClellan's in saying that this order was not executed until one o'clock in the afternoon, and that it was after three when the Union troops made their movement against the main heights on the left of Sharpsburg. It was at this moment that A. P. Hill's division arrived on the scene to reinforce the Confederate right, and successfully protected the heights against the Union assault. Burnside's advance was checked and his troops driven back toward the bridge. So far as human eye can divine the delay of Burnside in carrying out the movement against the Confederate right, marred, in large degree, the results of a good battle. During the day the Union right had hard work to maintain its ground on the west side of the Antietam, and the centre had to be weakened in order to support it, so that the contemplated movement of the Union centre had to be abandoned. The loss on the Union right had been very large. Mansfield was killed, and Hooker, Sedgwick, Meagher and Richardson were wounded. The larger part of the thirteen thousand Unionists killed and wounded in the battle fell in the severe contest on the Union right. When night fell upon the combatants, it was difficult to say with which side rested the victory. Nearly twenty-five thousand men were stretched upon the field. The Union loss

The losses.

had been a little more severe than that of the Confederates. But the Union forces had advanced their position and held ground taken from the Confederates. Both sides were worn out with the conflict, and with the marches and battles preceding it.

After long deliberation, during the night, McClellan decided not to renew the battle on the morning of the 18th, but to permit his troops twenty-four hours' rest, allow his officers time to reorganize their broken and scattered commands, and give opportunity for reinforcements to come up. The Confederates were also too much exhausted to make any movements. They remained quietly in their positions during the 18th.

Retreat of
the Confeder-
ates. Toward the close of the day McClellan gave his orders to renew the attack on the next morning. During the night, however, the Confederates abandoned their ground and retreated across the Potomac.

Antietam was, thus, a Union victory, but not a very brilliant victory. McClellan estimated his own force engaged at over eighty thousand men, and that of the Confederates at over ninety thousand. Lee, on the other hand, affirmed that the battle was fought on the Confederate side with less than forty thousand men. There is little doubt that the Union force outnumbered the Confederate somewhat, but not to the degree indicated in Lee's report. On the other hand the Union army acted on the offensive against a strong position, well selected by the Confederates, and defended by them with great skill, bravery and obstinacy.

Incomplete as was this victory, however, it was most welcome to the Union cause, which had suffered during the preceding months such general reverse. It restored courage, faith and hope throughout the loyal North.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE PROCLAMATION OF EMANCIPATION AND THE DOWNFALL OF McCLELLAN

The Opportunity Given by the Victory for Issuing the Proclamation—The Text of the Proclamation—Suspension of the Privileges of the Writ of Habeas Corpus—Effect of the Proclamation—The President's Anxiety and Restlessness—The Autumn Elections—The Crossing of the Potomac by the Federals—The Movements of the Confederates, Stuart's Raid—Longstreet at Culpeper Court House—The Downfall of McClellan—The Reason for his Removal from the Command of the Army of the Potomac—The Influence of the Emancipation Proclamation in Producing the Removal.

MORE than all, this quasi-victory furnished Mr. Lincoln with the opportunity for which he had, for several months, been anxiously waiting. According to his own testimony, as we have seen, he had resolved upon the issue of an emancipation proclamation, as a war measure, but not wishing it to appear like a cry of desperation, he had felt constrained to delay it until after a success in the field. He thought this necessary to make the measure appear serious and practicable. Mr. Lincoln affirmed that several days elapsed after the battle before he could learn whether the Union forces had gained a victory or suffered a defeat, and that when he was certain of the former, he "fixed up" his already prepared proclamation, and issued it. It appeared on the 22d of September. It was substantially the paper read to his Cabinet on the 21st of the preceding July.

The opportunity given by the victory for issuing the Proclamation.

The importance of this great document makes it necessary, however, that it should be fully quoted. It read :

The text of
the Proclama-
tion. “I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relation between the United States and each of the States and the people thereof in which States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed.

“That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all slave States, so called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits ; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent with their consent upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the governments existing there, will be continued.

“That on the 1st day of January, A.D. 1863, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free ; and the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.

“That the Executive will, on the 1st day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof, re-

spectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State or the people thereof shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence, that such State and the people thereof are not then in rebellion against the United States." The Proclamation, furthermore, called attention to the Congressional Act of March 13, 1862, forbidding the employment of the army and navy in returning fugitive slaves, and to the Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862, and commanded their enforcement by all persons in the military and naval service of the United States.

The Proclamation, finally, announced the intention of the President to recommend that compensation should be made to all citizens of the United States remaining loyal during the rebellion for all losses sustained by them through acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves, upon the restoration of constitutional relations.

Two days later the President issued his proclamation suspending the privileges of the writ of Habeas Corpus in respect to all persons arrested, or thereafter, during the rebellion, to be imprisoned, by any military authority, or by the sentence of any court-martial or military commission.

Suspension
of the priv-
ileges of the
writ of Ha-
beas Corpus.

While it is not difficult to say what the effect of the Emancipation Proclamation was upon the inhabitants of the sections in rebellion, it is not at all easy to calculate what the immediate effect was upon the people of the loyal sections. It certainly stifened and consolidated the Southerners in their determi-

Effect of the
Proclamation.

nation to win their independence. The non-slaveholding whites, and the loyal men among the small slaveholders, now generally gave up their opposition to the Confederacy, and fell into line with the secessionists. Everywhere in the South the President was considered to have violated his plighted word, and to have left the Unionists in the lurch. Everywhere the purpose of his Proclamation was represented as being, and generally believed to be, a desperate attempt to mend the fortunes, or rather the misfortunes, of the Union arms, by recourse to the incitement of slave insurrection, and its attendant consequences of rapine, rape and murder. And everywhere the former Unionists now hastened to prove their devotion to their firesides by entering the ranks of the Confederate armies. The Confederacy was enabled by it to assemble its entire strength for the mighty effort for deliverance. On the other hand, the Proclamation was received in some parts of the North with astonishment, and dismay, and even with hostility. The Abolitionists approved it, naturally ; a large number of the Republicans were amazed and puzzled ; while the Democrats denounced it as a violation of plighted faith, a usurpation of power, and a destructive policy to the nation. Especially did it grieve the hearts of the loyal men of the "border States," who had been able to keep their "States" true to the Union only by repeating the President's earlier declarations that the war was for the Union entirely and exclusively. The patriotism of these men was sorely tried, and it is greatly to their credit that it came out in most cases chastened and refined.

The President himself was at first troubled by the effect of it. In a private letter to the Vice-President, of September 28th, he wrote : "It is known to some that while I hope something from the proclamation,

my expectations are not as sanguine as are those of some friends. The time for its effect southward has not come: but northward the effect should be instantaneous. It is six days old, and while commendation in newspapers and by distinguished individuals is all that a vain man could wish, the stocks have declined, and troops come forward more slowly than ever. This, looked soberly in the face, is not very satisfactory."

The anxiety of the President was so greatly increased that he became restless, and turned his attention again from the play of politics to the movements in the field. He visited McClellan's head-quarters on October 1st. He felt he must have another victory, and a more decisive one. Despite the tremendous exertions which the Army of the Potomac had made during the preceding four months, he began to ply McClellan with exhortations and orders to advance. On October 6th, he sent a despatch through Halleck to McClellan directing him to cross the Potomac at once, and to give battle to the Confederates or drive them southward. McClellan replied on the next day that his army needed shoes, clothing, tents, horses, etc., before it could advance, and that not an hour would be lost in carrying out the President's instructions, so soon as his troops could be equipped for the movement. He estimated that three days would be the minimum time in which this could be accomplished. He also informed Halleck that he should operate on the line of the Shenandoah, although the President had expressed preference for a line nearer Washington.

Four days later, McClellan telegraphed again to Halleck complaining that the required supplies had not been received, and telling him that the army could not move until they arrived.

On the 13th, President Lincoln wrote a long letter to McClellan, upbraiding him for his "over cautiousness," and appealing to his sense of manliness to go forward. The General still delayed, however, alleging that the shoes, clothing and horses necessary to equip his troops for a successful advance were still wanting.

The autumn elections for members of the lower House of Congress now began to occur. In the five great States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, New York and Pennsylvania, the Democrats were victorious, also in Wisconsin; and in Michigan and New Jersey, the Republican majorities of 1860 were much reduced. The anxieties of the President were driven to the highest point. He felt that immediate success in the field was indispensable. There is no question that, under the existing conditions, McClellan's apparent slowness and excessive caution irritated and distressed him severely. Still he bore with it, though not without using some cutting words in his correspondence with the General.

At last, on the 26th of October, McClellan began crossing the Potomac. As we have seen, he had in the early part of October expressed the intention of crossing at, and above, Harper's Ferry, and of operating upon the line of the Shenandoah River, but now, at the end of the month, he adopted the President's suggestion of crossing below Harper's Ferry, and moving along the east side of the Blue Ridge. He gave as his reasons for this change that the approaching rainy season would swell the upper Potomac, and make the roads in that section heavy, and that the Confederates would, on these accounts, be prevented from recrossing into Maryland while he was operating to the east of the Blue Ridge. He was also influenced by the fact that the President promised him

The crossing of the Potomac by the Federals.

thirty thousand additional soldiers, if he would choose the more eastern line, while he would engage to send him only fifteen thousand if he followed the line of the Shenandoah. By the 2d of November the army was on the south bank of the river and headed for Warrenton. The troops were now in fine condition, well rested and thoroughly equipped. Organization and discipline were restored, and there seemed every prospect of a successful movement. Morell, with some ten or fifteen thousand men, had been left to watch the crossings of the upper Potomac. Still there remained something like one hundred thousand men in the advancing army.

The Confederates had also rested and reorganized their beaten and scattered forces, and were on the watch for developments. They sent their great cavalry leader, General Stuart, with some twelve or fifteen hundred men, entirely around the Union forces in search of information. They undoubtedly intended to recross into Maryland in case McClellan had placed his army on the east side of the Blue Ridge during the first half of October. When, now, in the first days of November, he turned his columns toward Warrenton, they felt that part of their forces must be interposed between him and Richmond. Longstreet's corps, therefore, hastily crossed the Blue Ridge and took position, about November 3d, at Culpeper Court House. One of Jackson's divisions was also removed to the east side of the Blue Ridge. The remainder of the Confederate army was at different points in the Shenandoah Valley. McClellan saw his opportunity for attacking the two parts of the Confederate army separately, and was laying his plans for such a movement, when suddenly and without warning, on the night of the 7th of November, he was ordered

The movements of the Confederates. Stuart's raid.

Longstreet at Culpeper Court House.

The downfall of McClellan.

from Washington to turn the command of the army over to General Burnside, and to report at Trenton, New Jersey.

No sufficient specific reason has ever been given for this act of the President at that juncture. The President said afterward that he had made up his mind to remove McClellan if he failed to prevent the Confederates from crossing the Blue Ridge. To the mind of any man who knows anything about military matters, this must appear almost childish. The great desideratum at that moment was to get at the Confederate forces in open field. Simply keeping them in the mountain fastnesses, and seizing their empty capital, were matters of little moment. The destruction of their army was the thing to aim for. The capital would then fall as a consequence, and without any expenditure of energy to effect it. The only satisfactory explanation of the order of removal must be that it was the final outcome of the long course of misunderstandings, conflicting views, and heated controversy which had obtained between McClellan and the Washington authorities, and of the political jealousies existing between the Republicans and the Democrats in regard to the command of the army.

The hostilities aroused by the Emancipation Proclamation between the Republicans and the Democrats undoubtedly influenced the President, in some degree, in his view of the fitness of Democratic generals to prosecute the war against slavery. What McClellan would have done in the next few days, if he had been left in command, can, of course, never be known. Whether a crushing victory over the Confederates, ending at once the rebellion, before slavery was destroyed, was wanted by all of those who composed the Washington Government may well be

The reason for his removal from the command of the Army of the Potomac.

The influence of the Emancipation Proclamation in producing the removal.

suspected. And it is very nearly certain that there were some who would have preferred defeat to such a victory with McClellan in command. It was a dark, mysterious, uncanny thing, which the historian does not need to touch and prefers not to touch.

CHAPTER XIX

FREDERICKSBURG

Burnside's Plan of Operations—Halleck and Burnside—Burnside's March to Falmouth—The Counter-movements of the Confederates—The Army of the Potomac at Falmouth, and the Confederate Army on the Heights of Fredericksburg—The Delay in Crossing the River—The Confederate Fortifications—Burnside's Plan of Attack—The Laying of the pontoons—The Crossing of the Troops—The Federal Line of Battle—Burnside's Plan of Battle—The Failure of the Plan—The Attempt to Storm Marye's Heights—Defeat of the Federals—Cause of the Defeat—Burnside's Desire to Make Another Effort Opposed—The Removal of Burnside—The Failure of the Expedition against Vicksburg.

BURNSIDE assumed command on the 9th of November; and on the same day he sent a communication to

Burnside's plan of operations. General Halleck outlining his plan of operations, as requested by Halleck a few days

before. This plan involved the abandonment of the line of advance on Richmond through Culpeper and Gordonsville, as favored by the President and General Halleck, and substituted therefor a movement on Fredericksburg, and the establishment of a new base of operations at Aquia Creek. Upon the receipt of this communication Halleck went to Warrenton

Halleck and Burnside. to meet Burnside and discuss the proposed change. Burnside says, in his report, that the result of the discussion was that Halleck declined to take the responsibility of issuing an order for either plan, but said that the whole matter would be left to

the decision of the President, and that if the President approved the Fredericksburg line, the main army should be moved to Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, and should cross the Rappahannock River at that point on pontoon bridges, to be sent from Washington. General Halleck says in his report that, as the result of the discussion, General Burnside agreed to so modify his plan for approaching Fredericksburg as to cross the army over the Rappahannock by fords many miles above the town, instead of by marching down the north side to Falmouth, opposite the town, and crossing by pontoons; that he submitted this modified plan to the President; and that when the President assented to it he, on the 14th, telegraphed the same to General Burnside. Halleck does not recite the words of the despatch. Burnside does, and, according to him, they ran: "The President has just assented to your plan. He thinks it will succeed if you move rapidly; otherwise not." . . .

Upon receipt of the despatch Burnside put his army in motion direct for Falmouth by roads on the north side of the river. The grand division commanded by Sumner was in advance, and the head of it arrived at that place on the 17th.

Burnside's
march to Fal-
mouth.

Sumner with his accustomed energy, proposed to ford the river at once near Falmouth, and seize upon the heights, which run from the opposite point on the south side of the river, along behind Fredericksburg, to a point a mile or more below the town. Burnside, however, interdicted the movement.

Meanwhile the Confederates had discovered the movement toward Fredericksburg, and the Confederate commander ordered, on the 17th, two divisions of infantry, a brigade of cavalry and a bat-
The counter movements
of the Confederates.
tery of artillery, all from Longstreet's corps, to go to Fredericksburg and strengthen the small garri-


son there. At the same time he sent General Stuart with his cavalry across the upper Rappahannock to ascertain more fully the movements of the Union army. Stuart forced a passage at Warrenton Springs, on the 18th, and entered Warrenton just after the last of Burnside's troops had left for Falmouth. He returned to Lee with the information that the whole Union army was marching on Fredericksburg. On the morning of the 19th, consequently, Lee sent the remainder of Longstreet's corps to Fredericksburg, and directed Jackson to move his corps across the Blue Ridge to Orange Court House in order to be able to support Longstreet.

Burnside himself arrived at Falmouth on the 19th, and his entire army was there and in the neighborhood by the 21st. Longstreet had, however, by this time arrived, and had occupied the heights running along behind Fredericksburg, and Jackson was approaching rapidly from Orange Court House. Nothing but prompt and energetic action on the part of the Union army could warrant any reasonable expectation of success. Both Sumner and Hooker were anxious to go ahead, but Burnside sat down to wait for the pontoons from Washington. Sumner was allowed to summon the municipal authorities of Fredericksburg to surrender the place on the 21st, and to threaten bombardment in case of refusal, but the inhabitants simply abandoned their homes, and the Union General omitted his bombardment.

The pontoons did not arrive until the 25th, owing, as Burnside claimed, to the remissness of the Washington authorities, who, on their part, claimed that they had approved, or assented to, no plan which involved the need of pontoons in crossing the Rappahannock. When they arrived, the

The Army of the Potomac at Falmouth, and the Confederate army on the heights of Fredericksburg.

The delay in crossing the river.





entire Confederate army was on the heights back of Fredericksburg, or in easy supporting distance.

For two weeks more now Burnside waited, as he said, perfecting his plans for crossing in the face of a formidable force. By the expiration of this time, the Confederates had so fortified the crest of the hills behind the town as to make their position fairly impregnable.

The Confederate fortifications.

Burnside says, in his report, that his first intention was to attempt the crossing at Skinker's Neck, a point some fourteen miles below Fredericksburg, but that his preparations attracted the attention of the Confederates, and caused them to make formidable arrangements to meet him at that place. He thereupon concluded to surprise his antagonists by undertaking to cross at the town, where he had appeared to make no preparations.

Burnside's plan of attack.

In execution of this design, he caused the material for his bridges to be taken during the night of the 10th of December to the points determined on.

His plan was to throw two bridges across at the upper end of the town, one at the lower

The laying of the pontoons.

end, and two about a mile further down. The work began about three o'clock on the morning of the 11th. The whole of the day was employed in this work. The Confederate forces in the town kept up a musketry fire upon the working parties, until the heavy fog, which had hung over the valley during the entire morning, raised and gave the Union artillery posted along Stafford Heights on the north side of the river opportunity to drive them away. Four regiments of Union infantry, sent across on pontoons, completed this work of protection to those placing the bridges in position.

The troops began to cross over during the night of the 11th, and continued to do so throughout the 12th. The

Confederates did not molest them much, but awaited the attack in their intrenched position on the heights back of the town. On the night of the 12th,

The crossing of the troops.

the army was placed in position as follows. Sumner's grand division of some twenty-seven thousand men held the centre and right of the

The Federal line of battle.

town. Franklin's grand division of some sixty thousand men held the ground in front of the lower bridges and along the old turnpike road to Richmond, which runs here for a little distance parallel with the river, and then turns southward around the lower end of the line of hills back of the town, and runs up the valley of the Massaponax Creek. Hooker's grand division of some twenty-six thousand men remained on the north side of the river, to render support at either point as might be needed. The Union artillery was planted on the heights on the north side, which were higher than those on the south side occupied by the Confederates, with the purpose of silencing the Confederate batteries when the Union infantry should make the assault upon the intrenchments.

Burnside's plan was to have a part of Franklin's force go around the eastern end of the heights occupied by the Confederates, and fall upon their flank and rear at the same time that Sumner should storm the heights in front. In order to accomplish this, however, it was necessary, first of all, that the eastern point of those heights should be taken, to protect the passage of the troops around the same in the valley below.

Between seven and eight o'clock in the morning of the 13th, Franklin received Burnside's order to carry this point. He sent Meade's division to do this

The failure of the plan.

work. Jackson's corps of the Confederates formed this portion of their line. Some of the best troops of the Confederacy were, therefore, in front of Meade.

Supported first by Doubleday's division and then by Gibbon's, the brave Pennsylvanians moved to the attack. It was, however, one o'clock in the afternoon before Meade met with any considerable success. At that moment, or a few minutes after, he carried the point, and seemed able to hold his ground, but the sudden advance of the Confederate divisions of Early and Taliaferro, while Meade was still insufficiently supported, caused the withdrawal of Meade's troops from this very important position. The Union forces were not able to regain this indispensable point, and the plan of turning the right flank of the Confederates thus failed completely.

Feeling sure that Franklin with his large force could and would turn the Confederate right by noon at the latest, Burnside ordered Sumner to proceed to storm the heights directly in front. With the situation obtaining on the Confederate right at the moment, this was a perfectly reckless, desperate and hopeless movement. The brave soldiers led by their brave old General advanced to the attack again and again, only to be repulsed by the murderous fire of the Confederates lying safely behind their intrenchments. At half-past one, Burnside ordered Hooker to support Sumner. Hooker, seeing the perfectly useless nature of the movement, pleaded with Burnside not to waste any more lives at that point, but the Commander seems to have lost his head entirely at the moment, and sternly ordered Hooker to go forward. The result was simply the sacrifice of a few more thousands of brave men. Six times the noble soldiers led by Sumner and Hooker attempted to carry Marye's Heights, but every time they were hurled back by the storm of lead and iron which was poured upon them. When night fell the Union forces had been repulsed at all points. They had lost over twelve thou-

The at-
tempt to
storm Marye's
Heights.

Defeat of the
Federals.

sand men. The Confederates had lost only about five thousand.

The Confederates had repulsed the attack with so much ease, that they did not think, at first, that the battle was ended. They expected its renewal on the next morning. They did not know the severity of the losses which they had inflicted on their antagonists. The Union army was, however, too much crippled and demoralized to undertake battle again, immediately. During the 14th and 15th, it remained, for the most part, quietly in the town and along the river. On the night of the 15th, it recrossed to the north side.

If there is any special criticism to be made on the failure to execute the miserable plan of battle, it would seem to be that Franklin did not do his part.

Cause of the defeat.

Full half of the army was under his command, and yet his grand division lost less than four thousand of the more than twelve thousand men placed *hors de combat*. Moreover, he had the only chance for success in the plan. He ought to have so supported Meade's advance as to have enabled the latter to hold the point which he so bravely won, the point which would have protected the march of the Union troops into the Confederate rear. The fact that the largest division in Franklin's grand division hardly participated at all in the battle, indicates certainly that he had the power to support Meade, and simply failed, for some rather unsatisfactory reason, to use it.

Unwilling to accept the defeat as final, Burnside planned to make another attempt, which was interdicted

by the President, and then another which was prevented by the inclemency of the weather. Nearly all of the leading officers advised against any further movements on that line, and Generals Franklin and W. F. Smith addressed a

Burnside's desire to make another effort opposed.

letter to the President protesting against it, and advising a return to the line of the James River. It was evident that Burnside had lost the confidence of his officers and of the army. He recognized the sad fact himself and besought the President ^{The removal of Burnside.} to accept his resignation. The President seemed at first unwilling to do so, but when, at last, Burnside proposed the dismissal of Generals Hooker, Brooks, Newton and Cochrane, and the relief from duty of Generals Franklin, Smith, Sturgis, Ferrero, and Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Taylor, the President surmised that he had lost his mental balance, and immediately issued an order, dated January 25th (1863) relieving him from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and substituting General Hooker in his place. This order also relieved Generals Sumner and Franklin from duty, the former at his own request.

Thus ended the disastrous Fredericksburg campaign. Thereto came, at the same time, the failure of the expedition undertaken by Grant and Sherman ^{The failure of the expedition against Vicksburg.} against Vicksburg. Grant's depot and stores at Holly Springs having been captured by Van Dorn on the 20th of December, Grant had been forced to turn back to protect his line of communication. And Sherman had been severely repulsed at Chickasaw Bluffs.

The advantages and good effects of the victory at Antietam seemed entirely destroyed and effaced, and the gloom of spiritual as well as physical winter seemed to hang over the discontented and sorrowing North.

CHAPTER XX

THE PRESIDENT'S ORDER EXECUTING THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION

The Execution of the Order of Emancipation—The Morality and Legality of the Order of Emancipation.

IN the midst of such deep and universal discouragement throughout the North, the time arrived for Mr. Lincoln to carry out his threat of emancipation. Defeat at the polls, defeat on the battle-field, and Indian treachery and attack, even so near as Minnesota, where in August a massacre of some eight hundred whites had been perpetrated by the Sioux tribes, were enough to break the courage of any mortal. Nevertheless the President proceeded upon the course he had marked out in the preceding September, when under the inspiration of the victory at Antietam.

On the day appointed in his monitory Proclamation, he issued the final Proclamation. In this immortal instrument, after referring to such parts of his September Proclamation as bore upon the immediate subject, the President struck the death-blow at slavery by the executive edict, which was expressed in the following language: "Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United

States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of 100 days from the day first above mentioned, order and designate as the States and parts of States wherein the people thereof, respectively, are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit: Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Anne, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are for the present left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued.

“And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States and parts of States are, and henceforward shall be, free; and that the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages.

“And I further declare and make known that such persons of suitable condition will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts,

positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service."

Both the morality and the legality of this act have been made subject to serious question, and it is certainly proper, if not necessary, in a constitutional history, to suspend the narrative of military operations for a moment and examine briefly the criticisms which have been made upon it.

The morality and legality of the order of emancipation.

It was claimed, in the first place, that the purpose of the President was slave insurrection, or that, at least, the inevitable result of his act would be slave insurrection, and that the incitement of the slaves to the massacre of their masters and mistresses was not only immoral but positively barbaric. It would be difficult to meet this criticism, provided it were true that such was the President's purpose, or that such would be the inevitable result of his act. It is certainly immoral to attain any end, however desirable and necessary, by immoral means. If the progress and the ends of civilization are providentially ordered, still the means for effecting that progress and realizing those ends are subject to human choice, and it is in the making of such choice that the human will manifests its freedom and proves its quality.

But did the President entertain the immoral purpose attributed to him? He said that he did not, in the words of the Proclamation itself. He enjoined upon those who might attain freedom to abstain from violence and to labor for reasonable wages. So far as his purpose was concerned, if we accept his own assurances in regard to it, it went no further than to deprive the Confederates of the support of slave labor in their rebellion against the Government and the Union. The ethics of war certainly allowed this. While the fact that no slave insurrection, no massacre

of whites by blacks, resulted from it is sufficient proof that such were not, and were not seen to be, the inevitable results of the Proclamation either by the President or by his advisers.

From the point of view of existing law, the President had no authority to fix the permanent status of the negro, who might be freed from slavery as the result of the enforcement of his Proclamation. The military dictatorship of the President is temporary, and the powers exercised by virtue of it are limited by the period of the necessity which calls them into play. The freedom acquired by the slave in consequence of the President's act could continue legally, after the suspension of the war powers, only by means of some constitutional provision or of some legislative act warranted by constitutional provision. The war powers of the President justified his act as a temporary measure, but they did not and do not authorize the President to fix the permanent civil or political status of anybody.

In the second place, the declaration of the President that the persons freed from bondage by his Proclamation would be, when of suitable condition, received into the military and naval service of the United States was denounced as an immorality, the immorality of arraying a barbarous race against a civilized race upon the battlefield, and in the prosecution of war. To this it may be answered that the negro race in the South was not exactly a barbarous race. It was an uneducated race, but it did not exhibit the cruel qualities which are generally considered as attaching to barbarism. It was simply a subject race sunken in ignorance, which the President was calling upon to lend a hand in its own enfranchisement, by becoming regular soldiers of the United States under the command of officers who would lead them and employ them in accordance with the rules of civil-

ized warfare. It is to be regretted that the questions at issue between the Union and the Confederacy could not have been fought out, when appealed to the trial of arms, by the whites only. But it is difficult to demonstrate the immorality of Mr. Lincoln's order upon this subject; while the previous employment of Indians by the Confederates, and the method of warfare actually followed by the Indians so employed, make all criticisms upon the use of negro soldiers by the United States from that quarter appear insincere and trifling.

CHAPTER XXI

THE PERRYVILLE-MURFREESBOROUGH CAMPAIGN

Strength of the Armies of Buell and Bragg—Buell's Advance—Retreat of the Confederates from Bardstown, and their Stand at Perryville—The Battle at Perryville—The Confederate Retreat—The Pursuit—The Losses at Perryville—The Removal of Buell—Rosecrans—The Battle of Iuka—The Battle of Corinth—Rosecrans's Advance toward Murfreesborough—Rosecrans's Plan of Battle—The Plan Discovered by the Confederates and the Federal Attack Anticipated—The Confederate Attack—The Momentary Check of the Confederates by Sheridan—Union Situation on the Night of the 31st of December—The Renewal of the Battle on the 2d of January, 1863—The Operations of the 3d of January—The Confederate Retreat from Murfreesborough—The Terrible Losses—The Results of the Union Victory.

It must have seemed to the sad and discouraged President that a sign of approval from Heaven had been vouchsafed him, when, two days after he issued the final order of emancipation, the news of victory from the West reached him.

We left, in the course of our narration, the Army of the Ohio at Louisville in the latter part of September. It was fatigued by long and rapid marching and considerably discouraged and disorganized. Buell found awaiting him at Louisville a large number of raw levies. These he incorporated at once into his existing regiments, and in five or six days from the time of the arrival of the main body of his troops in the city, he was ready with an army of nearly one hundred thousand men to face the Confeder-

Strength of
the armies of
Buell and
Bragg.

ates. Bragg had, including Kirby Smith's division, only about fifty thousand soldiers, but they were all seasoned veterans. The mass of them were at Frankfort and Bardstown. Kirby Smith was in immediate command at Frankfort, and General Polk at Bardstown. Bragg himself was at Frankfort, engaged in political business, in setting up a rebel "State Government" there with Richard Haines as governor.

On the very day that Bragg inaugurated Haines, October 1st, Buell put his army in motion from Louisville to drive the invaders out of the Commonwealth. The left corps of the army, commanded by A. McD. McCook, bore off a little toward Frankfort, while the centre and right corps, commanded by Generals Gilbert and Crittenden, marched toward Bardstown.

As the Federals approached the latter place, Polk drew his forces back in the direction of Harrodsburg, and it appeared that this place had been selected by Bragg as the point of junction of Smith's army with Polk's. The Federals pressed the retiring Confederates rather hard, and when Polk reached the advantageous position along the Chaplin Fork of Salt River, at Perryville, he halted his troops, by command from Bragg, and drew them up in line of battle along the west bank of the river. Buckner's division was on the right, Anderson's formed the centre, and Donelson's division the left. Polk's entire army was organized in two wings, commanded by Hardee and Cheatham. The divisions of Buckner and Anderson belonged to Hardee's wing, and that of Donelson to Cheatham's.

It was Buell's centre corps which was pressing upon the Confederate rear, and when on the morning of the 8th of October, the Confederates first struck back, they

Retreat of
the Confeder-
ates from
Bardstown,
and their
stand at Per-
ryville.

came upon Colonel Dan McCook's brigade of this corps, which was protecting the meagre water-supply of the troops. This brigade was supported by the divisions of Mitchell and Sheridan of the ^{The battle} at Perryville. same corps, and it was therefore able to hold its ground.

Buell, who was with the centre corps, had sent orders, in the evening of the 7th, to McCook on his left and Crittenden on his right to hasten forward in the support of the centre. McCook's corps came up about eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 8th, and took a strong position on the left of the centre corps. McCook's corps was organized in two divisions, one commanded by General L. H. Rousseau and the other by General J. S. Jackson. McCook's line of battle was composed of the brigades of Lytle and Harris of Rousseau's division on the right, Terrill's brigade of Jackson's division in the centre, with Webster's brigade of the same division in reserve behind the right centre, and Starkweather's brigade of Rousseau's division with two batteries of artillery on the left.

Buell's purpose was to attack the Confederates upon the following day. But Bragg, who arrived on the field about the middle of the forenoon of the 8th, determined to take the offensive at once, before the concentration of all the Federal corps could be consummated. His plan was to attack McCook's corps, the Federal left, and overwhelm it. With this purpose in view the three brigades on the Confederate left led by Cheatham were swung around to the extreme right of Polk's line, and Wharton's cavalry which covered the Confederate right opened the battle with a fierce charge upon McCook's left, and then with the infantry support from Cheatham's men upon the centre of McCook's line. Starkweather's brigade and the artillery supported by it remained firm, but Terrill's brigade, composed largely of raw troops,

gave way in confusion, Terrill and Webster, and also Jackson, their division commander, all being killed.

During the fierce attack on the left and centre of McCook's line, Buckner assaulted the right and drove it back some distance. The Federals seemed now to be in considerable peril, and McCook sent to Buell for help. Buell was with Gilbert's corps, and knew nothing of the battle raging on his left. About four o'clock in the afternoon McCook's aid found him, gave him the news of the struggle and asked for reinforcements. Buell immediately ordered Schoepf's division of veteran troops to go to McCook's assistance, and dispatched an order to Crittenden or Thomas, who was second in command of the whole army and was with Crittenden, to send a division to take Schoepf's place in the centre, and to attack the Confederate left flank with the remainder of his corps. Night came before these orders could be entirely executed. Schoepf reached McCook, but Crittenden's corps did not deliver the attack on the Confederate left flank.

The Federal commanders supposed that the battle would be surely renewed on the next morning, and Buell's orders were for Gilbert and Crittenden to attack the Confederate centre and left, while McCook's troops, greatly fatigued and decimated by the battle of the 8th, should remain quiet in their position, and take advantage of any opportunity which might occur. But during the night of the 8th the Confederates withdrew and retreated safely to Harrodsburg, where they were joined by Kirby Smith's troops.

The Federals waited in Perryville until the 11th for Sill's division of McCook's corps, which had marched farther to the left than the other divisions in order to watch Kirby Smith at Frankfort. Sill struck a part of Smith's troops going to Harrodsburg at Lawrenceburg and a sharp skirmish ensued.

On the 11th Buell began the pursuit. The Confederates retired slowly and in good order toward Cumberland Gap, stripping the country of everything as they went. The Federals followed them as far as London. Here they halted. Buell saw that his enemy was escaping through the defiles of the mountains and could not be caught. He, therefore, resolved to send his troops westward toward Bowling Green and Nashville, while the Confederates poured through Cumberland Gap, and down the East Tennessee valleys, and then up the railroad to Murfreesborough before the Federals could get south of Nashville.

The battle of Perryville was a bloody conflict. The Federals had about eight hundred and fifty men killed, twenty-eight hundred wounded, and five hundred captured. The Confederate loss ^{The losses at Perryville.} was about half as many. From the point of view of Federal strategy, it was one of the worst fought battles of the war. It was entirely beyond comprehension that Buell allowed McCook's corps to be almost overwhelmed by Polk's entire force, when he had two large corps of soldiers, one of them hardly a mile distant from McCook's right, at the time the battle was in progress. He had the very best of opportunities to throw his right, under the lead of such a commander as Thomas, around the Confederate left and cut off the line of retreat of Polk's entire army. The pursuit also was managed in a very slovenly way. Opportunities for bringing the Confederates to battle were thrown away, and they were allowed to escape with all their plunder, which furnished them subsistence for the following winter. ^{The removal of Buell.} The dissatisfaction with Buell's management was so great in the army, and among the people of the North, and at Washington, that the President felt compelled to remove him and to institute a

commission of inquiry upon the campaign, which finally reported very unfavorably to Buell. He was removed on the 30th of October, while at Bowling Green, and General W. S. Rosecrans was appointed in his stead Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Ohio.

General Rosecrans had won his way to this high distinction by his successful work in Northern Mississippi during the two months just preceding his appointment. After Buell's army had gone from Corinth to make the attempt on Chattanooga, General Sterling Price, with great audacity, occupied Iuka, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, about twenty-five miles south-east from Corinth.

The battle of Iuka. Rosecrans, who had been left at Corinth in command of the troops in Northern Mississippi, undertook, in conjunction with General Grant, who then commanded the troops in West Tennessee, an expedition against Price at Iuka about the middle of September. The attack was delivered on the 19th, and, Grant's soldiers failing to come up, by Rosecrans's men alone. After a stubborn battle, the Confederates abandoned the place under cover of the night and retreated to Ripley, where Van Dorn joined Price with reinforcements sufficient to make the combined army number thirty thousand men, and took command of the entire force.

Van Dorn now laid his plan for driving Rosecrans out of Corinth. On the morning of the 3d of October his troops collided with some of Rosecrans's detachments which had been thrown out to the west of the fortifications for the purpose of discovering whether an attack on Corinth was designed, or whether the Confederates were pushing on to attack Ord's troops at Bolivar in Tennessee, or Grant's at Jackson still farther north. The Federal commander soon made up his

mind that Corinth was Van Dorn's objective point, and he drew his forces back into the intrenchments and prepared to receive the assault. It came without delay, and during the afternoon of the 3d and the forenoon of the 4th, the battle raged with great fury. The Confederates charged the works with such determination that they actually captured one of the strongest forts, Fort Richardson, and Rosecrans's own head-quarters, but the Federals brought up their reserves and retook them. At last the Confederates gave up the desperate attack and fell back with exhausted and decimated ranks. They had lost nearly five thousand men of their thirty thousand in their grand effort. The Federals lost only about half as many. Rosecrans had only twenty thousand men, and although he had fought behind strong fortifications and had only repulsed his enemy, still the battle of Corinth was regarded as the chief Federal victory of the autumn of 1862 after Antietam. It established the claim of Rosecrans to the great advance in rank which he received by being made Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Ohio.

On reaching Nashville, Rosecrans came finally to the conclusion that, despite the inclement season, he would move at once against Bragg. He had learned that a large part of the cavalry belonging to Bragg's army had been sent into Kentucky, under Morgan, to cut communication between Louisville and Nashville, and that another division of it, under Forrest, had been sent into West Tennessee to destroy the railroad which supplied General Grant's army in West Tennessee and Northern Mississippi, the Mobile and Ohio Road. Bragg had supposed that the Union forces had gone into winter quarters at Nashville, and that he could with impunity weaken his cavalry arm. But Rosecrans was not thinking of rest until after he had dealt a decisive blow,

and had freed Middle Tennessee from the Confederates. The Confederates themselves had gone into winter quarters at Murfreesborough, and had planned and were enjoying a season of gay festivity. The President of the Confederacy in company with General J. E. Johnston made them a visit, and exhorted and encouraged them to hold their ground in Middle Tennessee.

On the 26th of December, Rosecrans began operations. At the moment a large part of one of the three Confederate corps, that of Hardee, was located about twenty miles west of Murfreesborough on a turnpike leading from Nashville to Shelbyville, *via* Nolensville. The other two corps, commanded by Polk and Kirby Smith, were at Murfreesborough and at Readyville. Rosecrans was thus compelled to advance with a broad front. He sent McCook with three divisions direct against Hardee, at the same time that he ordered Thomas to move, with his two divisions, down the turnpike to Franklin on the right of McCook and threaten Hardee's left flank. Crittenden, with three divisions, was directed to advance on the turnpike leading from Nashville to Murfreesborough, and stop at the village of Lavergne. These movements were all accomplished under sharp skirmishing during most of the day.

Rosecrans's plan was to have McCook develop the intentions of the Confederates by pressing Hardee, and to keep Thomas in a position to support either McCook or Crittenden, as circumstances might require. On the 27th and 28th, McCook's movements forced Hardee to seek a junction with the other Confederate corps at Murfreesborough. Thomas was, therefore, directed to move by cross-roads to the support of Crittenden. By the night of the 29th the Confederates were all consolidated in and around Mur-

freesborough, and the Union forces were in position some three or four miles to the north and north-west of the place. McCook's divisions formed the Union right, Thomas's the centre, and Crittenden's the left. The plan of battle was to have Thomas and McCook engage the Confederate centre and left, while Crittenden should cross Stone's River which separated the Confederate right, consisting of the division commanded by Breckenridge, from the centre and left, and crush this single division by hurling his two divisions, commanded by Van Cleve and Wood, upon it. From this position his artillery would take the Confederate fortifications in reverse, and make them untenable, and Thomas would be thereby enabled to drive the Confederate centre westward and crush it, and Crittenden would have the way open before him into Murfreesborough, from which place by moving westward along the turnpike to Franklin he would gain the Confederate rear, cut off their retreat, and crush their whole army between his troops and those of McCook and Thomas.

It was a most skilful plan. Theoretically nothing was wanting. But the most skilful plan must be carefully concealed and ably executed. The trouble with the battle was that the Confederates divined the plan and foiled it by their sudden and furious attack, in the dim light of the early morning of the 31st, on McCook's right. The success of the plan of battle depended, as Rosecrans told McCook, on McCook's being able to hold his ground for three hours. It proved that McCook's line fronted too much eastward with his extreme right not sufficiently refused, as the military men say, to protect his right flank.

At about half-past six in the morning, while the Union troops were calmly drinking coffee, the Confeder-

The plan discovered by the Confederates and the Federal attack anticipated.

ates rushed in heavy force upon the extreme right of McCook's line, crumbled two brigades of Johnson's division in pieces, and quickly dislodged the right brigade of Davis's division and then the centre brigade of the division.

The Confederate attack.

The Confederates next struck Sheridan's division, and were momentarily halted by the energy and ability of this splendid officer and his brave men.

The momentary check of the Confederates by Sheridan.

It soon became evident, however, that McCook must be reinforced, or the entire right wing of the army would be crushed. In-

stead of being able to hold his ground for three hours, McCook had, within one hour, demanded succor. Rosecrans soon saw that the plan of the battle was spoiled, and that he must now work hard and quickly to save the army. He immediately countermanded the order to Crittenden to cross the river, and sent Rousseau's division of Thomas's corps, and Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps to the support of Sheridan, who had repulsed the Confederates three or four times, but in so doing had swung his right from a south-easterly to a north-westerly face. This prompt redistribution of

the Union troops checked the Confederates and enabled Rosecrans to form a new line of battle, against which the Confederates stormed in vain. When night fell the Union army held its original ground on the left, but on the centre and right it had been forced backward a considerable distance. The new line was, however, a better one for defensive action than the original one, and during the night the left wing of the army was also drawn back to it.

Union situation on the night of the 31st of December.

The following day, January 1st (1863), passed without any serious movement from either side. On the 2d, the battle was renewed. In the forenoon, the Con-

federates began a fire from heavy artillery on the centre and right of the Union line, but the Union artillery replied with so much energy and such good aim as to put a speedy end to the attack. About the middle of the afternoon, the Confederate right advanced to attack the Union left, which had now again occupied ground on the east side of the river. The Confederates were at first successful and drove Van Cleve's division back across the river again in confusion. But Rosecrans, who happened to be present at this point, at the critical moment, sent the larger part of Negley's division and some other forces to Van Cleve's support. These reinforcements, assisted by the heavy fire from Crittenden's artillery posted on an eminence on the west side of the river, compelled the Confederates to retire again with great loss. The night now came on, and the weary troops sank to rest on the battle-field.

The renewal
of the battle
on the 2d of
January, 1863.

The next day it rained dismally, and little was done, except to clear the woods occupied by the Confederates in front of Thomas's corps. The Union left wing had at this moment, however, advanced so near to Murfreesborough that the artillery could shell the town. The Confederate commander was now convinced that the battle was lost, and that he must save his army. He did not await the coming of the dawn of the next day, but began his retreat in the middle of the night, and by the time that the Union commanders learned of his movement, in the forenoon of the 4th, his rearguard of infantry was several miles to the south of Murfreesborough, and only a cavalry force remained in the town. This withdrew in the early morning of the next day, and the weary but victorious Union army quietly took possession.

The operations
of the
3d of Janu-
ary.

The Confed-
erate retreat
from Mur-
freesborough.

Nearly fifty thousand men had taken part in this conflict on the Union side, and nearly forty thousand Confederates. The Union loss was about thirteen thousand, and the Confederate about ten thousand. It was one of the most sanguinary and obstinately fought battles of the war.

Considered as a trial of strength alone, it was not very decisive, but its results were most important to the Union cause. It gave Middle Tennessee back to the Union. This was much. But its influence in raising the hopes and the courage of the North was vastly more important. At the same time the news was received that Colonel Harlan had driven Morgan away from the line of railroad connecting Rosecrans's army with its base at Louisville, and that General Sullivan had driven Forrest out of West Tennessee. The campaign of 1862 may be said to have ended with these victories instead of with the defeat at Fredericksburg, and the anxious President could now feel that his Proclamation was more than ink and parchment. He could even feel that he had a sign from above that his great act was approved by Almighty justice and power.

CHAPTER XXII

CONFEDERATE ATTEMPTS TO REGAIN THE COASTS OF VIRGINIA AND NORTH CAROLINA

The Confederate Attempt to Retake Suffolk—Longstreet Sent by the Richmond Government to Carry Out the Plan—The Confederate Strategy—The Discovery of the Confederate Plan by the Federals—Longstreet and Hill in Front of Suffolk.

THE Confederate victory at Fredericksburg and the Union victory at Murfreesborough seemed to balance each other, in a way, and to make both parties content to give themselves a little time for rest and recuperation. While the main armies both of the East and the West were thus living in a state of suspended activity, the Confederates on the lower course of the James and the Union forces on the Mississippi were planning advances upon their respective adversaries in these quarters.

When McClellan abandoned the Peninsular campaign, he left General Keyes with his corps to hold possession of Yorktown, Williamsburg, Norfolk and Suffolk. Of these points, Suffolk was, in some respects, the most important, since from this quarter the railroads running south from Richmond might be most easily reached. The Federal forces, under General Peck, at Suffolk, occupied themselves during the latter part of the year 1862 in fortifying the place; and, in January of 1863, the Confederates commanded by General Prior appeared upon the

The Confederate attempt to retake Suffolk.

Blackwater, a stream some twenty miles west of Suffolk, and began to throw up intrenchments along the course of the river. The last of January, Prior advanced a part of his troops in the direction of Suffolk. He met the Federal forces at about the half-way point between his base on the Blackwater and Suffolk. A sharp encounter followed in which the Federals were worsted. The Confederates, however, decided to retire to the line of the Blackwater.

The Confederate Government at Richmond now formed a plan for rescuing the coasts of Virginia and North

Longstreet
sent by the
Richmond
government
to carry out
the plan.

Carolina from Federal occupation. Longstreet with three divisions of his corps was withdrawn from Lee at Fredericksburg, and sent to Petersburg, from which place he might operate to best advantage for the realization of the plan; and General D. H. Hill was sent into North Carolina to organize the North Carolina militia. Longstreet was to operate against Norfolk and Suffolk, and Hill against the Federal forces at the mouths of the North Carolina rivers.

The plan of campaign of the Confederates was to threaten the North Carolina coasts first, and thereby

The Con-
federate strat-
egy.

cause reinforcements to be drawn from Norfolk and Suffolk to the Federal garrisons on these coasts, and then make a dash for Suffolk. Fortunately for the Confederates, the Federal commander on the coasts of North Carolina, General Foster, was ordered at this juncture to send some ten thousand of his best troops to General Hunter at Port Royal, to aid in one of those abortive expeditions planned at Washington for the capture of Charleston. The Confederates were quick to take advantage of Foster's weakness. On the 14th of March, the Confederates, under Pettigrew, attacked a Federal fort on the Neuse

just across from Newbern. They were beaten off, however, by the gun-boats.

On the 30th, General Hill himself laid siege to the town of Washington on the Tar River. General Foster reinforced the Federal garrison, and it was able to hold out against the attack. Foster felt obliged, however, to apply to Keyes for aid. This was just what the Confederates were working to effect. A brigade of Peck's division at Suffolk was made ready to go to Foster, but, most happily for the Federals, Peck learned on the very day set for the brigade to depart, that Longstreet was preparing to attack him at Suffolk with a large force, and that the Confederate movements in North Carolina were feints to draw troops from Suffolk. Peck took the responsibility of keeping his men at Suffolk, and began vigorous preparations to meet Longstreet. The latter arrived in front of Suffolk about the 12th of April with nearly twenty-five thousand men. Thanks to a few small vessels and his fortifications, Peck was able to ward off immediate danger, and to convince Longstreet that he could not take the place except by a regular siege. Longstreet sat down for more than two weeks to wait for his siege guns, which did not arrive until the 30th. Hill now came up from North Carolina with about ten thousand new troops, and just as everything was ready to proceed to active work, Hooker's movements in front of Fredericksburg caused the Confederate President to recall Longstreet's forces to Richmond, and Suffolk was relieved from the impending danger.

The discovery of the Confederate plan by the Federals.

Longstreet and Hill in front of Suffolk.

On the Federal side, the attack on Charleston proved a signal failure. Du Pont with nine ironclads undertook, on the 7th of April, to force his way into the harbor, but was repulsed with the loss of one of his boats.

CHAPTER XXIII

CHANCELLORSVILLE

Hooker's Reorganization of the Army of the Potomac—The Disposition of the Confederate Forces—Cavalry Fight near Kelly's Ford—Hooker's Plan of Campaign—The Real Movements of the Federals—The Defect in Hooker's Plan—The Discovery of the Federal Plan of Attack by Lee—The Relative Strength of the Armies Around Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg—Hooker's Indecision—The Confederate Plan to Attack Hooker's Right Wing in Flank and Rear—Jackson's Attack on the Federal Right Rear in the Wilderness—Rout of the Federals at Dowdall's—The Battle of Chancellorsville—Death of Jackson—Federal Preparations for the Renewal of the Battle—The Confederate Attack on the 3d—Hooker Injured—Sedgwick's Attack upon Early—The Battle at Salem Church—The New and Advantageous Position of the Federals—Critical Position of Sedgwick's Troops—The Retreat of the Federals—Results and Losses of the Expedition—Fruitless Operations of Stoneman's Cavalry.

HOOKER, the new commander of the Army of the Potomac, had spent the months of February and March in reorganizing the army in front of Fredericksburg, and in restoring its numbers and discipline to the condition existing before Burnside's disaster. He abolished Burnside's grand division system, and went back to the corps organization of McClellan. He divided the army into seven corps, under the respective commands of Reynolds, Couch, Sickles, Meade, Sedgwick, Howard and Slocum. Each of these corps numbered from fifteen to twenty thousand men. The cavalry was organized in one grand division

Hooker's reorganization of the Army of the Potomac.

under the command of Stoneman. Hooker's army thus reached the enormous figure of about one hundred and twenty-five thousand men, well armed and equipped, and supported by a powerful artillery of some three hundred cannon. It was not to be expected that such a force would remain inactive when the mild weather appeared ; it was not to be tolerated that it should.

Upon the opposite bank of the Rappahannock, within plain sight, lay Lee's army, numbering about half as many men as the Army of the Potomac, Longstreet with three of his divisions being, The disposition of the Confederate forces. as we have seen, absent on the Suffolk campaign. The two divisions of his corps remaining at Fredericksburg formed Lee's left wing, while Jackson's large corps formed the right wing, and guarded the river below Fredericksburg against any movement of the Federals in that quarter. The Confederate cavalry divisions under Stuart, Fitzhugh Lee, and Mosby were carrying on petty warfare about and within the Federal lines.

On the 17th of March a sharp little battle took place between them and three brigades of Federal cavalry commanded by Averill, at a point about a mile south of Kelly's Ford, on the upper Cavalry fight near Kelly's Ford. Rappahannock. The Confederates were rather worsted, but the Federal commander decided that it was wise for him to retire to the north side of the river.

It seems that Hooker's plan at that moment was, so far as it had been developed, to send Stoneman with his entire division around the Confederate left wing for the purpose of destroying Lee's communications and line of retreat, and to cross the river with his grand army below Fredericksburg and turn the Confederate right. Hooker's plan of campaign.

About the middle of April, Stoneman took possession

of the crossings of the upper Rappahannock and prepared to enter upon his part of the movement. Hooker, however, became convinced that the more promising plan was to divide his army, leaving one part of it before Fredericksburg to detain Lee, and make a rapid march with the other up and across the Rappahannock and down the other side through a country known as the Wilderness, and thus take Lee in his left flank and rear.

He made a feint upon Port Royal below Fredericksburg in order to confuse Lee as to his real intention, and, on the 28th of April, he sent the corps

The real movements of the Federals.

of Howard, Slocum and Meade up the river to Kelly's Ford, where they crossed to the south side. They were now above the point where the Rapidan empties into the Rappahannock. They must, therefore, cross the Rapidan before they could reach their objective point, which was Chancellorsville, a place situated a little south of west from Fredericksburg, and about twelve miles distant therefrom. It was also about six miles south of the Rappahannock. On the morning of the 30th the three corps had crossed the Rapidan and by the evening of that day they had advanced nearly to Chancellorsville. Hooker had placed these three corps under the superior command of Slocum, as the senior officer, and had ordered him, in case Lee did not come out to meet him at Chancellorsville, to proceed toward Fredericksburg, on a line of march parallel with the Rappahannock, until he should come upon the high ground opposite Banks's Ford, some three or four miles above Fredericksburg, and thus force Lee's extreme left wing to draw back upon Fredericksburg. This would give the Federals possession of the fords of the Rappahannock between the confluence of the Rapidan with the Rappahannock and Fredericksburg, viz.: United States Ford and Banks's Ford, and would thus enable them to connect the

two parts of their army separated by the Rappahannock. With this in view, Hooker ordered Couch to move with two divisions of his corps to a point on the north side of the river directly in front of these two fords, and wait there for the appearance of Slocum on the south side.

The three corps commanded by Reynolds, Sickles and Sedgwick, and the one division of Couch's corps left opposite Fredericksburg, were placed under the superior direction of Sedgwick, as Hooker himself designed to be with the other part of the army, and Sedgwick was instructed to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg when informed that Slocum had crossed the Rapidan, and endeavor to seize the roads leading from Fredericksburg to Richmond. In case Lee should weaken himself by sending troops to meet Slocum, Sedgwick was expected to attack the Confederate works. In case he should retreat toward Richmond, a vigorous pursuit must be made.

It was a good plan, and in the first stages of its execution the Federal officers and troops acted with energy and enthusiasm. One great mistake had been made, however. Having sent all of ^{The defect in Hooker's plan.} his cavalry toward Gordonsville, Hooker failed to cover properly the movements of Slocum's columns on the south side of the river. In consequence of this error, the ever-present Stuart had on the 29th discovered these movements, and during the night of the 29th succeeded in reporting them to Lee.

At the same time Sedgwick sent two divisions across the Rappahannock to make the proper diversion, but his inactivity revealed his true purpose to Lee, and convinced Lee entirely that the ^{The discovery of the Federal plan of attack by Lee.} attack was coming from the other side. He sent General Anderson at once, with one brigade toward Chancellorsville and authorized him to draw the two

brigades which were guarding United States Ford to him. Anderson succeeded in getting to Chancellorsville with these troops in advance of the Federals, but was obliged to yield the place on the morning of the 30th to the superior numbers of the Federals. Hooker now ordered both Couch and Sickles to cross the river at the fords left open by the withdrawal of the Confederates to go to Anderson, and went himself to Chancellorsville to assume the immediate command.

On the 1st day of May, Hooker had an army, at and around Chancellorsville, which exceeded in numbers Lee's entire force, and in addition to these sixty or seventy thousand men he had two more full army corps on the other side of Lee's position. It seemed as if nothing could now save Lee from a most disastrous defeat.

The relative strength of the armies around Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg.

At this critical moment, Hooker's judgment began to waver. Instead of marching entirely out of the Wilderness into the open country between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, where he could deploy his great infantry force and use his superior artillery to advantage, he now began to cling to the skirts of the almost impenetrable forest through which his troops had made a successful march, as if he thought he needed its protection.

Hooker's indecision.

On the preceding night, Jackson had begun moving from his position on the Confederate right wing toward Chancellorsville. He took with him about twenty-five thousand fine troops. He arrived in the morning of the 1st of May within a few miles of the Federal forces around Chancellorsville and made a junction with Anderson and McLaws. Jackson now had at least thirty-five thousand troops. About noon the heads of the two columns moving in opposite directions on the turnpike between Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg met on the hill just east

of Chancellorsville. Sykes's division of Meade's corps formed the Federal advance, and Mahone's brigade of Anderson's division the Confederate. The Federal forces rapidly occupied good positions clear of the forest, and appeared to be quite advantageously placed to receive the attack.

At this moment, to the surprise and consternation almost of his corps and division commanders, Hooker ordered his troops to draw back to the edges of the forest. At the same time he sent instructions to Reynolds to bring his corps to the south side of the river, and to Sedgwick to threaten Early at Fredericksburg. Lee was now with Jackson before Chancellorsville, and the Confederate force left at Fredericksburg was not strong enough to hold the Confederate positions against a determined attack by Sedgwick. The situation before Chancellorsville was now simply an investment of the large Federal army in the Wilderness by the whole Confederate army, except the ten or twelve thousand troops with Early. As we have seen, the Federals greatly outnumbered the Confederates, but in the tangles of the forest, their superiority in this respect was to prove of little value. At first, the Confederate commander was at a loss how to begin active operations against an adversary so situated.

In the evening of this day (May 1st), while Lee and Jackson were in close consultation, Stuart appeared at their quarters with the information that the Federal right was badly exposed at a place called Dowdall's Tavern in the Wilderness. Jackson, as usual, took in at a glance the importance of this communication. He quickly proposed to his superior to allow him to march around the Federal right and attack it in reverse. Lee also saw, in a twinkling, the advantage of such a movement. It

The Confederate plan to attack Hooker's right wing in flank and rear.

meant indeed the division of his army into three parts, widely separated from each other, and the exposure to the danger of having each part overpowered in detail, but he felt that he could rely upon the immobility of the Federals to preserve him. He allowed Jackson to take almost his entire corps, nearly thirty thousand strong, thus leaving only about half that number with which to hold Hooker in check at Chancellorsville.

In the early morning of the 2d, Jackson started upon his march through the southern part of the Wilderness. The Federals discovered the movement by the middle of the forenoon, but thought that the Confederates were retreating toward Gordonsville, and did not take the slightest precautions for the security of their extreme right. Sickles's corps started in pursuit of Jackson, but Jackson's veteran rearguard not only protected his march, but concealed the purpose and destination of it. About the middle of the afternoon, Jackson caught sight of the Federal encampment at Dowdall's. It was Howard's corps which occupied the position. The line was fronting nearly southward at the moment, and Jackson thought best to move a little farther around to the westward in order to take it in the flank and rear. Between five and six o'clock, while Howard's soldiers were engaged in preparing their evening meal, the attack began. The Federals were taken completely by surprise.

In a few minutes Devens's division was crushed, and the Confederates were rushing toward Chancellorsville.

In a few minutes more Schurz's division was routed. The last of Howard's divisions, Steinwehr's troops, endeavored to make a stand, but in vain. In less than an hour from the beginning of the attack, Howard's corps was almost annihilated.

Jackson's
attack on the
Federal right
rear in the
Wilderness.

Route of the
Federals at
Dowdall's.

Those who had not been killed or wounded were fleeing in every direction open to them.

By this time, report of Jackson's onslaught spread through the army, and Sickles and Pleasanton succeeded in bringing together sufficient infantry and artillery on the plateau of Chancellorsville ^{The battle of Chancellorsville.} to check the Confederate advance from the south-west side. Night now closed upon the combatants, and the battle ceased momentarily.

During the evening, while reconnoitring the positions of the Federals, Jackson was accidentally wounded by his own men, and died a few days later ^{Death of Jackson.} from the complications occasioned by the injury. The knowledge of the disaster was kept from his men so far as possible. Stuart assumed the chief command of the corps.

Sickles renewed the battle in the moonlight, and drove the Confederates back. The Confederates suffered anew in the wounding of another of their chiefs, General A. P. Hill. About midnight the conflict ceased again.

The Federal line now extended from Ely's Ford on the Rapidan through Chancellorsville to United States Ford on the Rappahannock. It was a fairly ^{Federal} good defensive position, after Sickles had ^{preparations for the renewal of the battle.} occupied the heights on the south-west of Chancellorsville. Hooker had gathered here about eighty thousand of his men, and had not much more than half that number in front of him. There seemed no doubt that he would repulse the Confederates, if they dared to make another attack. In the early morning of the 3d, Hooker surprised and amazed his generals again by ordering Sickles to abandon the high ground to the south-west of Chancellorsville, and draw his line back to the plateau upon which the place was

situated. These heights commanded Chancellorsville on that side, as was seen so soon as the Confederates occupied them and planted their artillery upon them. This happened almost immediately, and under the artillery fire as a protection, the Confederate

The Confederate attack on the 3d.

infantry advanced to the attack upon the plateau of Chancellorsville. The troops of Sickles and of Couch met and drove them back again and again. They returned as often to the conflict with renewed determination. The decisive moment was approaching. The Confederate troops remaining with Lee on the east and south-east of Chancellorsville had reached around to the southward until they formed connection with Stuart's right. From the east, south and west, the Confederates now rushed up the slopes around Chancellorsville. Hooker had plenty of fresh troops with whom to oppose them. The corps of Reynolds and of Meade had not yet been in the battle at all. They were awaiting the word of command from Hooker.

Hooker injured.

At this instant Hooker was so stunned by the concussion of a cannon-ball from one of the Confederate batteries striking the pillar of the Chancellor House against which he was leaning, that he was rendered incapable of directing the battle, and before any of his subordinates could assume command, the Confederate infantry gained the plateau and forced the Federals back toward the Rappahannock.

It was now nearly midday of the 3d. At this moment of Confederate success, news was brought to Lee that Sedgwick had attacked Early, and driven him from the heights back of Fredericksburg, and now held the road from Chancellorsville to Fredericksburg. Instead of advancing upon the Federals in front of him, Lee must now look to those in his rear. He immediately sent most of the troops of Long-

Sedgwick's attack upon Early.

street's corps to meet Sedgwick, remaining himself with the rest before Hooker.

One of Longstreet's brigades, that commanded by Wilcox, which had been left with Early at Fredericksburg, retreated from Marye's Heights along the road to Chancellorsville in order to im-
The battle at Salem Church.
pede Sedgwick's march as much as possible. Wilcox made a stand at a strong point on the road some four miles out from Fredericksburg. There was a building at this point called Salem Church. He met here the forces sent back by Lee before the head of Sedgwick's column arrived. When the Federal troops came up, the Confederates were ready to receive them, and the battle opened at once. While the Federals were not worsted in the encounter, their advance was checked. Night fell again at this juncture and the two forces ceased operations.

The whole Federal army was now in position for easy communication between all of its parts, Hooker with the main army being in front of United States Ford, and Sedgwick in front of Banks's Ford,
The new and advantageous position of the Federals.
only about five or six miles apart, and the north side of the river being entirely in the hands of the Federals. Hooker had heard the sounds of the battle at Salem Church. He knew, therefore, that Sedgwick was near at hand. He could easily have sent Sedgwick one of his corps during the night, without the slightest danger to himself; or he could have ordered Sedgwick to join him by crossing to the north side of the river at Banks's Ford, marching up the north side to United States Ford, and crossing again to the south side. But he does not seem to have thought of either of these things. It is charitable, at least, to conclude that his mind was still in a state of confusion from the severe shock which he had received a few hours before. Dur-

ing the entire night of the 3d, he remained passive, while Early was reorganizing his scattered forces, and bringing them to the aid of Lee against Sedgwick. He virtually left Sedgwick to take care of himself, with about half of the Confederate army preparing to attack his single corps. When the morning of the 4th broke,

Critical position of Sedgwick's troops.

Sedgwick found himself in a highly dangerous situation. The Confederates were moving on him from all sides except the north and east. A little after midday, they retook Marye's Heights with but slight opposition and thus threatened his rear. Fortunately for him, it was late in the afternoon before the Confederates were ready to reopen the attack. He was able to hold out against them until night came. The darkness was so great that the Confederates were obliged to retire a little from the positions won by them in order to reform their lines. This gave Sedgwick the opportunity to retreat to Banks's Ford and cross to the north side, which he accomplished successfully in the early morning of the 5th. Lee now turned upon Hooker again, but the great fatigue of his soldiers and the inclemency of the weather prevented him from getting into position for this purpose before the night of the 5th. But Hooker decided not to wait for him.

The Federal troops had lost all desire for battle and about all confidence in their Commander-in-Chief, and he gave the order to retreat. Through rain and mud and darkness the disheartened soldiers dragged themselves and their trains of artillery back across the river, and back to their old positions at Falmouth. On the 7th they were all in the old places, and the Confederates had reoccupied their old positions in front of them.

The expedition had cost the Federal army nearly eighteen thousand men, while the Confederates lost only

about twelve thousand. But, more than this, it had cost the Federal army almost all confidence in its leaders and in itself, while it had inspired the Confederates, on the other hand, with an enthusiastic faith in their own invincibility. At this day it seems so plain to anybody, who knows anything at all about military movements, what ought to have been done to make the campaign a Union success, that no explanation of Hooker's conduct is satisfactory, except that his mind was so affected by the concussion which he suffered in the battle of the 3d as to deprive him of a proper realization of the situation down to the last moment.

Stoneman's cavalry operations were equally fruitless. Their purpose was to cut off Lee's retreat; but Lee did not retreat. That part of the force under Averill was driven back by W. H. F. Lee, and returned to Hooker about the 2d of May.

Results and losses of the expedition.

Fruitless operations of Stoneman's cavalry.

The rest of it was separated by Stoneman into a number of detachments, which scoured the country between Fredericksburg and Richmond, and created quite a panic throughout that region. Kilpatrick, with his detachment, rode almost up to the suburbs of Richmond. But so little real damage was done to Lee's communications that everything was restored to previous conditions by May 12th.

CHAPTER XXIV

VICKSBURG AND PORT HUDSON

Operations on the Mississippi River—Grant's March from Milliken's Bend to Hard Times—The Diversions against Vicksburg and Port Hudson—March of Grant's Army to Schroon's and the Crossing of the Mississippi—The Capture of Port Gibson and Grand Gulf—Retreat of the Confederates toward Vicksburg—Communication Established between Grant and Banks, and Grant Reinforced by Sherman—Pemberton's Plan of Defence—Grant's Line of Advance—Pemberton's Mistake—The Fight at Raymond—The Approach of Johnston—Attempt of Johnston to Unite with Pemberton—The Battle of Champion Hill—The Federal Victory and the Confederate Losses—Pemberton Confined in Vicksburg—The Federal Assaults on Vicksburg—Federal Reinforcements around Vicksburg, and the Confederate Strength—The Siege—Attempts to Divert the Federals from Vicksburg—The Capture of Vicksburg—The Occupation of Jackson—Siege and Capture of Port Hudson—The Results of the Victories on the Mississippi.

At the same time that the Army of the Potomac was suffering its almost disgraceful defeat at Chancellorsville, Grant and Porter, from above, and Banks and Farragut, from below, were pushing their movements for the opening of the great river through the middle of the Confederacy. The former had Vicksburg for their objective point and the latter Port Hudson.

The first months of the year 1863 had been employed by Grant and Porter in the attempt to cut a canal around Vicksburg on the west side of the river, and in

the attempt to open up a waterway from the Mississippi to the upper Yazoo, through which Vicksburg might be taken in the rear. Both of these enterprises were, however, finally abandoned. Banks had likewise failed in his first attempt on Port Hudson, in the middle of March, although Farragut had succeeded in running the batteries with two of his vessels.

After Porter's failure to get his fleet into the Yazoo, Grant returned to his plan of going around Vicksburg on the west side of the Mississippi, and crossing his army over below the town. With this plan in view, he collected an army of about eighty thousand men with a great quantity of material and stores at Milliken's Bend, some twenty miles above Vicksburg on the west bank of the river. During the first half of April he succeeded in marching a large part of this force through the mud and swamps on the west side of the river to New Carthage some twenty miles below Vicksburg; and on the night of the 16th of the month Porter ran the batteries both of Vicksburg and Warrenton with his fleet. On the 17th, thus, both the army and the fleet were below Vicksburg and in position to make the crossing. On the night of the 22d five large transports ran the batteries and reached New Carthage safely, and therewith Grant had the means necessary to transfer his army to the east bank of the river. Grant now marched his forces a little farther down the river to Hard Times Plantation almost opposite Grand Gulf.

His first concern was to prevent the Confederate forces at Vicksburg and Port Hudson from disputing the passage of the river. That is, those places must be so threatened as to prevent troops being sent by them to the point on the east bank of the river which Grant had selected for

Grant's
march from
Milliken's
Bend to Hard
Times.

The diversions
against Vicks-
burg and Port
Hudson.

the debarkation of his forces. Two diversions from the north, and one from the south were now executed. Sherman threatened Haines's Bluff on the Yazoo above Vicksburg, and Colonel Grierson made his famous cavalry raid through the country back of Vicksburg, from La Grange to Baton Rouge, in which he destroyed the Southern railroad between Meridian and Jackson, the road over which Pemberton received his supplies at Vicksburg, and created a perfect panic in Pemberton's rear. At the same time, Banks advanced from Baton Rouge against the Confederate forces at Opelousas, commanded by General Richard Taylor. On the 20th of April, he drove Taylor back and occupied Opelousas, and from this point opened communication with the Mississippi River above Port Hudson through the Bayou Atchafalaya.

On the 29th of April the attempt was made by Porter's fleet to silence the Confederate batteries at Grand Gulf, in order to make the crossing safe for the troops; but the movement was not successful. Grant now found that he must march his army still farther down the west bank of the river and seek a crossing below Grand Gulf. He therefore moved his army, on the next day, to Schroon's Plantation, some six or seven miles lower down; and from this point he succeeded, on the day following, May 1st, in transporting a large part of his forces over to the east bank of the river. The diversions made by Sherman and Grierson, and the movements of Banks, had prevented the sending of troops from Vicksburg or Port Hudson to dispute the passage, and Grant reached the high ground on the east bank without any considerable resistance from the Confederates.

March of
Grant's army
to Schroon's,
and the cross-
ing of the Mis-
sissippi.

His first objective point was now Port Gibson, a place





Vicksburg, 1863.

some ten miles inward from the point of his crossing, on Bayou Pierre, from which he could take Grand Gulf in the rear, advance on Jackson, and then take Vicksburg in the rear. The Confederate commander at Port Gibson undertook to defend the place against the Federals. He had nearly eight thousand men under his direction, but the Federal force sent by Grant against him was too strong, and he was compelled to evacuate his works on May 1st and to retreat toward Grand Gulf. Grand Gulf was, however, in consequence of the occupation of Port Gibson by the Federals, immediately evacuated, and the Confederates turned the heads of their columns in the direction of Vicksburg.

Grant now sent McPherson toward the crossings of the Big Black River in order to cut off the retreat of the Confederates upon Vicksburg. McPherson succeeded in forcing his way across the north branch of Bayou Pierre in the face of General Loring's division, which had advanced from Jackson to the aid of Bowen, but the delay at this point enabled the garrisons from Grand Gulf and Port Gibson to escape across the Big Black at Hankinson's. When the vanguard of the Federals reached the bridge, the Confederate rear was just disappearing on the other side. The pursuit was so hot that the Confederates were not able to destroy the bridge.

At the same time General Banks advanced to Alexandria on the Red River, and on the 6th of May was in communication with Grant by means of Porter's fleet, which had gone up Red River to meet him. Grant had also ordered Sherman to bring his corps to Port Gibson, and on the 8th of May these fine troops arrived at the point designated. The Federal commander had by this

The capture of Port Gibson and Grand Gulf.

Retreat of the Confederates toward Vicksburg.

Communication established between Grant and Banks, and Grant reinforced by Sherman.

time accumulated a sufficient store of supplies at Grand Gulf, and was now ready to resume his advance movement.

Pemberton's plan of resistance was to hold the line of the Big Black River in the rear of Vicksburg, and to rely upon such forces as might be gathered at Jackson from the immediate neighborhood of the city and from the east to defend the Mississippi capital.

In his advance, Grant, supposing that Pemberton might attempt to come out of Vicksburg and cross the Big Black in order to form a junction with the Confederate troops in and around Jackson, kept his left wing along the course of the river to prevent Pemberton from crossing, pushed his centre toward Clinton, in order to cut railroad communication between Jackson and Vicksburg, and marched his right wing directly against Jackson. McClernand commanded the left, Sherman the centre, and McPherson the right.

Pemberton evidently thought that Grant's entire army was seeking him, and was manœuvring to concentrate at or near Edwards's Station. Grant encouraged this idea in Pemberton's mind by making a strong diversion toward this place, at the same time urging his right wing on toward Jackson.

On the 12th of May McPherson encountered a Confederate force near Raymond, about twelve miles southwest from Jackson, under General Gregg. A sharp little battle resulted, in which about five hundred men were killed and wounded on each side; but the Confederates were driven back, and lost also about five hundred prisoners.

Grant now learned that General Joseph E. Johnston was on his way to Jackson with reinforcements drawn from Bragg's army in South-eastern Tennessee. He,

therefore, pushed his troops forward speedily. On the next day (the 13th), McPherson struck the railroad from Jackson to Vicksburg near Clinton, and cut railroad and telegraphic communication between Johnston, who arrived that day at Jackson, and Pemberton. Pressing rapidly forward, the Federals attacked Jackson on the next day, and drove Johnston with his little force northward. In the afternoon of that day, the Federals occupied the Mississippi capital.

Johnston now endeavored to make a junction with Pemberton. From his position north of Jackson, he sent an order to Pemberton to leave small garrisons at Vicksburg, Warrenton, and Haines's Bluff, and march with the main body of his troops toward Clinton. Pemberton, fearing to go on the north side of the railroad line, lest he should uncover Vicksburg to Grant, moved along on the south side of it. This made the junction with Johnston far more difficult, in fact, as we shall see, impossible; for Grant, learning of Johnston's plan, and of Pemberton's movement, resolved to throw his whole army on Pemberton at once and crush him. He headed his columns for Bolton Station, and on the 15th occupied this position. A successful reconnoissance during the night gave him the necessary information in regard to the location of Pemberton's troops, and on the morning of the 16th he pressed on to the attack.

Pemberton had by this time learned his mistake in moving on the south side of the railroad in place of going to the north of it, and was attempting to rectify it by retreating across Baker's Creek in order to place this stream between himself and the Federals and then turn northward, but he was too slow in this change. Smith's division of Mc-

The approach of Johnston.

Attempt of Johnston to unite with Pemberton.

The battle of Champion Hill.

Clermand's corps caught up with his rear about eight o'clock in the forenoon, and forced the Confederates to turn and fight. Pemberton immediately seized a good position, the chief point of which was a hill something less than one hundred feet in height, called Champion Hill, and made a stand against the Federal advance. He had between twenty and twenty-five thousand men in line. Grant had some seven or eight thousand more. Grant's left wing held the Confederate right at bay, while Grant's right, led by the impetuous Logan, flanked the Confederate left, and cut off their retreat toward Johnston. Pemberton was thus forced back toward Vicksburg. The Confederate right wing, under Loring, was also separated from the rest of Pemberton's force, and was prevented from crossing the Big Black. It wandered for days through the forests south of the battle-field, and finally reached Johnston by going around the Federal forces by the east.

The Confederate loss in this battle was very severe, some three thousand in killed and wounded, about as many more in prisoners, and a large part of their artillery. The consequences of the defeat were, however, far more disastrous. Pemberton was cut off from Johnston, and forced back into a position from which it was impossible to extricate himself. He retreated rapidly with the main body of his troops toward the railroad bridge across the Big Black River. The Federals were in close pursuit. By sacrificing almost another division of his troops in the defence of the crossing, Pemberton succeeded in getting over with the rest, and in destroying the bridge. This delayed Grant sufficiently to allow Pemberton to draw the garrisons from Haines's Bluff and Warrenton to Vicksburg. He had now about thirty thousand men with which to defend the place. On the next day (the

The Federal
victory and
the Confeder-
ate losses.

18th) just before the Federals shut off all communication between him and Johnston by the north-east, Pemberton received an order from Johnston to come out of Vicksburg with his army by that line, and make another attempt to join him.

But before Pemberton could prepare to obey this order the Federal line closed in upon him. By the 19th the forces of Grant extended from the Yazoo above Vicksburg to the Mississippi below, Pemberton confined in Vicksburg. and communication with the fleet was re-established, whereby the army could receive reinforcements and supplies. If Johnston wanted a junction with Pemberton now, he must go to Vicksburg himself. Down to this stage of this brilliant campaign, the Federal loss had been comparatively small, not over four thousand men, if so many.

Grant now made two attempts to take Vicksburg by assault, one on the 19th and another on the 22d, but both failed, the latter with great loss. He was convinced thereby that he must advance The Federal assaults on Vicksburg. by regular circumvallation. He also felt that he must have more troops in order to hold Pemberton in Vicksburg, and capture him there, and, at the same time, hold Johnston with his newly organized force at bay.

He sent in every direction for reinforcements, and by the 12th of June he had received six new divisions, containing some forty thousand men, making his army nearly eighty thousand strong. Federal reinforcements around Vicksburg, and the Confederate strength.

Johnston's force at Jackson now numbered nearly thirty thousand men, and with Pemberton's thirty or thirty-five thousand made a Confederate army of between sixty and seventy thousand with which Grant had to deal. His approaches were now within five hundred yards of the Confederate works

at Vicksburg, but he had only a few siege guns, most of his artillery being field pieces, and no regular corps of engineers. He made his mortars, however, out of the

The siege.

trunks of trees bound with iron, and the few West Pointers under his command taught the men the art of siege movements in the trenches. He confided to Sherman the task of checking Johnston's approach. Sherman stretched his line across from Haines's Bluff on the Yazoo to the Big Black, and fortified it strongly. The rear of Grant's army was now completely defended against Johnston by these fortifications and the course of the Big Black River.

By the last of June Grant had some two hundred guns in position against Vicksburg, and had pushed some of his approaches to within one hundred feet of the Confederate works.

The Confederate forces in Arkansas had begun a diversion for the relief of Pemberton during the first half of the month. On the 9th, they approached

Attempt to divert the Federals from Vicksburg.

Milliken's Bend, but were repulsed. Their commander, General Holmes, now planned an attack upon Helena, Arkansas. But he was too late. The attack was made on the day that Pemberton raised the white flag, and was then repulsed with great loss. Johnston was also too late in his movements. He set out from Jackson on the 29th and advanced as far as Brownsville, but found that it would be useless to attempt to break the Federal lines from Haines's Bluff to the Big Black, and along the course of that river. Pemberton was left to his fate. His army was now thoroughly exhausted with fatigue and hunger. He knew

The capture of Vicksburg.

that he could not withstand the assault which was to be expected at any moment. On the 3d of July he sought Grant and proposed surrender. The negotiations were concluded on the next day, and

Vicksburg, with thirty-two thousand men and seventy-two cannon, was delivered into the hands of the Federals.

Grant now sent Sherman with some forty thousand men to attack Johnston. Upon hearing of the fall of Vicksburg Johnston had retreated to Jackson. Sherman arrived in front of the place on the 9th of July, and began the investment.

The occupation of Jackson.

Johnston decided not to take the chances of a siege, and on the 16th evacuated his works and retreated toward Meridian. There had been some fighting in front of Jackson, which had demonstrated to Johnston the temper and the strength of his adversaries.

Banks was also successful at Port Hudson. Setting out from Alexandria on the Red River, May 14th, he brought his army to Port Hudson, and, on

Siege and capture of Port Hudson.

the 25th, began the siege. He had some sixteen thousand men, while the Confederates numbered some seven or eight thousand. He first undertook to carry the works by assault. He made three attempts, on the 27th of May and the 11th and 14th of June, but was not successful. He then began a regular siege. The Confederate General Taylor advanced from Western Louisiana, captured Brashear City on the 23d of June and threatened New Orleans, but Banks pressed the siege. On the 6th of July the news of the fall of Vicksburg reached both armies at Port Hudson. The Confederate commander, General Gardener, now realized the hopelessness of his situation, and on the next day surrendered the place with his army.

The Mississippi was at last open again from source to mouths to the commerce of the Union, and

The results of the victories on the Mississippi.

the Confederacy was cut squarely in two. The country west of it was now virtually cut off from any further participation in the conflict against

the Union. Besides this, the Confederates had lost between sixty-five and seventy thousand soldiers, while the Federal loss was only about fifteen thousand. It was the most crushing blow which the Confederates had received, one from which they never recovered.

CHAPTER XXV

GETTYSBURG

Lee's Army after Chancellorsville—The Invasion of Pennsylvania—Hooker Prevented by Halleck from Taking the Offensive—Lee's Strategy—The Battle of Brandy Station—Lee's Plans at Last Discovered—Hooker Held Back from Richmond by the Washington Authorities—Hooker's Pursuit of Lee—Milroy's Defeat at Winchester—Halleck's Plan for Cutting the Confederate Army in Two—The Invasion of Pennsylvania—Early's Rush for Harrisburg Checked by the Federals—The Movements of the Army of the Potomac—Stuart's Raid—Hooker's Resignation of the Chief Command—Meade's Plans—Lee's Movement toward Gettysburg—Preoccupation of Gettysburg by the Federals—The Battle of Gettysburg—Federal Defeat on the First Day—The Situation on the Morning of the 2d—The Battle of the 2d of July—The General Repulse of the Confederates—Rectification of Lines During the Night of the 2d—The Battle of the 3d—Pickett's Charge—Federal Victory—The Losses—The Cavalry Battle between Stuart and Pleasanton—The Retreat of the Confederates—Federal Pursuit—The Skirmish between Stuart and Kilpatrick—Meade's Apprehensions—The Attacks on the Confederate Trains—Lee's Manœuvres—Concentration of the Federals on the Antietam—The Confederates Escape into Virginia—The Army of the Potomac in Virginia Again—The Confederates Regain Communication with Richmond—The Weakening of the Army of the Potomac—The Advance of the Federals to Culpeper Court House.

At the same time the Army of the Potomac inflicted on the Confederacy a corresponding defeat. It is true that it did not annihilate the Virginia army as did Grant the army of Pemberton, but it hurled the invading Con-

federates back beyond the Potomac with enormous loss in men, material and prestige.

After the victory of the Confederates at Chancellorsville, Lee brought back to Fredericksburg Longstreet's

Lee's army
after Chancel-
lorsville.

troops from Richmond and the lower James, and gathered around himself a veteran army of about eighty thousand men. He divided this formidable host into three corps of infantry, under the respective command of Longstreet, Ewell and A. P. Hill. To each of these corps he attached about eighty pieces of artillery. Besides the three infantry corps of over twenty thousand men each, Lee had some ten thousand splendid cavalry. These he organized into a single corps, under the immediate lead of Stuart. This great army of excellent soldiers, flushed with victory, full of faith in its chiefs, and puffed up with confidence in itself, could not remain quietly behind Fredericksburg when the season should arrive which would permit action. The army which watched it from across the Rapahannock was, on the other hand, reduced in numbers, sceptical about the capacity of its leaders, and gloomily despondent. It was natural, even inevitable, that the Confederate commanders should feel that the moment had arrived for a supreme effort. They resolved to make the attempt to transfer the war to the soil of Pennsylvania. They felt that they must destroy the sources from which the Federals drew their strength in order to reach a final triumph.

On the 3d of June Longstreet started with the first corps for Culpeper Court House, *en route* for the Shenandoah Valley, and through this for Maryland and Pennsylvania. On the 4th and 5th Ewell followed, leaving only Hill's corps to detain Hooker before Fredericksburg.

The invasion
of Penn-
sylvania.

The movements of Hill's troops in accomplishing the

redispositions made necessary by the departure of Longstreet and Ewell excited the attention of Hooker. On the 5th he caused pontoons to be thrown across the river at Franklin's Crossing below the town, and ordered Sedgwick's corps to hold itself in readiness to pass over. Hooker's idea was to make such a demonstration against the Confederate lines back of Fredericksburg as either to cause Lee to return, or to put Hill in such a position as to make his destruction easy. But Halleck now ordered Hooker to cover Washington and Harper's Ferry against the movements of Lee. Hooker was thus prevented from making any offensive movement himself, and was compelled to sit still and watch the developments of Lee's campaign, the purpose and destination of which were naturally, at the moment, unknown to him.

Hooker prevented by Halleck from taking the offensive.

On the 6th Hooker sent only Howe's division of Sedgwick's corps across the river, and ordered his cavalry, now commanded by Pleasanton, to make a reconnoissance toward Culpeper Court House and find out, if possible, what was occurring in that quarter.

Lee joined Longstreet at Culpeper on the 7th, and immediately ordered his cavalry to threaten the Federal right wing in such a way as to produce the impression on Hooker that a movement toward Washington by way of fatal Manassas was what was in process of execution. Stuart started on the morning of the 8th, and in the evening arrived at a place called Brandy Station, situated about midway between Culpeper and the fords of the Rappahannock, which the Federal cavalry were at the same time approaching on the north side. In the early morning of the 9th, the Federals crossed over in two columns, one at Beverly Ford and the other at Kelly's Ford. The first column was composed of Buford's cavalry division and Ames's bri-

Lee's strategy.

gade of infantry belonging to Howard's corps. The second column was composed of the cavalry divisions, commanded by Gregg and Duffie, and Russell's brigade of infantry belonging to Sedgwick's corps. The Federal force numbered some seven or eight thousand cavalry, and three or four thousand infantry. Stuart had about ten thousand cavalry and some twenty-five or thirty pieces of artillery. Pleasanton's plan was for both columns, except Duffie's cavalry, to move on Brandy Station, and for Duffie to go to Stevensburg on the road between Chancellorsville and Culpeper, and find if the Confederates were marching along this road.

The battle
of Brandy
Station. Buford's column had hardly crossed at Beverly before it struck Stuart's outposts. The

Federal cavalry began a vigorous attack. They were at first successful, but Stuart soon came up with the larger part of his entire force and checked the victors.

At this moment, the other Federal column, which had crossed at Kelly's Ford, approached Stuart's rear. Stuart left two brigades in front of Buford, and went with the remainder of his troops to meet this new force led by Gregg. By this time Gregg had captured Stuart's head-quarters on Fleetwood Hill and dispersed the troops that had been left to guard it. With double Gregg's numbers, Stuart now threw himself upon the victorious Federals and beat them back. Before being obliged to withdraw from the commanding eminence, however, Gregg had seen Ewell's division marching toward Brandy Station, and in the effects of Stuart, which had been captured, were found plans and instructions which showed that Lee's army was moving toward the Shenandoah Valley, and that Stuart was executing a demonstration against Manassas to cover Lee's movements. Pleasanton had thus obtained what he wanted,

and he withdrew his forces to the north side of the river about nightfall, and sent his information to Hooker.

Hooker wanted now to throw himself on Hill, crush him, and open the way to Richmond. But Lincoln and Halleck, consumed with their old fear about the safety of Washington, would not agree to the plan, despite the fact that they had a garrison of forty thousand men in and around the capital. Hooker must follow Lee whithersoever the latter might choose to go.

It was all in vain that he referred to the Washington garrison, to Keyes's corps needlessly remaining at Suffolk, to the troops under Milroy and Tyler at Winchester and Harper's Ferry, together with an army of seventy thousand men or more, which might be assembled at Washington, while he might advance upon Richmond, where there were not more than ten thousand men. The General-in-Chief at Washington put his foot down upon any such plans and insisted obstinately upon the covering of Washington by the Army of the Potomac as the prime element in any campaign which Hooker might undertake, and that too without giving him command of any of the seventy thousand men above mentioned.

On the 11th, Hooker began to follow Lee. He sent Sickles's corps up the Rappahannock to a point near Beverly Ford, Reynolds's corps to Bealeton and Howard's corps to Catlett's, remaining himself with about half the army at Falmouth. Ewell's corps, composed of Jackson's old soldiers, accompanied by the cavalry brigades of Imboden and Jenkins, formed Lee's advance. They passed through the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap and reached the Shenandoah on the 12th. His first object was to crush Milroy, with his division of some seven thousand men,

Lee's plans
at last discovered.

Hooker held
back from
Richmond by
the Washington
authorities.

Hooker's
pursuit of Lee.

at Winchester. Milroy was in utter ignorance of what was impending. On the 13th, Ewell's advance approached Winchester. Milroy thought that it was a mere cavalry raid. He posted about five thousand of his troops south of the town, leaving the rest in the intrenchments. In a skirmish during the late afternoon, he took a few Confederate prisoners, and from these he learned that Ewell's entire corps was in front of him. Still he did not retreat from Winchester. General Schenck, who was his immediate superior, had ordered him to defend Winchester, and he supposed that the Army of the Potomac was closely following the Confederates. He simply concentrated all his forces in the town and in the forts, and awaited Ewell's pleasure. During the 14th the Confederates placed their artillery in position to batter the works, and about six o'clock in the afternoon they made the assault. The chief fortification was quickly carried, but night now intervened and stopped the battle. Under the cover of the darkness Milroy undertook to escape in the direction of Martinsburg, but he was intercepted at Rocktown by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, and his force was completely broken up and routed. Some of his soldiers reached the Potomac at Hancock, and others, with Milroy himself, reached Harper's Ferry. About one-half of the men of his division were lost.

By this time Hooker's entire army was marching toward Manassas and Fairfax Court House, and Hill had left Fredericksburg to join Lee in the Shenandoah. Lincoln and Halleck, after learning of Ewell's presence at Winchester and the rout of Milroy, wanted Hooker to try to cut Lee's long column in two somewhere. But events followed too rapidly now to permit of any movement of that kind. On the 15th, Jenkins's cavalry entered Penn-

Milroy's defeat at Winchester.

Halleck's plan for cutting the Confederate army in two.

sylvania and reached Chambersburg, but immediately returned to Williamsport on the Potomac, where Ewell was waiting for Longstreet and Hill to come up. It was quite evident now that the invasion of Maryland, and probably of Pennsylvania, was intended. On the 17th, 19th and 20th, Pleasanton ran upon the Confederate cavalry at Aldie, and near Middleburg and Ashby's Gap, and drove them in. Some of Buford's scouts climbed to the summits of the Blue Ridge, and saw Lee's whole army marching toward the Potomac. Up to this time Stuart's movements had confused Hooker somewhat as to Lee's ultimate purpose, but now his object was tolerably clearly revealed.

The invasion of Pennsylvania.

General Couch was now sent in great haste to Harrisburg to organize the Pennsylvania militia for the protection of that city and Philadelphia, while the Army of the Potomac was pushed on toward the Potomac. On the 20th and 21st, Ewell's corps crossed the river at Shepherdstown, and occupied Sharpsburg and Hagerstown. Lee now ordered Ewell to push on to Harrisburg. On the 24th, Ewell's troops were in Chambersburg. They immediately moved on toward Harrisburg, the divisions of Johnson and Rodes marching by the direct route, and Early's division going by way of Gettysburg. On the 27th, Johnson and Rodes reached Carlisle, and Early passed through Gettysburg, *en route* for York, while Longstreet and Hill occupied Chambersburg. On the 28th, Early arrived in York, while the scouts of Johnson and Rodes had reached the banks of the Susquehanna, and were examining the approaches to Harrisburg.

Early's next move was to have been the seizure of the bridge across the Susquehanna at Wrightsville, over which he intended to throw his division with great ra-

pidity and march upon Harrisburg by the east bank of the river. At this juncture, however, the fortune of the Confederates began to fail them. A detachment of Federal troops succeeded in burning the bridge at Wrightsville, and Early's advance was thus stopped at the bank of the river.

Early's rush for Harrisburg checked by the Federals.

From the 24th to the 27th inclusive, the different corps of the Army of the Potomac had succeeded in crossing the Potomac at or near Edwards's Ferry and had seized Turner's and Crampton's Passes in South Mountain. They were marching in the same general direction as the Confederates, with the South Mountain range between them and the two Confederate corps led by Longstreet and Hill.

The movements of the Army of the Potomac.

Lee had strangely allowed Stuart to leave his right flank on the 24th and make an attempt to ride around Hooker's army and join the Confederate column again in Maryland. Stuart expected to accomplish this exploit in three days, but on account of Hooker's rapid movements northward, he was obliged to make a much wider detour east and north, and did not reach Lee again for more than a week. Deprived of the protection of his cavalry, Lee's movements were exposed now to the reconnoissances of the Federal cavalry, which both kept watch of his advance and veiled the movements of Hooker. He did not learn that the Federals had crossed the Potomac for forty-eight hours after it had happened. Moreover he had now the difficulties to contend with which the Federals had suffered under in Virginia. He did not know the country, and the inhabitants would give him no information, while they gave notice of his movements to the Federals.

Stuart's raid.

At this juncture a most important event happened in the Army of the Potomac. The army was, on the 27th, concentrated in Maryland between the Monocacy River

and South Mountain. The extreme left was within reach of Harper's Ferry, where there was a Federal garrison of some twelve thousand men, at the time commanded by General French. Hooker wanted to send Slocum's corps through South Mountain, join French's troops with it, making a force of about thirty thousand men, march them up the Cumberland Valley, in Lee's rear, cut thus Lee's communications, and force him to fight on ground chosen by the Federals. He felt that he could keep this force in easy connection with the rest of his army on the east side of South Mountain range. Of course this plan involved the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, which, on account of Lee's presence in Pennsylvania, was a useless post, as Hooker viewed it. But Halleck absolutely forbade the abandonment of Harper's Ferry, except in case of supreme necessity, and Hooker did not feel that the movement up the Cumberland Valley would be successful without the aid of the troops under French. He had been balked so many times by Halleck, that he now felt that his resignation was desired. He sent it to Washington on the evening of the 27th, and on the next day Meade was appointed to take the chief command. It is certainly a demoralizing thing to change commanders at a critical moment, such as this was, unless reasons of great weight, derived from the circumstances of the case, require it. It was true that the army had lost very largely its confidence in Hooker at the battle of Chancellorsville, but he had certainly done well during the movements of the fortnight just passed, and was beginning to win back that confidence.

It is pretty sure that the President and General Halleck thought his plans too risky, and considered the situation too serious for brilliant enterprises. In the light of succeeding events, it is probable that the substitution

Hooker's
resignation of
the chief com-
mand.

of Meade for Hooker, at this juncture, was no mistake. Meade was certainly more careful and prudent than Hooker, and the situation seemed to require his qualities more than those of his brilliant friend.

Meade agreed with Halleck in regard to the matter of not abandoning Harper's Ferry, and deemed it wise to keep the entire Army of the Potomac between Meade's plans.

Lee's army and Washington and Baltimore. He, therefore, marched his army on substantially parallel lines with Lee's advance in the direction of Harrisburg. He marched in three columns. His left was composed of the corps of Reynolds and Howard, his centre of the corps of Sickles and Slocum, and his right of the corps of Hancock (Couch's old corps), Sykes (Meade's old corps), and Sedgwick. His left wing was therefore nearest to the corps of Longstreet and Hill, on the west side of the South Mountain range, while his right wing was marching almost directly against Early's division, now in the neighborhood of York.

On the 29th General Reynolds received information which led him to surmise that Lee was moving through the South Mountain passes east of Chambersburg in the direction of Gettysburg. It looked as if Lee were trying to lead the corps of Longstreet and Hill into a position where Ewell's troops could easily form a junction with them.

Reynolds's line of march lay through Gettysburg, and he decided to push Buford's cavalry quickly forward to occupy the place before the advance guard of the Confederates could arrive.

When Buford reached the place, about midday of the 30th, he found a detachment of Confederates on the west side of the town, and drove them off. They belonged to Hill's corps, which was already at Cashtown. Meade now ordered

Preoccup-
ation of Gettys-
burg by the
Federals.


Reynolds to proceed at once to Gettysburg with his own corps and that of Howard. Before they arrived Lee had pushed Hill's corps forward from Cashtown to drive Buford back and occupy the place. But Buford, who had taken in at a glance the advantages of the location, immediately seized the ridge lying west of the town, called Seminary Ridge, and resolved to hold it until Reynolds could arrive. Buford saw that the hills and ridges on the south-east of the town, called Cemetery Ridge and Hill, offered the strongest positions, but Reynolds was advancing up the Emmetsburg road in the valley, which ran along the west side of Cemetery Ridge, and between Cemetery and Seminary Ridges, and unless Buford should hold Seminary Ridge, and keep back the Confederates to the west of it until Reynolds should arrive, the Confederates would take Reynolds's troops on their exposed left flank as they marched up the valley. Buford quite correctly, therefore, saw that Seminary Ridge must be held by his own force alone until Reynolds should arrive. He had about five thousand men with whom to resist the onslaught of Heth's entire division, made in the early morning of the 1st of July. For two hours the battle raged, The battle of Gettysburg. and the Confederates slowly pressed forward, when suddenly the advance division of Reynolds's corps, led by the brave general himself, appeared, and began to climb the ridge. They had not succeeded in getting into position before the Confederate line struck them, and in the attempt to place his men, under such disadvantage, Reynolds fell and instantly expired. His troops, however, drove the Confederates back, and held the Emmetsburg road open until the remainder of the corps and the divisions of Howard's corps arrived. By virtue of seniority, Howard now took chief command, while Doubleday succeeded to the immediate command of Rey-

nolds's corps. He immediately posted his troops so as still to keep open the Emmetsburg road, and sent word to Sickles and Slocum to hurry up.

Ewell's troops were now, however, approaching from the north and north-east, and threatened the Federals in flank and rear. The part of the Federal line which they were advancing upon was composed of Howard's men, now commanded by Schurz. At the moment when Doubleday was successfully resisting another onset from the west, Early's division of Ewell's corps came rushing down the road from Heidlersburg, struck Schurz in the right flank, and routed the entire corps. Doubleday was now forced back, and the remnants of the two Federal corps drew slowly back to the strong ground on Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill.

At this moment of defeat, in the late afternoon, Hancock arrived on the scene of battle. He had been sent forward by Meade to take command of the two corps at Gettysburg. After placing the troops and artillery in position to defend the new line, he was reinforced by the arrival of the corps of Sickles and Slocum. Lee had not followed up his success vigorously, but had decided to wait on Seminary Hill and in the village of Gettysburg for Longstreet to come up. He did not immediately close the Emmetsburg road, and the central column of the Federal army, composed of the corps of Sickles and Slocum, came unhindered up to the Cemetery Ridge during the night of the 1st.

Hancock immediately transferred the command to Slocum, and set out for Taneytown to find Meade and give him personal information in regard to the situation. He met his own corps a few miles from the battle-field and placed it within easy supporting distance.



The Country from the Potomac to Harrisburg.



The two corps commanded by Sykes and Sedgwick were, however, some twenty or thirty miles away, Sykes near Hanover, and Sedgwick in the neighborhood of Manchester. Meade arrived at Cemetery Hill about midnight, and Sykes's troops came up about ten o'clock in the forenoon of the 2d. The entire Army of the Potomac, with the exception of Sedgwick's corps, was now concentrated on the hills and ridges south-east and south of Gettysburg, under the command of its general-in-chief; and the entire Confederate army under Lee, with the exception of some six or seven thousand men of Longstreet's corps and Stuart's cavalry, was concentrated on Seminary Ridge and in the village of Gettysburg. The Federal line extended from Culp's Hill, on the right, to Little Round Top, on the left, forming a curve with the convex side to the Confederates, having thus the advantage of shorter interior connections. Slocum was on the extreme right; then came Newton, now in command of Reynolds's corps; then Howard and Hancock, with Sykes in reserve behind them; and lastly, Sickles on the extreme left. Sickles's troops extended from the south base of Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top. He did not occupy this eminence, but threw his troops forward toward the Emmetsburg road on to a slight elevation called the Peach Orchard. This was the weak point in the Federal line. It was a much longer distance than that covered by any other corps, and the line bent outward making the curve here rather concave toward the Confederates than convex. The Confederates were quick to discover the vulnerable point, and made their attack just there. The Confederate line reached from Benner's Hill, opposite Culp's Hill, through the village of Gettysburg, and along Seminary Ridge to a point opposite Little Round Top. Ewell's corps com-

posed their left wing, Hill's their centre, and Longstreet's their right.

The Confederates began the battle in the afternoon of the 2d by an attempt to seize Little Round Top. Law's and Robertson's brigades of Longstreet's corps were ordered forward to the attack. They were met by Ward's and De Trobriand's brigades of Sickles's corps. A most obstinate conflict followed, in which the Federals were gradually pressed backward, on account of the thinness of their line and the superiority in numbers of the Confederates. Meade himself now ordered one division of Hancock's corps and Sykes's whole corps to support this part of the line. Having some doubt of the wisdom of Sickles's selection of positions, he had sent General Warren to look over the ground, and select new points, if he should find better ones. Warren recognized at once the necessity for occupying Little Round Top, and succeeded in leading a regiment of Sykes's corps to the summit of the hill just in time to prevent a Confederate detachment from taking possession of it. Vincent's brigade of the same corps and Hazlitt's battery and then Weed's brigade arrived soon afterward, and this most important position was saved to the Federals. Sedgwick's corps now came up and took the reserve position which Sykes's corps had occupied, so that the whole of Sykes's troops could go into the battle. The Confederates now hurled two of Longstreet's finest brigades, commanded by Barksdale and Wofford against Sickles's men in the Peach Orchard, and succeeded in pushing them back. In the struggle Sickles himself was so severely wounded that he was compelled to transfer the command to the general of his first division, Birney.

Lee had ordered Ewell to attack the right wing of the Federals so soon as he heard Longstreet's cannon, but

an adverse wind carried these sounds in the contrary direction, and Ewell's troops had remained quietly in position. By this time, however, that is, near five o'clock, Hill began to execute his movement against the Federal centre, and Ewell taking the sound of Hill's guns as his notice, advanced to the assault of the forces on Culp's Hill. He sent Johnson's division for this purpose, but it was promptly repulsed. Johnson now attempted to turn Culp's Hill by marching through the gorge to the east of it. At the same moment, the Confederates made their last supreme effort of the day to break through the Federal line between Cemetery Ridge and Little Round Top. Hancock, now in command at this point, succeeded in establishing a new line running direct from the base of Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top, some distance back of Sickles's first line through the Peach Orchard. This he defended successfully against the advancing Confederates. He even extended this line to the Devil's Den and Great Round Top on the extreme left. The Confederates were now repulsed all along the line: Johnson in the gorges of Rock Creek, Rodes and Early in front of Cemetery Hill, Anderson's division of Hill's corps in front of the Federal centre, and McLaws's division of Longstreet's corps in front of the Federal left. They had, however, gained some ground, and when the night of the second day of the great battle came on, it was still doubtful which party would be finally victorious. The losses on both sides had been enormous, but as the Federal army outnumbered by twenty thousand that of the Confederates, it could better afford the diminution of forces.


The general
repulse of the
Confederates.

During the night of the 2d the Federals rectified their lines and made ready for the attack which they felt the Confederates would deliver on the next day. The rein-

forcements which had been drawn from the right to support the left were largely returned to the right in order to prevent the Confederates from turning the Union right through the defiles of Rock Creek to the east of Culp's Hill. Several brigades of Sedgwick's corps were also sent to the same part of the line. Newton and Howard still held Cemetery Ridge and Hill. Sickles's troops, who had suffered so severely, were drawn back into the position of reserve, while Hancock's men took their place in front, and Sykes's men were firmly planted on the Round Tops.

The Confederates strengthened Johnson in his position to the east of Culp's Hill, and their line in front of Cemetery Ridge was also strengthened by the arrival of Pickett's splendid division of Virginians. It was evident that the Confederates were going to make a desperate attempt to turn the Union right and seize the road from Gettysburg to Baltimore in their rear, and in aid of this movement would make another attack upon the Federal left to prevent any help being sent from that quarter toward the right.

The battle of the 3d. on the extreme Federal right, where Johnson was attempting to lead his troops around Culp's Hill. Again and again did he hurl Jackson's old soldiers against the obstacles in his way to the Baltimore road, but the Federal artillery mowed them down mercilessly and the soldiers of Williams and Sedgwick would not yield the ground. By noon the Confederate strength was exhausted in this quarter, and their thinned ranks were driven back across the valley and the creek. The battle on the right was about over, before that on the left and centre was opened again. Longstreet's men, except Pickett's division, having sustained the loss and fatigue of the struggle of the 2d in this quarter, it



Gettysburg—Final Attack of the First Day, and Battle of the Second Day.¹

¹ The first day's battle is represented north of the Fairfield and Hanover roads. The second day's battle south of the same roads.



was decided by the Confederates to make the attack with Pickett's division, strengthened by some six or seven brigades of Hill's corps. Nearly one hundred and fifty pieces of Confederate artillery were trained upon the Federal position to be attacked, with the purpose of silencing the Federal guns which swept the ground in front of it. It was about half-past one in the afternoon when the fire from this artillery opened. It was immediately answered by the Federals, who had planted some eighty pieces of fine ordnance at this point in their line. For an hour the terrific roar of more than two hundred cannon went on, when gradually the Federals ceased firing. The Confederates thought that the Federal batteries were silenced, and prepared to make the infantry-charge upon the position. This ^{Pickett's} charge was what the Federals wanted. And they had ceased firing to invite it and prepare to receive it. Nearly fifteen thousand of the finest Confederate infantry now rushed forward upon the Federal line on the southern declivity of Cemetery Hill. The Federals allowed them to approach within good grape and canister range, and then opened upon them a most murderous fire from the batteries, with terrible effect; but on they came without faltering up to the musket shot line of the Federal infantry. Thousands and tens of thousands of rifles now belched forth their deadly contents. The carnage was terrible, but still the brave Virginians rushed on. Up to and over the first line of intrenchments they went, striking Gibbon's front line with great force and driving part of it, in a hand to hand conflict, back upon the second line. They could not, however, break the second line. Decimated and exhausted, they now began to falter and to yield. Hill's brigade had not sustained Pickett very closely and the daring Virginians were left almost alone within the Federal

position. Overwhelmed and almost surrounded, it became a matter of *sauve qui peut*. More than two-thirds of the entire division had been killed or wounded. Only Pickett and one other of the general and field officers remained unhurt. The remnants of this once splendid body of troops now fled in great disorder down the slope and across the valley, followed by Hill's troops, who had supported them so badly. The great battle was over. The Confederate army had failed, and from that moment the Confederacy was a sinking cause.

Federal victory.

The losses. The losses. thousand men were placed *hors de combat*, about equally divided.

During the time that the battle was raging in front of Hancock, Stuart had attempted to flank the Union forces by the east and take possession of the road to Westminster, so as to cut off the way of retreat in case of a Confederate victory. But Pleasanton's men were on the watch for him, and in a bloody encounter checked the dangerous movement.

The cavalry battle between Stuart and Pleasanton.

The Federals were too much exhausted to pursue their vanquished foes, and the Confederate army drew its bleeding columns back to a defensive position on Seminary Ridge, preparatory to the retreat through the defiles of South Mountain. In the late afternoon of the 4th, in the midst of a downpour of rain, this movement began, Hill's corps leading the way, Longstreet's in the middle, and Ewell's soldiers bringing up the rear. The retreat was directed toward the bridge across the Potomac left standing by Lee some four or five miles below Williamsport, and some twenty miles above Harper's Ferry. Lee sent his wagons in two trains, one by Cashtown and the other by Fairfield.

The retreat of the Confederates.

Kilpatrick started out in the early morning of the 4th to feel the movements of the Confederates. He went first to Emmetsburg, but finding no traces of them ^{Federal} there, and concluding, therefore, that they ^{pursuit.} were making no effort to turn the Federal left, but were really in retreat, he turned his column westward, with the purpose of striking the road leading from Gettysburg to Hagerstown through Fairfield. He came into this road at Fountain Dale in the early evening, a few hours after the Confederate wagon train had passed through. By a rapid pursuit he overtook this train before midnight, captured and burned a part of it, and then hurried on to Hagerstown in advance of Lee's army. Some of his men entered the place during the morning of the 5th, thus severing Lee's communications with Virginia. Already on the 3d, a detachment of cavalry from French's force at Frederick, having learned that the bridge below Westport was feebly guarded, had surprised the few Confederates left there, dispersed them and destroyed the bridge; and the heavy rain of the night of the 4th was now raising the waters of the river so rapidly that fording would soon be impossible. It seemed as if prompt and vigorous movements on the part of the Federals must result in the destruction of the Confederate army.

Lee himself was at the moment ignorant of the mortal danger which impended over him. But his capable and energetic lieutenant, Stuart, discovered almost immediately the movements of Kilpatrick, and set out in pursuit of him. ^{The skirmish between Stuart and Kilpatrick.} The two cavalry forces collided at Smithburg, and after a sharp skirmish the Confederates drew off, to go in search of the column of infantry coming from Fairfield, and protect the retreat.

The main body of the Confederate infantry was, in

the late afternoon of the 5th, between Fairfield and the pass through South Mountain, on the Fairfield and Hagerstown road. Meade had now the best of ^{Meade's apprehensions.} opportunities to attack the long column in flank and cut it in two. But the Federal chief did not dare to risk an attack. Instead of this, he began marching his army along the east side of South Mountain in the general direction of Middletown, where he purposed to make a new concentration of his forces. On the 6th the advance of the Confederate infantry reached Hagerstown, and passed on toward the Potomac.

Meade now knew that the bridge below Williamsport was destroyed, and that the river was no longer fordable. His infantry force was now about double that under the command of Lee, and its morale was much better. Still he did not incline to incur the chances of an attack. He was afraid of spoiling his victory at Gettysburg, and of uncovering Washington. His plan was, therefore, to keep his army between the Confederates and Washington, but out of striking distance.

Only the energetic cavalry leaders, Buford and Kilpatrick, made strong efforts to destroy the Confederate trains. In this attempt they fought two sharp little engagements on the 6th at ^{The attacks on the Confederate trains.} Hagerstown and near Williamsport, with Stuart and Imboden, in which, however, the Confederates succeeded in beating them off and saving their trains.

Lee now ordered his cavalry to make a strong demonstration in order to keep Meade on the east side of South Mountain and give the Confederate army time ^{Lee's manoeuvres.} to cross the Potomac. The Federal division under General Kelley, resting above Hancock, had also to be watched.

Meade, at the same time, began to manifest some inten-

tion to attack before the swollen waters of the Potomac should subside. He ordered his forces to march through the South Mountain passes and concentrate on the Antietam. This was effected on the 9th and 10th. Lee met this threatening movement by placing his army in a good defensive position in front of Williamsport, and throwing up intrenchments. On the 11th, Meade advanced his troops in line for battle about a mile. On the 12th, it seemed as if the struggle would be opened again. The Washington authorities were urging another battle, and the troops were anxious for it; but Meade still hesitated. The 13th passed unimproved; and, during the night, the Confederates began to cross the Potomac on a hastily constructed bridge, and by the fords, which had now become passable again. Before the night of the 14th the whole of Lee's army was safely over and collected on the south bank of the river. Lee had manoeuvred with great skill, and this, with the indecision of his adversary, had effected his escape from what appeared to be a fatal position. The army, the people of the North, and the Washington Government were greatly disappointed and displeased. Meade was made to feel the general discontent so keenly that he asked to be relieved of the chief command. The President, however, felt too grateful for what he had done at Gettysburg to show him any lack of sympathy or the least unkindness. He declined to relieve him, and the General began to withdraw the troops to the east side of the mountain range, in order to keep the army between Lee and Washington.

Concentration of the
Federals on
the Antietam.

The Confederates escape
into Virginia.

The Federal army now crossed the Potomac, and took possession of the more northern passes of the Blue Ridge. Meade's plan was to march southward on the east side of these mountains, and, while covering Wash-

ington, threaten Lee's communications with Richmond. Lee divined the purpose of the Federal movements immediately, and by rapid and precise marching he passed his troops through Chester Gap and the gaps farther south before Meade could arrive in front of their eastern outlets.

The Army of the Potomac in Virginia again.

By the 25th, two of the three Confederate corps were at Culpeper, and the other was at Madison. The communications with Richmond were thus completely protected, and the plan of the Federal General to interrupt them had failed. Meade now turned his columns toward War-

The Confederates regain communication with Richmond.

renton Junction as a new point of concentration, while Lee drew his army back behind the Rapidan in order to be in easy reach of Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg. In these positions, the two armies rested during the month of August.

The riots in some of the Northern cities, notably in New York, caused by the attempt to enforce the

The weakening of the Army of the Potomac.

conscription law, passed March 3d (1863), now made it necessary to send some of the troops under Meade to these cities, and the movements around Chattanooga caused the Richmond Government to order one of Lee's corps, that commanded by Longstreet, to Northern Georgia. These things, with the great exhaustion in both armies after the active work of the spring and summer, made this period of rest both necessary and grateful to both parties. So soon, however, as Meade learned of Longstreet's departure for the south-west, he resolved to advance

The advance of the Federals to Culpeper Court House.

again. Between the 13th and 15th of September, he occupied the country between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, and established head-quarters at Culpeper Court House. While perfecting here the plans for further

movements, the defeat of Rosecrans at Chickamauga occurred. This occasioned a halt, from the necessity of sending reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac to Chattanooga. The two strong corps of Howard and Slocum were ordered from Washington to go immediately to the rescue of Rosecrans.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE CHICKAMAUGA-CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN

Rosecrans's Advance against Bragg, and Burnside's Advance toward Knoxville—Morgan's Raid into Indiana and Ohio—The Capture of Morgan and His Raiders—Bragg's Retreat to Chattanooga—Burnside's Occupation of Knoxville—The Evacuation of Chattanooga by the Confederates—Position and Strength of the Federals—The Confederate Line—The Battle of Chickamauga—The Disaster to the Federal Right Wing—The Federal Retreat—The Losses—The Advance of the Confederates on Chattanooga, and the Beginning of the Siege—Reinforcements for Chattanooga from the Army of the Potomac, and from Vicksburg—General Grant Ordered to Cairo—The Situation at Chattanooga in the Last Days of September, and Wheeler's Raid—Grant and Sherman *en route* for Chattanooga—Opening of the Line of Communication between Bridgeport and Chattanooga—Seizure of Brown's Ferry by the Federals—Battle between Hooker and Longstreet—Longstreet's Expedition against Knoxville—The Siege of Knoxville—Sherman's Arrival in Chattanooga and the Plan of Operations Fixed—The Federal Reconnaissance of the 23d—The Battle of Lookout Mountain—The Capture of Lookout Mountain, and the Crossing of the Tennessee by Sherman's Troops—The Battle of Missionary Ridge—The Federal Victory—The Losses—Grant's Attempt to Relieve Burnside—The Pursuit of Bragg's Forces—The Confederate Attack upon Knoxville—Sherman's March to Knoxville—Longstreet's Retreat from Knoxville, and the Entry of Sherman's Army—The Pursuit of Longstreet—Disposition of the Armies in Northern Georgia and East Tennessee During the Winter of 1863-64.

FROM the battle of Stone's River to the 1st of June Rosecrans had done little more than reorganize and re-

equip his forces, so greatly decimated and fatigued by that exhausting campaign. By the close of June he was, however, pressing upon Bragg's forces along the line of Duck River. At the same time three divisions of Burnside's Army of the Ohio, commanded by General Hartsuff, were advancing from South-eastern Kentucky on Knoxville.

Rosecrans's
advance
against Bragg,
and Burn-
side's ad-
vance toward
Knoxville.

Bragg became immediately aware of these movements, and planned to delay them, at least, by a strong diversion in the Federal rear. He selected the bold partisan John Morgan for the purpose.

On the 2d of July, Morgan effected the crossing of the Cumberland above Nashville with a fine body of cavalry, some twenty-five hundred strong. He immediately came into collision with a troop of Federal horse belonging to the command of General Judah, and drove them back. This event gave notice of Morgan's presence in Kentucky, and the Federal commanders in this section began to concentrate their scattered forces in pursuit of him. Morgan rode straight on toward Louisville, fighting several skirmishes, some successfully and others unsuccessfully, until he reached a point some twenty miles south of the city, and then, to the confusion of his pursuers, he turned westward and went to Brandenburg on the Ohio River. Here he captured some boats and crossed with his men over into Indiana. This was July 8th.

Morgan's
attempt to
divert the
Federal ad-
vance.

Bragg had forbidden Morgan to cross this river, but the wilful chieftain, calculating on a victory for Lee in Pennsylvania, of whose defeat he had not yet heard, and counting upon the sympathy, if not the positive assistance, of the peace men, or copperheads as they were called, along the border, determined, upon his own responsibility, to

His raid
into Indiana
and Ohio.

make the bold attempt to ride up the north bank of the Ohio, and join Lee in Pennsylvania.

After getting into Indiana, Morgan learned of the defeats of the Confederates at Vicksburg and Gettysburg. He now recognized the desperate character of his situation. He quickly saw, however, that there was nothing left for him to do except to attempt to go up the Ohio to a point above navigation and ford the stream into Virginia. The Ohio was now closed to him by the gun-boats. The militia of Indiana and Ohio were gathering to attack him, and the cavalry brigades of Judah and Hobson were in pursuit of him. On the 13th, Morgan reached the boundary line between Indiana and Ohio, with Hobson only forty miles behind him, and Judah's force ascending the river on transports to intercept him. By means of a clever diversion against Hamilton, he succeeded in attracting Burnside's attention from Cincinnati to this point, then, crossing the Miami River much lower down, he seemed to threaten Cincinnati. Whereupon Burnside drew his troops stationed on the outskirts into the city, as Morgan had calculated he would, and the Confederates slipped by, a few miles northward, unmolested. Judah now proceeded up the Ohio River still farther with his boats, while Hobson continued the pursuit from behind.

Morgan was headed for Buffington Ford, a place on the river about one hundred and fifty miles eastward from Cincinnati. The ford is above the rapids at the mouth of the Kanawha, which usually prevent further ascent by steamers in the summer season. By most prodigious efforts and excellent manœuvring, Morgan reached this point on the 18th, ahead of his pursuers. To his consternation, however, he found the river so full of water as to allow the passage of the gun-boats over

the rapids, and to make fording extremely dangerous. His only course was to go higher up. His men were now utterly exhausted, and he was obliged to give them a few hours of rest. The delay thus caused was fatal.

On the morning of the 19th the Federals were upon him. Judah, who had disembarked a little lower down the river, came into his rear, and Hobson, descending from Jackson, appeared on his left flank, while the gun-boat Morse barred the river. About one-half of his command surrendered. He, with the other half, went farther up the stream to the ford at Belleville. Here about half of these succeeded in getting over into West Virginia. Morgan, however, was still left on the northern side of the Ohio. With this last remnant of his fine force, he fled farther up the river, pursued by Shackelford's cavalry. He tried to cross at Blennerhassett's Ford on the 19th, but a Federal boat intercepted him. He fled onward, toward the north now, coming into contact with Federal detachments and losing his men. At last with a few trusty followers he was captured by Shackelford's cavalry at New Lisbon, on the 26th, a place which is nearly west from the point where the Ohio River crosses the Pennsylvania line. Although Morgan's force was thus destroyed, except the three hundred men who crossed at Belleville, and finally reached Knoxville, yet this bold achievement did much to delay the movements of Burnside and Rosecrans on Knoxville and Tullahoma; and it gave time for the transfer of Longstreet's troops from Virginia to Bragg before a battle could be forced by the Federals. What it might have accomplished, if Lee had only been victorious at Gettysburg, we can only imagine.

By a well-planned and well-executed series of manoeuvres Rosecrans, in the fortnight between the 23d of

June and the 6th of July, forced Bragg to evacuate his positions along Duck River and fall back upon Chattanooga. He also inflicted upon Bragg's army, during the movement, a loss of some two thousand men and much war material, while himself losing not over five hundred men.

Bragg's retreat to Chattanooga.

Burnside with a force of some twenty thousand men, called the Army of the Ohio, now advanced from Lexington in Kentucky to the relief of East Tennessee, which district, on account of its loyalty to the Union, had been made to suffer most severe hardships during the long Confederate occupation. The Confederate General Buckner was in command of nearly twenty thousand men in and around Knoxville. Burnside's men being largely mounted traversed the country between Lexington and the gaps of the Cumberland Mountains very rapidly. He seized upon these without much opposition, and by the 1st of September he was at Kingston.

On the 3d he entered Knoxville, Buckner's forces having hastily retreated before him, one part of them, under the personal command of Buckner, going toward Chattanooga, and the other part, led by General Jones, going toward Abingdon in Virginia. A few days later Burnside's forces captured Cumberland Gap, taking the entire garrison prisoners of war.

Burnside's occupation of Knoxville.

At the same time, Rosecrans, by a series of clever movements, which made Bragg think that he was trying to join Burnside above Chattanooga and come down upon this place from the north-east, and drew Bragg's attention in that direction, succeeded in throwing his own army, almost unmolested, across the Tennessee River, and in seizing the mountain ridges to the south-east of Chattanooga.

Bragg was thus forced to evacuate Chattanooga in

order to prevent the severing of his connections with Dalton, and that part of the Confederacy lying east of the Alleghanies. On September 9th, a brigade of Crittenden's division occupied Chattanooga.

The evacuation of Chattanooga by the Confederates.

Rosecrans supposed that Bragg was retreating upon Atlanta. He, therefore, ordered McCook, in command of his right wing, to march direct to Summerville, Thomas, with the centre, to La Fayette, and Crittenden, with the left, to Ringgold. The length of the Federal line from the extreme right to the extreme left was thus about fifty miles. It was a dangerous situation, and Rosecrans would never have placed his army in it except for the belief that Bragg was in full retreat toward Atlanta. In this he was destined soon to find that he was woefully mistaken. In fact, Bragg had seized on and was firmly holding the first point at which Rosecrans could concentrate his army after passing it through the gaps of Lookout Ridge, viz., LaFayette, a place some thirty miles south from Chattanooga.

Rosecrans's blunders in the pursuit of Bragg.


It was at this juncture that Longstreet's soldiers began to arrive and also reinforcements from Johnston in Mississippi. Bragg's force was now increased to nearly sixty thousand men. He now outnumbered Rosecrans by some five thousand men. He had already attempted to take advantage of the scattered condition of the Federals, but his officers were out-maneuvred by the Union generals, and Rosecrans succeeded in concentrating his army, about the 17th of September, along the west bank of the Chickamauga River in the neighborhood of Gordon's Mills. Rosecrans had also received reinforcement. Granger's division had come to him. The two armies were now nearly equal in numbers.

The arrival of Longstreet's corps from Virginia.

Position and strength of the Federals.

On the 18th, Bragg began his movement for turning the Federal left, and placing himself between the Federal army and Chattanooga. A powerful Confederate column moved down the east bank of the Chickamauga and forced a passage, thus almost placing itself between the Federal left wing, under Crittenden, and Chattanooga. The Federals were, however, aware of the peril which impended. During the night of the 18th-19th, the Federal centre, under Thomas, was brought around to the left of Crittenden and the Federal right wing was moved into the position vacated by Thomas. The left wing of the Federal army was now composed of Thomas's corps, the centre of Crittenden's and the right of McCook's. By this movement Rosecrans again covered Chattanooga. The Federal army was now in order of battle, as has been just described, with the modification that Negley's division of Thomas's corps was on Crittenden's right, and Granger's division was in reserve.

The Confederate army was organized into two wings, the right commanded by Polk, and the left, at first, by Hood. The battle began about nine o'clock in the morning of the 19th. The Confederates were still pursuing their plan for turning the Federal left and seizing the road to Chattanooga. But, as we have seen, it was right here that Rosecrans had succeeded in placing his best troops, commanded by his most capable lieutenant. All day long the battle raged, chiefly at this point, but the Federals stood their ground and inflicted a decided repulse upon the Confederates. The necessities of the battle had, during the day, drawn Palmer's division of Crittenden's corps and Johnson's division of McCook's corps to the aid of Thomas, and in the night of the 19th-20th Rosecrans sent Negley's division also to him. This left Crittenden with only two divisions in the centre and



Chickamauga Campaign.



McCook with only two divisions on the right. Thomas had six divisions on the left. The centre and right were, however, drawn a little closer toward the left, and breastworks of felled trees were constructed chiefly in front of Thomas. On the side of the Confederates, the chief change made during the night of the 19th was in consequence of the arrival of Longstreet in person with the remainder of his troops. Bragg placed him in command of his left wing, instead of Hood, and sent Polk reinforcements led by Breckenridge. He still adhered to his plan of turning the Union left.

The battle was re-opened about ten o'clock in the morning of the 20th. Still the efforts of the Confederates could effect nothing against Thomas. It seemed, however, to both Thomas and Rosecrans that almost the whole Confederate army was assailing that part of the Federal line, and Thomas urgently requested Rosecrans to strengthen him still further. Rosecrans now made the unfortunate move which lost him the battle. He ordered Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps and Sheridan's division of McCook's corps to march toward Thomas's position. This movement left the right wing of the Federal army weak and attenuated.

Longstreet with his fine troops from Virginia was now opposite this part of the Federal line, watching for the opportune moment to overwhelm it. It came quickly, and as usual by a misunderstanding of orders. Rosecrans instructed Wood's division of Crittenden's corps to close up on Reynolds's division of Thomas's corps. Wood was confused by the order, since Brannan's division of Thomas's corps was between his own division and that of Reynolds's. He at last interpreted the order to mean that he should go to the support of Reynolds. He was even then skirmishing with the Confederates advancing upon

The disaster
to the Federal
right wing.

his front, but he suddenly withdrew his division from the line in order to pass behind Brannan and go to the support of Reynolds. This left an open space in the Federal line between Brannan and Davis's division of McCook's corps, the only division left on the right wing. Davis attempted to fill it up by extending his line toward Brannan, but Longstreet was too quick for him. He poured his fresh troops through the gap in the line, attacked the Federals in flank and rear, and inflicted a terrible defeat upon the right wing almost before its commanders knew what had happened to them. The column of fugitives rushed toward Chattanooga, by way of McFarland's Gap, driving along with it all the officers, who were struggling in vain to restore order, McCook, Crittenden, Davis, Sheridan, and the rest. Even Rosecrans himself was swept along, and seemed to have lost not only control of the army, but control of himself. He stopped at Rossville long enough to send back word to Thomas to take full command on the battlefield, and then proceeded to Chattanooga to prepare a place of refuge for his broken forces.

Meanwhile Thomas had gone toward the right in person and, ably assisted by Brannan, had so reformed the centre and placed its detachments in favorable positions as to check somewhat the Confederate advance. At the same moment Granger came up with his reserve division, and with a fresh supply of ammunition. The Confederates were now repulsed with considerable loss. They, however, renewed their attack on the Federal left, and the battle gradually extended again along the whole line.

This was the situation when Rosecrans's chief of staff, General Garfield, delivered to Thomas the communication from the commander-in-chief. Thomas interpreted these instructions as a command to retreat to Chattanooga as quickly as the movement

The Federal
retreat.

could be safely accomplished. During the night, therefore, he brought his troops successfully, but with difficulty, back to Rossville, and on the morning of the 21st the entire army was in temporary safety in and around Chattanooga.

The losses on both sides had been terrible. The Federal killed and wounded numbered nearly twelve thousand men, and in addition thereto about five thousand of the Unionists were captured.

The losses.

The Confederate killed and wounded reached a somewhat higher figure. They lost, however, but few prisoners.

So soon as Bragg was certain that Rosecrans had stopped his retreat behind the fortifications of Chattanooga, he prepared himself to begin the siege.

On the 23d, the right of his army, commanded by Polk, occupied Missionary Ridge, while Longstreet threw out the left wing so as to rest upon that part of Lookout Mountain next to the Tennessee River, around the base of which ran the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, over which line Rosecrans's army received its supplies. This line was now cut, and Rosecrans was obliged to haul his supplies in wagons from Jasper up the Sequatchie Valley and then across Walden Ridge to Chattanooga. This was practicable in the early autumn, but when the rains of the late autumn and winter should set in, the already execrable roads would become entirely impassable. Of course this long line from Jasper would be, at all times, exposed to the raids of the Confederate cavalry. It was thus entirely evident that Rosecrans's army would be starved in Chattanooga, unless relieved quickly from without. The authorities at Washington were fully aware of the situation, and they set themselves to work to provide the relief.

The advance of the Confederates on Chattanooga, and the beginning of the siege.

On the 24th of September they started Hooker with the corps of Howard and Slocum, taken from the Army of the Potomac, to Chattanooga. These splendid troops, about twenty thousand strong, arrived at Bridgeport, about thirty miles west from Chattanooga, the last of the month. Of course they could go no farther at the moment. Longstreet's forces were between them and Chattanooga.

Already ten days before the battle of Chickamauga, Halleck had telegraphed Grant, at Vicksburg, to send all the troops he could spare to Memphis by boat, and march them from Memphis to Tuscumbia in Alabama. He appeared to think that Bragg would flank Rosecrans by the south-west and move up again into Middle or West Tennessee. It was four days after the battle that Grant received this order. Grant was suffering from a fall from his horse, but he immediately set to work to obey the order. He collected six of the nine divisions of his army at Memphis, and about the 10th of October, this large force, led by Sherman, began to move eastward.

Meanwhile Grant himself had been ordered to go to Cairo. When he arrived there, he met the Secretary of War, who had brought to him from the President his appointment to the command of all the troops west of the Alleghanies and east of the Mississippi. These were, at the moment, organized into four distinct bodies, viz.: Grant's old Army of the Tennessee, Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland, Burnside's Army of the Ohio, and Hooker's two corps at Bridgeport. Grant was now charged with the great work of relieving Chattanooga from Bragg's investment, and he had all the forces of the Union, between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, at his command for its accomplishment.

The situation at Chattanooga was, indeed, becoming very critical. On the 26th of September, Wheeler started from the banks of the Chickamanga to go up the Tennessee in order to cross over into Rosecrans's rear, and destroy the Federal supply-trains coming from Jasper up the Sequatchie Valley and over Walden Ridge.

The situation at Chattanooga in the last days of September, and Wheeler's raid.

He drove the Federal cavalry across the Hiawassee at Charleston and forced them back upon and across the Tennessee at Loudon. These actions of the Federals made him quite certain that they were not supported by Burnside, and that Burnside was remaining quietly in Knoxville, instead of advancing toward Chattanooga in aid of Rosecrans. Thus assured, he crossed his own forces over the Tennessee about the 1st of October. He immediately proceeded to Pikeville in the Sequatchie Valley and started down the Valley toward the point where the wagon road from Jasper turns out of the Valley southward, across Walden Ridge, in the direction of Chattanooga. The Federals now divined his purpose, and Crook with his cavalry brigade followed from above, while General Dan McCook with another cavalry brigade started from Bridgeport up the Sequatchie Valley to meet him. Wheeler now divided his force, sending a part of it under Wharton to McMinnville, which place was also a depot of Federal supplies. Wheeler calculated that Crook would pursue this body and leave him free to go down the Sequatchie in search of Rosecrans's trains from Jasper. In this he was correct. He succeeded in meeting, capturing and burning a great train of several hundred wagons, loaded with supplies, before Crook could overtake him or McCook head him off. McCook arrived in time to view the smoking ruins, and drove Wheeler back up the valley. Wheeler, however, soon

Destruction of the Federal supply-train.

turned out of the Valley northward toward McMinnville. He rejoined Wharton's detachment near this place, and entered the town, capturing and destroying the Federal stores here also. He now directed his course toward Murfreesborough, a still more important Federal depot. Crook was, however, in hot pursuit, and so admirably did the General manoeuvre his forces as to get into Murfreesborough in advance of Wheeler. McCook was now also on Wheeler's track. The Confederate partisan had, however, accomplished his work and he retreated hastily across the Tennessee near Florence. Rosecrans's army was, by the loss of its great wagon train, reduced to short rations, with the prospect of starvation unless soon relieved.

It was now the middle of October. Sherman had reached Corinth, and on the 20th he arrived at Eastport, on the Tennessee. About the same time Grant, with a few attendants, started from Cairo to go to Chattanooga and assume command in the face of the Confederates. He telegraphed Rosecrans, relieving him of the command of the Army of the Cumberland. He also telegraphed to Thomas, appointing him to the vacant position, and commanding him not to abandon Chattanooga. On the 23d, Grant arrived in person and assumed the superior command. He found the army reduced to about fifty thousand combatants, while the Confederates numbered about seventy thousand. The presence of the hero of the Vicksburg campaign gave, naturally, new courage to the disheartened soldiers, and Grant set at once about the work of delivery. His plan, quickly formed, was to re-open water and railroad communication with Bridgeport, by means of Hooker's troops, then at Bridgeport. The position of Longstreet on Lookout Mountain seemed to prevent this. The Confederates themselves thought

Grant and
Sherman en
route for Chat-
tanooga.

so. But Grant learned from Thomas and W. F. Smith that Lookout Mountain did not really command the ways from Bridgeport to Chattanooga, but that a range west of the Lookout Ridge did do so. This range was called Raccoon Mountain. Grant also learned that Longstreet had not occupied Raccoon Mountain with any considerable force. He now determined at once to bring Hooker from Bridgeport to Raccoon Mountain, have him seize this position, and join Thomas at a ferry on the Tennessee, a few miles below Chattanooga, and around the point of Lookout Mountain, called Brown's Ferry. The river makes a great bend northward at this point, and if Hooker could reach Brown's and protect the railroad from Bridgeport to the neighborhood of Brown's, then the supplies for Chattanooga could be easily transported across the river at this ferry and hauled to Chattanooga over the peninsula made by the bend in the river. In execution of this plan, Hooker was ordered to start from Bridgeport on the 26th with about three-quarters of his force, and advance through the defiles of Raccoon Mountain by way of Wauhatchie, until he should reach the valley separating Raccoon Mountain from Lookout Mountain, then turn down this valley and march toward Brown's Ferry.

Opening of
the line of
communication
between
Bridgeport
and Chat-
tanooga.

In the early morning of the 27th, several hours before daylight, some twelve hundred picked men embarked at Chattanooga in small boats, built for the purpose of constructing a pontoon bridge, and, dropping quietly down the river under cover of the darkness, landed on the south side at Brown's. They ran quickly up the bank, drove the few Confederate pickets away, and established themselves in a strong position. The boats recrossed at once, and brought over the troops of Hazen's brigade, and then of

Seizure of
Brown's Fer-
ry by the Fed-
erals.

Turchin's, who repelled the Confederate assault made upon the position first occupied. The bridge was then laid across the river at this point. Hooker was equally successful. On the 28th, the head of his column arrived in the neighborhood of Brown's. Longstreet now at last understood the Federal movements, and undertook to strike Hooker in the flank. In the night of the 28th, a short, sharp battle ensued, in which Hooker was victorious, and forced open his way to Brown's. On the 29th, the junction with the forces at Brown's was effected, and the way from Bridgeport to Chattanooga, both by the river and the railroad, was opened.

Battle between Hooker and Longstreet.

Instead of strengthening Longstreet, and making an effort to capture the passes of Raccoon Mountain between Bridgeport and Brown's, Bragg now resolved to send Longstreet to destroy Burnside at Knoxville. His idea was to accomplish this before Sherman's forces should arrive at Chattanooga, and thus deliver his army before Chattanooga from the danger of a descent of Burnside from Knoxville upon its flank and rear. He also calculated to have Longstreet's soldiers back again before Grant could be in a condition to offer battle. Longstreet set out upon this expedition on the 4th of November. He had about twenty thousand men. He marched them to Tyner's Station on the railroad from Chattanooga to Knoxville, and transported them in cars from this point to Sweetwater Station, a place about fifteen miles southwest of Loudon. From here he began operations against Burnside's army. Burnside succeeded, by dint of good manœuvring, in concentrating most of his force in Knoxville, and in keeping open his communications with the country east of Knoxville from which to draw supplies. He also succeeded in fortifying his positions

Longstreet's expedition against Knoxville.

on both sides of the Holston River at Knoxville. Besides Knoxville, Burnside held Kingston, lower down the river. Burnside's plan was to detain Longstreet before Knoxville until Sherman should arrive at Chattanooga, and Grant, thus reinforced, should defeat Bragg. Grant could then easily relieve Knoxville. On the 19th Longstreet took his position in front of the fortifications at Knoxville, and began the siege. He soon found that the place was too strong to be The siege of Knoxville. carried by an assault, and he settled down to the work of advancing by regular approaches. He was reinforced by two brigades from Buckner's division, raising his numbers to about twenty-five thousand men, while Burnside had less than twenty thousand. What would have been the outcome, if left to themselves, it would be difficult to say, but at this juncture came the movements around Chattanooga which were destined to put an end to the siege first of Chattanooga and then of Knoxville.

The head of Sherman's column arrived at Bridgeport on the 13th of November. Leaving his troops there, Sherman went in person to Chattanooga to Sherman's arrival at Chattanooga, and the plan of operations fixed. meet Grant, and to arrange with him the plan of his advance to Chattanooga with the troops in Bridgeport. He spent the 16th with Grant and Thomas, and it was decided by them that Sherman's troops should march around Chattanooga on the north, by roads out of the reach and view of the Confederates, to the point on the Tennessee above Chattanooga at which the North Chickamauga flows into it, and cross the Tennessee on pontoons at this point. This would place Sherman in a position to attack the north end of Missionary Ridge, on which the right wing of Bragg's army rested. The Confederates had not occupied this point of the ridge in much force,

and Grant calculated that Sherman could easily gain a foothold here, and could then move along the ridge southward without much difficulty, since the Confederate artillery and intrenchments faced westward toward Chattanooga. The Confederates once flanked in this manner, it was the further plan to hurl the Army of the Cumberland against Bragg's entire line and complete the victory.

Sherman's troops did not arrive at the point on the river above Chattanooga until the evening of the 23d.

The Federal reconnoissance of the 23d. During the day Grant, impatient with the delay, had been feeling Bragg's position by means of a strong reconnoissance. Two brigades of Wood's division of Granger's corps, led by Willich and Hazen, made a brilliant assault upon a Confederate position on Indian Hill, and captured it. It was a strong advance post, and Grant ordered it to be held and intrenched. From this point Grant had a good view of the Confederate line, and in assailing it he had directed the attention of the Confederates away from the real point of attack to be made by Sherman.

Grant had not planned to have Hooker take any important part in the impending battle. Hooker's troops were beyond Lookout Mountain from the contemplated battle-field, and Grant intended for them only the rôle of making such a demonstration as would detain the Confederates on Lookout Mountain from going to the aid of Bragg's right wing on Missionary Ridge. One of Hooker's corps, that commanded by Howard, had been moved up the river above Chattanooga on the south side to join and co-operate with Sherman when the latter should effect his crossing. But one of Sherman's divisions, that commanded by Osterhaus, had been left on the west side of Lookout Mountain by the washing away of the pontoons at Brown's. This, if joined with

Hooker, would so increase his force, as to enable him to do something more than make a demonstration. On the night of the 23d, Grant sent Hooker word, that if the bridge across the Tennessee should not be sufficiently repaired to allow Osterhaus to ^{The battle of Lookout Mountain.} cross over early in the morning of the 24th, he might attempt, with the assistance of Osterhaus's division, to capture Lookout Mountain. The bridge was not re-established by the time designated, and Hooker was eager to undertake the new rôle assigned him. He caused Osterhaus to make a strong diversion at a point opposite the northern extremity of Lookout Mountain both with infantry and artillery. He then sent Geary with two brigades farther southward to turn the Confederate position by ascending Lookout Ridge at a point comparatively undefended. Once gaining the crest of the ridge at this point, Geary was to move northward along the same and drive the Confederates before him. Geary did his assigned work with great promptness and thoroughness. While the attention of the Confederates was attracted to the bridge across Lookout Creek, Geary went farther up the stream, forded it, turned the Confederate position at the bridge, and rapidly gained the crest of the ridge. Nearly a thousand Confederates were killed, wounded and captured in this movement which cost the Federals only a nominal loss. The Confederate commander on the northern summit, General Stevenson, now sent reinforcements to his brigadier, Pettus, whose troops had been thus routed by Geary's advance. By the aid of these Pettus succeeded in rallying his broken line. Another sharp contest ensued, but the Federals continued to advance steadily, driving their adversaries before them along the ridge. It was now about the middle of the afternoon. At this juncture Carlin's brigade of Palmer's corps of the Army of

the Cumberland advanced from the east side of the mountain to meet Geary on the crest. The junction of the two forces was accomplished about five o'clock in the afternoon, and the Confederate force on the summit was now very nearly hemmed in upon all sides. An hour or so more of daylight would probably have enabled the Federals to capture them. Fortunately for them, darkness now intervened, and under its friendly cover they effected their escape to Rossville. On the morning of the 25th, the Union flag was flying from the summit of Lookout Mountain, and Hooker was in communication with Thomas's right. In fact, Hooker's troops now composed the right wing of the great army under the command of Grant.

The capture of Lookout Mountain, and the crossing of the Tennessee by Sherman's troops.

Soon after midnight, that is, in the morning of the 24th, Sherman began to cross his men over the Tennessee at the designated point. The first were carried over in the boats, which were to sustain the bridge, and then when the flooring was laid over them, the men marched over. In the early afternoon of the 24th, Sherman's troops, consisting of three divisions of his own corps, and Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland, were assembled on the south side of the river. He immediately formed his men in order of battle, and ordered three divisions forward up the northern slopes of Missionary Ridge. They climbed up to the crest without meeting any resistance worth the mention. Sherman was greatly surprised by his easy victory, but when he arrived at the topmost point it was all explained to him at a glance. He had only ascended a detached peak. The real ridge, upon which the Confederates lay intrenched, was separated from him by a deep valley. It was evident that the battle must now be deferred until the 25th, and be fought on a somewhat different plan.

After the retreat from Lookout Mountain in the night of the 24th-25th, the Confederate army was all gathered on the slopes and summit of Missionary Ridge from around Rossville to the northern extremity of the Ridge. It numbered about forty thousand men with one hundred pieces of cannon. This was now the position and the force against which Grant must hurl his army of nearly double the number of men, on the 25th. Grant's plan was to have Hooker attack the Confederate left near Rossville, and Sherman attack their right on the north end of Missionary Ridge, at about the same time, and then, upon the success of either, to hurl the vast mass of the Army of the Cumberland against the centre of the Confederate line.

The battle
of Missionary
Ridge.

Sherman began his attack early in the forenoon. Cleburne's division of Hardee's corps, the élite of the Confederate army, occupied the position against which he directed his advance. He did not attack in great force owing to the fact that the topography of the battle-field at this point did not favor the deploy of large bodies. The Federals, led by Corse, almost reached the summit of the ridge, but the Confederates stood their ground and inflicted a repulse upon their adversaries. Both sides were reinforced, and an indecisive conflict was fought for four hours at this point, the Federal line now advancing and now receding up and down the slope. Grant ordered Howard's entire corps to go to the aid of Sherman, but Sherman did not use Howard's troops. He was waiting for the Army of the Cumberland to advance to the attack. That is, he was waiting for Thomas while Thomas was waiting for him. He, however, sent two brigades down the foot of the ridge to try the ascent at a point farther south. They were met, however, by Gist's Confederate division, which succeeded in tak-

ing the advancing Federals in the flank, and routing them.

With this Grant turned his hopes on Hooker. Hooker had crossed Chattanooga Creek and had so threatened the Confederate left, as to cause Bragg to send it reinforcements from his centre. He had not yet, however, made the attack for which Grant was waiting. The middle of the afternoon had arrived, and the battle seemed to be at a standstill. Grant now resolved to go forward with the attack upon the Confederate centre.

About four o'clock, eleven brigades of the Army of the Cumberland, containing nearly twenty-five thousand men, led by such chiefs as Sheridan, Wood, Johnson and Baird, moved forward against the centre of the Confederate line, which was defended by fifteen thousand men and fifty pieces of cannon. The undertaking seemed almost desperate, and it looked as if the catastrophe of Marye's Heights would be repeated. But such was not the case. These splendid regiments fairly ran across the plain and up the slopes of the ridge through shot and shell and bullets, and by one of the most magnificent charges known to military history broke the Confederate centre, captured its positions, and drove the troops which composed it, pell mell down the east side of the ridge. By a quick movement, however, Hardee threw some regiments of Cheatham's division across the ridge, and barred the advance of the Federals along the ridge northward, and thus saved the right wing of the Confederate army. But Hooker had now gained the crest of the ridge on the flank of the Confederate left wing, and was driving Stewart's division before him, pressing it harder and harder until it was completely routed.

With the exception of the right wing, the Confederate army was now a mass of fugitives, trying to gain the

cover of the Chickamauga River. The right was also in retreat, but in an orderly manner. Night had spread its protecting mantle over the battle-field, but ^{The Federal} the Federals pressed forward by the light of ^{victory.} a full moon. The Confederates succeeded, however, in crossing the Chickamauga and destroying the bridge behind them.

It was a great victory for the Federals, but purchased at a great loss. Nearly six thousand of them had fallen in killed and wounded. The Con- ^{The losses.} federates lost about seven thousand men, more than four thousand of whom were captured uninjured.

Grant's chief solicitude now was to prevent Bragg from sending any aid to Longstreet in front of Knoxville. With this in view Long's brigade of cavalry had been sent, on the 24th, eastward toward ^{Grant's at-} Cleveland with orders to cut the railroad lines ^{tempt to re-} connecting Bragg with Longstreet. Having accom- ^{lieve Burn-} plished this on the 25th and 26th, Long entered Cleve- ^{side.} land on the 26th, and destroyed a large quantity of Confederate stores in depot there.

On the morning of the 26th, Sherman's soldiers crossed the Chickamauga in pursuit of Hardee's corps. They overtook the Confederate rear-guard a little beyond Chickamauga Station on the railroad ^{The pursuit} from Chattanooga to Ringgold. The Confed- ^{of Bragg's} erates retreated rapidly in the direction of Ringgold, ^{forces.} skirmishing with the Federal advance. By the evening of the 26th, Sherman's advance troops were near Graysville. Hooker with the Federal right wing was also in full pursuit by way of Rossville. In the early evening of the 26th, his advance reached that point in the road from Rossville to Ringgold, where the road from Graysville to Ringgold joins with it. It was here that Hooker's men struck the rear of Breckenridge's fleeing soldiers

and scattered them. Then turning up the road toward Graysville they struck Hardee's rear going out of Graysville by a more direct way to Ringgold, and drove it along. The retreating Confederates under Hardee and Breckenridge formed a junction near Ringgold, and Cleburne and Gist, with their divisions, undertook to delay the Federal advance until the scattered forces of Bragg could reach the cover of the Chattooga Mountains at Dalton. They posted their soldiers along White Oak Ridge and Taylor's Ridge, just east of Ringgold, and held Hooker at bay during the 27th, but Howard's corps moving from Graysville turned Cleburne's position and forced him to retreat hastily toward Dalton. The Confederates thus succeeded in gaining the cover of the Chattooga Mountains and established themselves at Dalton.

On the 28th, Grant deputed Sherman to go to the relief of Knoxville. It was understood, from Burnside's Sherman's troops ordered to go to Knoxville. advices, that the garrison would not be able to hold out against hunger beyond the 3d of December. Sherman started from his position around Cleveland on the 29th of November. He had with him a large part of the troops of the Army of the Tennessee, Howard's entire corps, and detachments from the corps of Granger and Palmer. The army thus marching to the rescue of Knoxville numbered nearly forty thousand men.

Longstreet had heard of the disaster of Missionary Ridge, and he determined to storm the town before Sherman could arrive. He ordered the attack to begin before daylight in the morning of the 29th. The point to be assaulted was the strongest part of the Union line, Fort Sanders. It was almost directly west of the town and on the north side of the river. The fort was not entirely finished, indeed, and its garrison consisted of only about one regiment of

infantry, and two batteries of artillery. They were well commanded, however, by General Ferrero and Lieutenant Benjamin, and they had timely warning of the Confederate attack.

Before the day dawned the soldiers of McLaws's division rushed upon the works. They were met by a murderous discharge of grape and canister and musket-balls. But on they went. They even reached and sprang into the ditch, and began to climb the parapet. The Federals, however, stood their ground and shot down their adversaries as they showed themselves upon the wall. A few of the Confederates got into the fort, but they were immediately captured. Meanwhile the artillery fire was kept up against those still beyond the ditch, and lighted bombshells were thrown down upon those in the ditch. Mortal men could stand no longer the iron hail. The Confederates broke and fled, after losing nearly eight hundred men, killed and wounded, in a period of half an hour. The attack on the fortifications on the other side of the river was momentarily successful, but the Federals soon rallied and drove the forces of Longstreet back again. The Confederate attempt had, thus, entirely failed, and Longstreet now saw himself necessitated to retreat, either toward Virginia, or toward Bragg at Dalton. He soon decided that he could not meet Sherman, who was now blocking the way to Dalton. He must go toward Virginia. He determined, however, not to raise the siege until the last moment. He calculated, by this means, to draw Sherman after him, and thus relieve Bragg.

On the 2d of December, the bulk of Sherman's forces were at Philadelphia. On the 3d, Howard's corps was at Loudon, still thirty miles from Knoxville. He tried to warn Burnside of his approach by firing cannon. Sherman

Sherman's
march to
Knoxville.

also sent Colonel Long to find his way as best he could to the besieged army. The Confederates had burned the bridge at Loudon, and Howard was therefore obliged to go up the Tennessee to a point above the junction of the Holston with it in order to find a passable ford. It was now, however, the 5th, before Howard and Sherman succeeded in crossing the Tennessee. The Holston was still between them and Knoxville, as well as the thirty miles of land. Blair's corps of the Army of the Tennessee now pressed rapidly forward, and by the evening of the 5th was within a dozen miles of Knoxville. Sherman's anxiety for the besieged was now dispelled by reliable news from Knoxville in regard to the repulse inflicted on the Confederates in front of Fort Sanders, and in regard to the sufficiency of supplies at Knoxville to feed Burnside's army for some days longer.

Longstreet knew of Sherman's approach, and decided that the moment had arrived for him to begin his march around Knoxville toward Virginia. In the night of the 4th, his troops moved quietly from their positions, and by daylight were well out of immediate danger. Sherman rode into Knoxville on the 6th, and was greeted with great enthusiasm by both the troops and the citizens. His army was, however, too much fatigued to follow Longstreet immediately, and Burnside now instructed Sherman to return to Grant with his entire force, less Granger's corps. With this corps, Burnside's army would number thirty thousand men, and would be sufficiently strong, in Burnside's view, to follow Longstreet.

A strong Federal column commanded by General Parke pursued Longstreet to Rutledge. After a sharp fight between Shackelford's cavalry and several of Longstreet's regiments at Bean's Station, in which each side lost about two hundred and

Longstreet's
retreat from
Knoxville, and
the entry of
Sherman's
army.

The pursuit
of Longstreet.

fifty men, killed and wounded, Longstreet withdrew to Russellville, where he proposed to winter his troops.

In the last days of the month, Grant went in person to Knoxville, and having decided that the Army of the Ohio was in no condition to make a winter campaign, he ordered its new commander, General Foster, who had succeeded Burnside some days before, to cease the pursuit of Longstreet, and go into winter quarters.

Sherman was sent to Bridgeport for the winter, Thomas was left in Chattanooga, and Dodge was stationed with a division at Pulaski, in the southern part of Middle Tennessee, to keep open the Nashville and Decatur Railroad. The Confederate President displaced Bragg and put J. E. Johnston in command at Dalton, where the defeated army had established its winter encampment.

Disposition
of the armies
in Northern
Georgia and
East Tennes-
see during the
winter of
1863-64.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE MOVEMENTS IN NORTH-EASTERN VIRGINIA IN THE AUTUMN OF 1863, AND THE CHARLESTON EXPEDITION

Lee's Manœuvre to Turn Meade's Right—Meade's Retreat toward Washington—The Retreat of the Confederates and the Federal Pursuit—Meade's Attempt to Turn Lee's Right—Assembly of Federal Troops on Folly Island—The Attempt to Occupy Morris Island—Fort Wagner—The Siege of Fort Wagner—The Attempt to Take Fort Sumter—The Texas Expedition—The French in Mexico—The Capture of Fort Esperanza.

WHEN, in the last days of September, Lee learned that the corps of Howard and Slocum had been detached from the Army of the Potomac, and sent to Tennessee, he resolved to take advantage of the weakened condition of his adversary, and make an offensive movement. His plan was to turn Meade's right, and place himself between the Federal army and Washington. The move-

ment began about the 8th of October. Lee
Lee's ma-
nœuvre to turn
Meade's right. marched his troops first southward in order
to decoy the Federals across the Rapidan.

He then turned his columns suddenly westward. Meade was at first deceived, and ordered his troops to cross the Rapidan, but before any of his infantry had passed over he learned of the change in the direction of the march of the Confederates, and recalled his troops to Culpeper. He now saw that he must go back behind the Rappahannock. He succeeded in crossing his infantry over on the 11th, without opposition, but his cavalry had a

sharp fight to save itself. At the same time Lee occupied Culpeper with Ewell's troops. Meade thought that the entire Confederate army was there, and was waiting there for him. He sent Warren, now commanding Hancock's corps, Sykes and Sedgwick back across the Rappahannock, on the 12th, to feel of them. But Lee was again pursuing his flanking march. Meade had thrown forces out on his right, and they struck the Confederate column on the 12th, but strangely enough, they did not inform Meade of the situation on his right until near midnight of the 12th. He then became aware that Lee's forces had crossed the Rappahannock at Sulphur Springs. He now comprehended that Lee was trying to anticipate him at Bristoe Station on the railroad connecting his army with Washington, and force him to attack the Confederates in a position chosen by themselves.

On the 13th Lee's army was assembled in Warrenton, preparatory to pushing on to Bristoe. The Federals were at the same time retreating rapidly along the railroad. The covering of the retreat fell to the lot of the gallant and capable Warren. Just as Warren's troops arrived at Broad Run in the afternoon of the 14th, Heth's division of Hill's corps struck them. But Warren turned and inflicted a severe repulse upon the Confederates. He then proceeded during the night of the 14th to Centreville, whither the whole army was concentrating.

Meade's retreat toward Washington.

Having reached the line of Chantilly-Centreville successfully, Meade turned to give battle, but Lee now decided that he could not hazard a battle with Meade in this position. He had probably disabled Meade from doing anything before going into winter quarters, and had thus gained a considerable advantage. He thought now only of withdrawing to a safe position for his own

winter's rest. Making a vigorous demonstration with his cavalry in order to cover his movements, and confuse Meade, he began his retreat on the 18th.

So soon as Meade's mind became clear as to Lee's movements, he set his army in pursuit, but the Confederates had gained too much ground to be overtaken. With only a sharp cavalry brush on the 19th, the Confederates got back safely to Culpeper toward the end of the month, and the Federals halted at Warrenton Junction.

The retreat
of the Confederates,
and the
Federal pursuit.

The weather was, however, still fine, and Meade resolved to make another effort to destroy Lee's army before settling down for the winter. On the 7th of November, he put his army in motion, with the Rappahannock bridge and Kelly's Ford as the objective points. One of Birney's divisions quickly and easily captured the ford and drove the Confederate posts away. Farther up, however, at the bridge, the Confederates had some detachments on the north side of the river, protected by some earthworks. Sedgwick's troops arrived before these intrenchments in the late afternoon, and in the darkness of the night Russell's brigade scaled the works and fairly destroyed the whole garrison, before Lee could send it any support from the south side of the river. Lee now felt that he must withdraw behind the cover of the Rapidan.

On the 9th the Federals occupied the district between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan. Lee's front was now protected by the Rapidan, and by a creek which runs out of the Wilderness into the Rapidan at a point some fifteen miles above the confluence of the Rapidan with the Rappahannock, called Mine Run.

Meade could not turn Lee's left without leaving Washington exposed, and he considered a front attack as too hazardous. The only course left to him was to cross the

Rapidan below the point of confluence of Mine Run with it, ascend the northern bank of Mine Run, and, crossing over beyond the eastern extremity of Lee's line, turn the Confederate right. ^{Meade's attempt to turn Lee's right.} From the 26th of November to the 1st of December, Meade endeavored to execute this movement. But Lee discovered his plan by the 27th, and succeeded in concentrating his entire force on the banks of Mine Run, and in placing them in such strong positions, that the Federals finally gave up the enterprise and, covered by the darkness, retired across the Rapidan during the night of the 1st of December. The two armies now went into winter quarters; the one around Culpeper, and the other around Orange.

The campaign of 1863 had, thus, been almost everywhere most disastrous to the Confederates. It seemed as if they were nearing the point of exhaustion. Had three months of good weather remained after the battle of Chattanooga, it does seem as if the war might then have been terminated. But the long, cold winter of 1863-64, and the execrable roads of the South, saved the Confederacy for another great effort. Another year and more of the great agony was to be borne, thousands more of firesides were to be laid waste, and those accustomed to gather by them to be scattered and destroyed, while the hearts of those away from the scenes of immediate action were still to be wrung by more and greater sacrifices than those already suffered. The horrible passions born of war were now running at their highest, and rivers of blood were still necessary to quench them, or rather to stop the beatings of the hearts animated by them.

The attempt of Gilmore and Dahlgren to capture Charleston was the one note of failure in the great movements of the Federal armies during the summer and au-

tumn of 1863. Beauregard's garrison at Charleston had been reduced in number of troops in order to send reinforcements to the armies in Mississippi and Virginia. In the middle of the year he had only about six thousand men at Charleston. Gilmore began in June to gather

Assembly of
Federal troops
on Folly Isl-
and.

troops on Folly Island. This place is separated from Morris Island, the northern portion of which commands the inlet to Charleston Harbor on the south, by a narrow passage called Lighthouse Inlet. The plan of the Federal chiefs was to capture Morris Island and its stronghold, Fort Wagner, gaining thus command of the entrance to the bay, and putting them in a position to demolish Fort Sumter. From about the middle of June until the end of the first week in July the Federals worked under cover of night, planting batteries on the northern end of Folly Island to protect the landing of their troops on the south end of Morris Island. They succeeded in doing this without being discovered by the Confederates.

In the forenoon of July 10th, the attempt was made by Strong's brigade to get a footing on Morris Island.

The attempt
to occupy
Morris Island.

As the boats on which they were loaded passed across Lighthouse Inlet, the Federal batteries on Folly Island opened fire, and Dahlgren's monitors shelled the Confederate works from the sea side. Under this cover, Strong's troops were quickly landed. They seized the Confederate batteries on the south end of Morris Island and pushed forward to the very front of Fort Wagner. Up to this point the movement had been successful. By making a demonstration against James Island, which lies between Charleston and Morris Island, the Federal General Terry had prevented Beauregard from sending aid to the Confederates on Morris Island.

The Federal troops now held possession of Morris

Island up to within a half mile of Fort Wagner, and Gilmore was anxious to storm the works before reinforcements could come from Charleston. He planned his attack for the morning of the 11th, but to his surprise he found, as his troops rushed to the attack, that they were met by a resistance which showed plainly that the aid had already arrived. The assault was repulsed with heavy loss to the assailants. On the evening of the 18th, a second attempt was made by Strong's brigade, with the black regiment, led by Colonel Shaw, in the advance. The artillery fire from the Federal batteries and monitors silenced the guns of the fort, but the Confederate marksmen mounted the parapets, on the approach of the Federals, and mowed them down with a murderous fire of musketry. The officers fell with the men. Both Strong and Shaw were killed. The Federals were again repulsed with great loss.

Gilmore now saw that he could take the fort only by regular approaches, and began at once the siege. From the 18th of July to the 10th of August, the Federals pushed forward their intrenched lines, until by the latter date they were within range of Fort Sumter and other Confederate works. It was now necessary to silence these before advancing farther on Fort Wagner. On the 17th the firing on Fort Sumter, from both the land batteries and the monitors, was commenced. For five or six days the walls of the fort were battered down by the enormous projectiles hurled at them. On the 23d it had been reduced to a complete ruin, and all of its guns were silenced. The garrison was still, however, within the place, and was determined to defend it against assault. They knew that the cross fire from the Confederate batteries all around them would render their capture next to impossible.

In order to prevent the Confederates from making any

further use of the ruins as shelter for mounting new guns the fort was again bombarded in the last days of August. It was thought best by the Federal commanders, however, to take Fort Wagner before making the assault upon Sumter. The approaches upon Wagner were now pushed forward until by the 6th of September the Federal intrenchments were within a few feet of the Confederate works. The assault was planned for the next day, but during the night of the 6th the garrison quietly and stealthily withdrew and escaped to Charleston.

Dahlgren now made his attempt, in the night of the 8th, to capture the garrison in Sumter, but, although he succeeded in landing an attacking party in front of the fort, he soon found that they could not climb over the ruins in the face of the musketry fire from the garrison and of the artillery fire from Sullivan's Island. On the 26th of October the ruins were again bombarded by the monitors and the Federal guns now mounted on Fort Wagner. But the result only proved to the Federals that they could not yet get into Charleston. From their position on Morris Island they had effectually closed the harbor, and released the blockading fleet from the duty of watching the inlet. With this advantage they had to be contented for the time being.

During this same period the Government undertook to organize an expedition for penetrating Texas. It was moved thereto chiefly by the French invasion of Mexico, which, beginning as a movement for forcing satisfaction for certain claims, had now developed into a settled purpose of conquest, or at least of imposing a new sovereignty upon the Mexicans. The French forces were advancing toward the boundaries of this country and the Govern-

The attempt
to take Fort
Sumter.

The Texas
expedition.

The French
in Mexico.

ment deemed it wise to prevent them from reaching a point from which they might be of service to the Confederacy. General Banks was placed in charge of the expedition. He sent a force under General Franklin, supported by some vessels commanded by Lieutenant Crocker, to effect a landing at Sabine Pass. The attempt was made on the 8th of September, but the Federals suffered a repulse. An attempt was then made, during the month of October, to reach Texas overland from the Mississippi, by way of Bayou Teche and Vermilionville. This proved a failure also. At last, however, having obtained proper naval support, Banks succeeded, in the early part of November, in occupying the towns and the country about the mouths of the Nueces and the Rio Grande. On the last day of November, he captured Fort Esperanza, the only Confederate work of any importance in the section. The capture of Fort Esperanza. With this he secured command of a large part of the Texan coast. During this same period, also, Schofield cleared Missouri and Kansas largely of the Confederate guerilla bands infesting them, and Steele took possession of Little Rock in Arkansas, while Sibley and Sully punished the Sioux Indians severely for the Minnesota raid of the preceding year.

CHAPTER XXVIII

INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION UNDER THE STRESS OF THE MILITARY EVENTS OF 1862 AND 1863

The Congressional Act of March 3, 1863, Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus—The Extent of the Power Conceded to the President by the Act—The Meaning of the Statute as an Interpretation of the Constitution—The President's Proclamation of September 15, 1863—The President's Acts—The Milligan Decision—The Control over Property Assumed by the General Government—The Ordinary Power of the Government to Tax—The Power of Congress to Exempt Property from the Operations of a Given Law of Taxation—The Tendencies to an Exaggeration of Governmental Power in the Act—The Revenue Act of July 1, 1862—The Measures for the Collection of the Revenue—The Government and the Freedom of the Press—Opinion of the Postmaster-General on the Subject—Opinion of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate on the Subject—War Powers of the Government in Respect to the Raising and Holding of Armies—The Act of March 3, 1863—The Transformation of the Monetary System under the Stress of War—Financial Situation in the First Part of 1863—The National Banking Act of February 25, 1863—The Chief Distinction between the Borrowing System of the United States and that of the Southern Confederacy—Congressional Power in the Government of the Territories and in the Admission of New States into the Union—The Creation of the Commonwealth of West Virginia—Return of Congress to the Doctrine that it may Lay upon New Commonwealths, as the Price of their Admission, Conditions not Resting on the Old Commonwealths.

THE Emancipation Proclamation and the Confiscation Act have been already sufficiently treated. This chapter will therefore be largely devoted to the development of the powers of the Government in the loyal North, at

the expense both of individual liberty and of "States' rights." Of course the natural avenue of approach to the personal liberty of individuals in the loyal section was through the fixing and administering of the criminal law. If the Government could, by virtue of its war powers, set aside the constitutional defences of the individual in criminal prosecution, then might it claim to be vested, during the period of war, with absolute power. Reference has been made to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus by the order of the President. There was no question that it might be constitutionally suspended in time of war and public danger. The questions were, who should determine when and where war or public danger existed, who should suspend the privilege of the writ, and what were the effects of the suspension upon the other elements of personal liberty. The Congressional legislation of this period gave some answers to these questions, which must be considered constitutional precedents in regard to this subject.

The Act of March 3, 1863, may be considered as representing the fulness of the claims of the Government in reference to its power to suspend the guarantees of personal liberty during a period of civil war. That Act authorized the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus throughout the whole United States, or any part thereof, during the existing rebellion, whenever in his opinion the public safety should require it; and it made the certificate under oath of any officer that he held any person prisoner under authority from the President a sufficient answer to the writ. It furthermore made an order issued by the President, or under his authority, a sufficient defence in all courts against prosecution for acts done or omitted by virtue

The Congressional Act of March 3, 1863, suspending the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus.

of such order. A law of Congress was also declared to be equal defence against such prosecutions. The Act then commanded that a list of all persons so seized and held in the loyal States should be furnished by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of War to the judges of the Circuit and District Courts of the United States and of the District of Columbia, and that unless the grand juries in the respective jurisdictions of these courts should find, before the termination of their sessions, indictments or presentments or unless other proceeding should be taken against the persons whose names appeared upon these lists, such persons should be discharged by these courts from further custody upon taking the oath of allegiance to the United States, and, in case the courts should see fit to require it, giving bonds with surety "to keep the peace and be of good behavior toward the United States." It also protected the officer acting under order of the President or by his authority against processes in the "State" courts by providing for the removal or appeal of such cases to the courts of the United States. While, therefore, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus did not, strictly speaking, authorize arbitrary arrest or delay in trial, or any unusual procedure in trial, but simply prevented the arrested person from having a judicial determination as to the continuance of his confinement, yet it is easy to see that the individual who might suffer arbitrary arrest would have no remedy, if the privilege of having his body brought before a judicial officer should be suspended, and if an order of the President should be a sufficient answer to any prosecution for unlawful arrest.

This Congressional Act was therefore virtually an indemnification of the President's orders, suspending the privilege of the writ and authorizing military arrest and trial by military commissions. It was especially the

President's proclamation of September 24, 1862, which was thus pronounced lawful. This proclamation made all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors in the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts or guilty of any disloyal practice, or affording any aid and comfort to rebels against the United States, subject to martial law, that is, to arrest by executive order, detention without the privilege of Habeas Corpus or bail, and trial by military commissions or courts-martial.

The extent of the power conceded to the President by the Act.

It is true, as we have seen, that the Act provided for the transmission of lists of the names of persons held under an order of the President or by his authority to the courts of the United States, and for indictment or discharge of such persons by the grand juries in said courts, but it did not forbid their trial by military commissions, and it did not provide any method for the revision of the decisions of said commissions by the United States judiciary or any other body.

It may, therefore, be claimed that it is the precedent of the Constitution in civil war that the President may suspend all of the safeguards of the Constitution in behalf of personal liberty anywhere within the country, taking upon himself the responsibility therefor to Congress, and that subsequent authorization by Congress to do the like things in future works indemnification, and makes the preceding Presidential assumptions legitimate and lawful, if they lacked anything of being so before.

The meaning of the Statute as an interpretation of the Constitution.

It is evident that the President considered himself now fully authorized to continue to act as he had done. He issued his proclamation of September 15, 1863, suspending the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus throughout the whole country in all cases where persons

were held by the civil, military or naval authorities under the orders, or by the authority, of the President as

The President's proclamation of September 15, 1863. "prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of the enemy" or for having resisted any draft or for any other offence against the military or naval service. The suspension also naturally applied to all persons belonging to the military

The President's acts. and naval service. The President also continued his military arrests, that is, his arrests without any civil warrant, and his trials by military commissions; and those commissions, as well as the officers arresting and holding persons, gave the most liberal interpretation to the words aiders and abettors of the enemy, so that almost any criticism of the policy of the Administration was in danger of being construed as giving aid and comfort to the enemy.

After the war was ended, indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of *ex parte* Milligan,

The Milligan decision. by a bare majority, the Chief Justice being among those dissenting, ruled that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus only authorized detention under arrest, but did not work the suspension of the other guarantees of personal liberty, and that martial law could not be established at any time in those parts of the country where the regular courts were open "and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction." There is no question that the practices of the Administration and the opinion of the Court were at variance, and there is little doubt that in spite of the opinion of the Court the practices of the Administration would be repeated under like circumstances. The practices of the Administration are, therefore, to be considered as the precedents of the Constitution in civil war rather than the opinion of the Court. They are justified by the necessity under which

the Government must act in executing its powers during a state of civil war.

The action of the Government in making the property of citizens in the loyal Commonwealths subject to its use was also thoroughgoing, if not despotic. In August of 1861, Congress imposed a tax on real estate of twenty millions of dollars, and apportioned it among the States according to population. The Act exempted the real estate of any person whose whole property of this nature did not exceed five hundred dollars in value. It provided for the appraisal of the property subject to this tax and for the levy and collection of the tax by officers of the General Government, but if any Commonwealth government would anticipate these operations by paying the amount apportioned to it beforehand, it might do so, and would be allowed a rebate of fifteen *per centum* on its apportionment for cost of collection. There was nothing in this part of the Act which could be regarded as straining the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution vests the Government expressly with the power to levy and collect taxes upon any object except exports from a Commonwealth, and the court has added to this exemption only the necessary instrumentalities of a Commonwealth government. The Constitution only requires that capitation and other direct taxes shall be distributed among the Commonwealths according to population, and that rule was followed in this Act in regard to this tax, since tax on real estate has been always regarded in our jurisprudence as a direct tax.

The control over property assumed by the General Government.

The ordinary powers of the Government to tax.

The question may, indeed, be mooted whether the Congress has the power to exempt real estate to the value of five hundred dollars, or to any amount, from a tax which it may vote to levy and collect. Such a

power in government is not strictly democratic in its nature. Exemptions from the burdens of the state are

The power of Congress to exempt property from the operations of a given law of taxation.

naturally connected with exclusions from the privileges, if not the rights, which it bestows. Still, as the Constitution of the United States is not a strictly democratic body of law, it can hardly be held that it disables Congress from making such exemptions, from the point of view of democratic theory. On the other hand, it is quite certain that an excessive use of this power by Congress would lead to results which would provoke loud protests. An unregulated power in government to make exemptions from taxation is a dangerous power. A fairly perfect constitution will not intrust government with such a power.

It cannot be so positively asserted that the other parts of the Act do not show an exaggeration of constitutional powers by Congress. For example, the income tax introduced by it, not

The tendencies to an exaggeration of governmental power in the Act.

only exempted incomes of eight hundred dollars and under, but the tax was imposed upon the proceeds of all property and labor, and was levied according to the rule of uniformity, that is, the rule of the same rate upon the same thing everywhere, instead of according to population. That is, Congress assumed this tax to be a duty, an excise, or an impost, rather than a direct tax, as it has recently been decided by the Court to be, in so far as it is levied upon the income from property. The Government can get at property with more facility through the principle of the duty or excise than through that of the direct tax, and hence the tendency of the Congress has been to expand the domain of the duty and the excise at the expense of that of the direct tax.

The Act of July 1, 1862, was an advance upon that

of August, 1861. It did not provide for any tax on real estate, but it developed the excise until it covered almost everything produced, sold or consumed, and forbade the pursuit of almost any business unless under heavily taxed license. It retained the income tax as a duty or excise, reduced the amount exempted to six hundred dollars, introduced the sliding scale of rates upon incomes in accordance with the amount of the income, three *per centum* on all incomes over six hundred and up to ten thousand dollars, and five *per centum* upon those above ten thousand dollars. It introduced the system of stamp duties, and imposed them upon almost every kind of agreement and legal document, as well as upon innumerable articles of property. And it introduced a tax upon legacies and distributive shares of personal property, grading the same according to the degree of kinship between the parties, from seventy-five cents to five dollars on each hundred dollars' worth of property so left or distributed. Naturally the Congress treated these taxes as excises or duties, and ordered their levy and collection by the rule of uniformity.

The Revenue Act of July 1, 1862.

The Congress also invented and applied the most vigorous measures for the levy and collection of all of these imposts, among the more questionable of which was that requiring certain corporations, such as railroads and banks, to deduct the amount of the income tax from dividends and interest paid by them to stockholders and bondholders, and pay the same over to the United States Government.

The measures for the collection of the revenue.

Such a sweeping use of the power of taxation had never before been made by Congress. In most respects what it did was strictly within its constitutional powers, but some of the provisions of this law could not now stand before the recent decisions of the Supreme

Court of the United States, as for instance, the provision in regard to the income tax, and that authorizing and requiring corporations to deduct the amount of the income tax from the interest payable to bondholders. The fact is that the Act of July 1, 1862, practically nullified some of the most important limitations placed by the Constitution upon the taxing powers of the Government. It marks quite an advance toward absolutism as well as nationalism in the powers of the Government over the property of the loyal citizen.

The Government advanced no less radically upon the domain of the freedom of the press. In August of 1861, Postmaster-General Blair gave orders excluding certain New York and Brooklyn papers from the mails. These papers had been indicted by United States grand juries for rebellious utterances. At the same time the United States Marshal in New York seized the copies of one of these papers, the New York *Daily News*, addressed to Philadelphia and to other cities west and south. These vigorous, not to say high-handed, acts of the Administration caused an investigation to be set on foot in the year 1862-63 in Congress concerning the executive powers in time of war over the public press. The report of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, made January 20, 1863, upon the subject, contains a statement from the Postmaster-General, the Hon. Montgomery Blair, of the powers claimed by the Administration in regard to the exclusion of mail matter from the mails.

The Gov-
ernment and
the freedom
of the Press. It was "that a power and a duty to prevent hostile printed matter from reaching the enemy, and to prevent such matter from instigating others to co-operate with the enemy, by the aid of the United States mails, exist in time of war, and in the presence of treasonable and armed enemies of the United States,

Opinion of
the Postmas-
ter-General on
the subject.

which do not exist in time of peace, and in the absence of criminal organizations." The Postmaster-General declared this to be a constitutional power; and he distinguished his doctrine on the subject, from that advanced in the year 1835 in regard to the exclusion of the abolitionist literature from the mails, in that he held that the power could not be exercised during a time of peace, but only during a time of war, and in that he held that, not the individual postmasters concerned could determine what should be excluded from transmission through the mails, but only the Postmaster-General himself.

The Judiciary Committee sustained the view of the Postmaster-General, and thus the freedom of the press was placed at the mercy of the Government in time of war, despite the words of the Constitution that "Congress shall pass no law abridging the freedom of the press." The precedent of the Government in civil war is, therefore, that this part of the Constitution may be suspended by order of the Administration, when in the judgment of the President the public safety demands it.

Opinion of
the Judiciary
Committee of
the Senate on
the subject.

Naturally the necessities of the war forced the Government to use its powers for raising and organizing armies and the navy to a very high degree, if not to the utmost. Down to the beginning of the year 1863, the Government had relied upon volunteers or militia calls. The unfavorable military situation during the latter half of 1862, and the early part of 1863, had thrown a great damper upon volunteering, and the constitutional and legal limitations in regard to the call and employment of the militia had rendered this arm of the service ineffective. The Constitution confers on Congress the power to raise and support armies without any limitations as to the form and manner in which this

War powers
of the Govern-
ment in re-
spect to the
raising and
holding of ar-
mies.

may be done. The Conscription Act of March 3, 1863, was therefore both necessary and constitutional. The Confederates had been compelled to have recourse to this means of maintaining the strength of their armies nearly a year before this. Their Conscription Act was passed on April 16, 1862.

The United States Act of March 3, 1863, provided that all able-bodied male citizens of the United States The Act of March 3, 1863. between the ages of twenty and forty-five, and all able-bodied foreigners of the male sex between these ages, who had declared on oath the purpose to become citizens of the United States, should constitute the National forces, and should be "liable to perform military duty when called out by the President for that duty." For the execution of this law the United States was divided into enrollment districts, by the provisions of the Act for the most part, but also in part by the President at his own discretion, and United States enrollment officers, appointed and controlled by the President, were put in charge. The President was authorized to assign the quota of each district, and to call them forth and organize them at his own discretion; and it was provided that after such call, any person disobeying the summons might be dealt with as a deserter, unless he had furnished, as he might do, an acceptable substitute, or paid the sum of three hundred dollars into the treasury of the United States for the purpose of enabling the Government to hire such a substitute for him. The machinery of the Commonwealth governments was thus entirely ignored in the whole procedure. The Nation claimed the military service of all its citizens, as a paramount duty on their part, and provided for their organization, equipment and control without any regard to the Commonwealths, and their powers over the militia, whatsoever.

The Act was pronounced unconstitutional in many quarters, because it was held to destroy the militia of the Commonwealths, and its execution was openly defied in some places, but the argument against its constitutionality is certainly sophistical, and was so considered by the Government at the time, since the rule of interpretation had been long established that where the United States Government and the Commonwealths may, by the Constitution, operate upon the same subject, the claims of the United States must be satisfied first, although they may exhaust the subject; and the resistance to the execution of the law was put down by military power. The precedent shows the Government to be completely national in the domain of the military system, at its own option.

The nationalization of the currency and bank of issue systems belongs also to the legislation of the year 1863. Down to the 1st of March, 1863, after the ac-
 cession of Lincoln, Congress had authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to borrow five hundred millions of dollars on bonds, two hundred millions on bonds or interest-bearing Treasury notes, and fifty millions on bonds, interest-bearing Treasury notes, or non-interest-bearing Treasury notes payable on demand, and to issue four hundred millions of dollars in non-interest-bearing notes of the United States payable to bearer, which should be a legal tender in all cases, except for duties on imports and interest on the public debt. Five hundred millions of dollars of these loans were intended to fund the Treasury notes and floating debt in bonds; and fifty millions of dollars of the United States notes were intended to be substituted for the fifty millions of dollars of demand Treasury notes, previously authorized.

The transformation of the monetary system under the stress of war.

The condition of the finances of the United States in

the first month of the year 1863—a condition partly realized and partly still in process of realization—was, so far as indebtedness was concerned, a bonded obligation of five hundred millions of dollars and a currency obligation of four hundred millions of dollars, and the problem was how to keep up the value of these bonds and notes. The pillars of support at that moment were the facts that interest on the bonds was payable in coin, and that the notes were convertible into the bonds. The receipts from the duty on imports, which must be paid in coin, placed the Government in the position to discharge its coin obligation in respect to the interest on the bonds. Naturally the Government preferred to sell its bonds for coin, although it could re-issue the notes, simply because it could buy more with the coin than with the notes. How to sell the bonds for coin and still keep up the value of the notes in circulation was the question.

The National Banking Act of February 25, 1863, was the answer to this question. Briefly considered from this point of view, the Act provided that any number of persons, numbering not less than five, might organize a banking association, having a capital stock of not less than one hundred thousand dollars in cities of more than ten thousand inhabitants, and of not less than fifty thousand dollars in cities and towns having less than ten thousand inhabitants; that every such association, after having fulfilled the requirements of the Act in regard to organization, should, before beginning business, transfer and deliver to the Treasurer of the United States interest-bearing United States bonds to the amount of at least one-third of the capital stock paid in, to be held by the Treasurer on deposit for the purpose of executing the other provisions of the Act; that upon making this transfer and delivery

Financial
situation in
the first part
of 1863.

The National
Banking
Act of February
25, 1863.

of bonds to the Treasurer of the United States, the said association should receive from the Comptroller of the Currency circular notes, equal in amount to ninety *per centum* of the current market value of the bonds so transferred and delivered; that such notes when put into circulation by the said association should be received at par in all parts of the United States in payment of any dues to the United States except duties on imports, and in payment of all debts and obligations owed by the United States, except interest on the public debt; and that such notes must be redeemed by the association issuing them in the lawful money of the United States, that is in coin and United States notes, or such clearing-house certificates or bank balances in certain of the larger cities as might be readily converted into such lawful money of the United States, and that for this purpose every such association must keep on hand lawful money of the United States to an amount equal to twenty-five *per centum* of its outstanding circulating notes and its deposits.

The Act furthermore provided that the banking associations formed under it might, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, be used by the Government as depositories of United States funds, "except the receipts from customs."

The demand thus created for the bonds and notes of the United States was very great, and the national banking system became the strong support of the national currency system and the national bond system.

A result had been thus reached in the nationalization of the currency system of the United States under the necessities of war, which was of immense benefit to the country. This Act, as re-enacted and developed by the Act of June 3, 1864, and supplemented by the Act of March 3, 1865, imposing a tax of ten *per centum*

on the notes of State banks paid out by any bank after July 1, 1866, put an end to what may be called the "State" bank of issue system, if it could be called a system at all, in the United States. Originating primarily in a necessity for providing ways and means for floating Government loans, the national banking system was a great step forward in the solution of the money and currency problems of the Government, a greater advance than had been made from the foundation of the Government to the date of its enactment. It is another great example of the solution of a great question by a flank movement, rather than by a front attack. Of course, this kind of a solution may leave the question still unsolved, at least in part, from the point of view of scientific merits, but in this case the new system was, from this point of view also, a great advance for this country, and it certainly was a great help to the Government in floating the immense loans of 1863, 1864 and 1865, which, with what had been authorized before, made a governmental debt of huge proportions, some 2,600,000,000 of dollars, an amount which no man in 1861 believed that the Government could possibly borrow. Naturally the supervision of the new banking system was placed in the hands of United States officials, chief of whom, under the Secretary of the Treasury, was the new official created by the Act, the Comptroller of the Currency.

The Confederate government did not create, or make use of, any banking system to sustain its loans. It simply issued Treasury notes bearing interest, and then Confederate notes bearing no interest, and provided for the funding of these notes in bonds, the interest on which should be paid in coin or legal tender money obtained from the export duty on cotton. The blockade ruined cotton exportation and knocked the

The chief distinction between the borrowing system of the United States and that of the Southern Confederacy.

foundation from under the whole system. By the end of the year 1862 about 300,000,000 dollars of Confederate notes had been paid out, and after that they were issued, on a rough guess, at the rate of about 500,000,000 *per annum*. No attempt to fund or restrict them was successful, or could be, since the coin basis for sustaining the interest on the bonds was destroyed by the blockade of the Southern ports.

It would be hazardous to say that a banking system similar to that invented by the United States would have saved the Confederacy from any of its financial difficulties, though it is easy to see that the coin already in the Southern communities might have been placed, in this way, more completely within the grasp of the Government.

Lastly, the nationalization of our legislation in 1863 is manifest in the attitude which the Congress took in reference to slavery in the Territories and in reference to the admission of new Commonwealths into the Union. As we know, it was the chief tenet of the Republican party that Congress had the power to prohibit or abolish slavery in a Territory, and that it was its duty to do so.

After the repeal by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of that part of the Missouri Compromise which related to the prohibition of slavery in the territory received from France and after the Dred Scott decision upholding the Kansas-Nebraska Act by pronouncing the repealed Act unconstitutional, the measures of Congress establishing Territorial governments contained nothing upon the subject of slavery down to the Act of February 24, 1863, establishing the Territory of Arizona. In this act the prohibition is outspoken, and Congress thus asserted the nullity of the Dred Scott decision. Of course such an as-

Congressional power in the government of the Territories and in the admission of new States into the Union.

sertion by the legislative department of the Government over against the judicial department is itself, in the ordinary relations of authority in our system, a nullity. It can only be upheld upon the theory of the military absolutism of the Government in a period of civil war. If the Civil War had not been followed by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the prohibition upon slavery in Arizona by Congressional Act would have lapsed, or at least have become questionable, with the return to the status of peace.

The growth of governmental power is also to be observed in legislation concerning the establishment of the new Commonwealth of West Virginia. The Constitution of the United States permits the erection of a new Commonwealth within the jurisdiction of an existing Commonwealth with the consent of Congress and of the legislature of the existing Commonwealth. The establishment of West Virginia proceeded formally upon the basis of a petition for admission into the Union by a convention of the people of those counties of old Virginia wishing to form a new Commonwealth, the consent of the legislature of old Virginia, sitting at Alexandria, and recognized by the United States Government as the legitimate legislature of Virginia, and the consent of Congress. Formally the letter of the Constitution had been fulfilled. The West Virginia convention formed the constitution for the Commonwealth of West Virginia in November of 1861. On the 3d of May, 1862, the voters in the section desiring to become a new Commonwealth ratified it. On the 13th of May, 1862, the Alexandria legislature gave its consent to the dismemberment of the old Commonwealth, and on December 31, 1862, the President approved the Congressional Act for the admission of West Virginia into the Union. Congress, however, attached

The crea-
tion of the
Common-
wealth of
West Vir-
ginia.

the condition that the admission should not take effect until after a proclamation of the President so declaring, and that this proclamation should not be issued until after certain changes should be made in the constitution of the new Commonwealth, which changes should make the children of all slaves born in the new Commonwealth after the 4th of July, 1863, free, and all slaves under ten years of age at that date free at twenty-one, and all slaves over ten and under twenty-one at that date free at twenty-five, and should prohibit the immigration of slaves into the new Commonwealth for permanent residence. The convention and the people of the forty-eight counties seeking to be made the Commonwealth of West Virginia complied with the condition, and on the 20th of April, 1863, the President issued his proclamation pronouncing West Virginia a member of the Union in sixty days from the date of the issue of the proclamation.

As we have seen, the legal forms were all observed, but when we examine into the real facts of the case, the forms must appear rather hollow. The legislature of Virginia, at Alexandria, represented chiefly that part of the old Commonwealth which was seeking to become the new and separate Commonwealth. That is, two of the nominal parties to this tri-partite agreement required by the Constitution were virtually the same party, viz., the people of the forty-eight western counties of Virginia. Really, they were simply dealing with themselves. The new Commonwealth was created therefore by the joint act of themselves and Congress. In other words, Congress assumed, by and with the co-operation of the majority of the people resident within a part of the Commonwealth whose secession from the Union had been declared, to detach that part from the old Commonwealth and establish it as a new Commonwealth. This is good doctrine as well as true fact.

When a Commonwealth proclaims its connection with the Union dissolved it is no longer to be considered a "State" of the Union, but a territory lawfully subject to the Union and inhabited by a rebellious population. Congress may then erect any part of this territory into a new "State," with the co-operation of the people inhabiting that part, without regard to those inhabiting any other part. Congress may even establish Territorial Government in such territory, without the co-operation of anybody in the creative Act. From the point of view of a sound political science, it is a great pity that this doctrine was not put into practice formally in the establishment of West Virginia. It is a pity that the legislature at Alexandria was consulted at all. Two years later, when the minds of men had become clearer in regard to the effect of attempted secession and rebellion upon the relations of a Commonwealth to the Union, it would hardly have happened.

One other thing is to be noticed in the process of admitting West Virginia as a Commonwealth into the Union, and that is that Congress here assumed to lay conditions upon the new Commonwealth as the price of its admission which the Constitution did not then lay upon any of the existing Commonwealths. The people seeking to become the new Commonwealth were required to adopt the gradual emancipation of all slaves in the Commonwealth under twenty-one years of age, declare the immediate freedom of all children born of slave parents in the new Commonwealth after the 4th of July, 1863, and prohibit the immigration of slaves for permanent residence, before they could be admitted as a Commonwealth into the Union, while the Constitution laid no such restrictions as these on the old Commonwealths. In a word, the

Return of Congress to the doctrine that it may lay conditions upon new Commonwealths as the price of their admission not resting on the old Commonwealths.

doctrine which prevailed in 1820, and which was adhered to from 1820 to 1861, viz., that Congress could lay no restrictions upon new "States" as the price of their entrance into the Union which the Constitution did not impose on the original States, or which the Constitution did not expressly authorize Congress to impose on the new organizations, was here again cast aside by the Government in its advance toward unlimited power. This is hardly the place to discuss anew this question from the point of view of constitutional law. The reader is referred for that to the chapter on the "Creation of the Commonwealth of Missouri" in the "Middle Period." Here the fact of the actual increase of governmental powers under the influence of civil war is the thing to be emphasized.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE CAPTURE OF ATLANTA

The Expedition against Meridian and Selma—Capture of Meridian—Fort Pillow—The Massacre—The Expedition up the Red River—The Battle of Sabine Cross Roads—Retreat of the Federals, and the Fight at Pleasant Hill—Peril of the Fleet—The Florida Expedition—The Comprehensive Plans of General Grant—Grant's Orders for the Accomplishment of His Plan—The Beginning of the Movements—Relative Strength of the Forces of Sherman and Johnston—Sherman's Capture of Dalton—The Occupation of Resaca—The Battle at New Hope Church—The Battle of Kenesaw Mountain—Retreat of the Confederates from Kenesaw—Crossing of the Chattahoochee by the Federals—The Command of the Confederates Transferred to Hood—Federals Closing Around Atlanta—The Battle of Peach Tree Creek—First Battle before Atlanta—The Battle of Ezra Church—The Capture of Atlanta.

BEFORE entering upon the history of the two grand movements of the campaign of 1864, viz., the advance of Grant upon Petersburg and Richmond, and the capture of Atlanta by Sherman, and his march through Georgia, it will be necessary to relate briefly the minor enterprises, in the Mississippi region especially, which preceded or accompanied them.

In the early part of January, 1864, Sherman went from Chattanooga or Bridgeport to Memphis, in order to prepare an expedition against Meridian in Mississippi and Selma in Alabama. The object of it was to destroy the system of transportation in the middle of the Confederacy. Meridian is the point where the railroad running from Vicksburg

The expedition against Meridian and Selma.

through Jackson and Selma into Georgia is intersected by the Mobile and Ohio road. The Confederate troops in and around Meridian and Selma numbered some ten or fifteen thousand infantry, and from seven to ten thousand cavalry. General Polk was in command of these forces, with his head-quarters at Meridian. The Federal expedition was to start from two points at about the same time, the first days of February.

Sherman's two columns of infantry, one commanded by Hurlbut, and the other by McPherson, set out from Vicksburg, and a division of cavalry, commanded by Sooy Smith, went from Memphis. On the 14th of the month Sherman's troops entered Meridian, having driven the Confederate cavalry before them ^{Capture of} all the way from Jackson. They met with Meridian. little resistance at Meridian, and succeeded in destroying everything about the place except the inhabited private houses, which they were ordered to spare. Hearing nothing of Sooy Smith's force, Sherman now brought his troops back to Vicksburg. Sooy Smith's part of the undertaking was an entire failure. He did not start on time, and was met by the Confederate cavalry, led by Forrest, at Okalona, and driven back. Instead of Smith going to Selma, Forrest entered Tennessee, and advanced almost to Paducah in Kentucky, where he met with a repulse at the hands of Colonel Hicks and the Federal garrison in that place.

Forrest then fell back upon the Mississippi, and made an attack on Fort Pillow, some thirty or forty miles above Memphis, on the 12th of April. The ^{Fort Pillow.} fort was garrisoned by about five hundred men, half of them negroes, under the command of Major Booth, and after he was killed, of Major Bradford. They were at first supported by a gun-boat in the river, but for some reason, probably the heating of her guns, the

boat drew off in the midst of the fight. Forrest demanded a surrender, but Bradford refused. He then carried the works by storm, when what was left of the garrison threw down their arms. The assailants now refused to spare them, and massacred them almost to the last man.

The massacre. They afterward sought to excuse themselves by pointing to the refusal to surrender, but

this refusal was made by the Federal commander before the Confederates got into the fort. The cry of the men for quarter they chose not to consider as a surrender. The truth of the matter undoubtedly was that the Confederates were excited to this horrible deed by the presence of negroes in the service of the United States. They recognized no duty of protecting such foes when captured, and they regarded white men when taken with them as also outlawed.

After his return from the Meridian expedition, Sherman went to superintend in person the expedition up the Red River. The expedition up the Red River. The military purpose of this movement was the capture of Shreveport, the chief strategic point west of the lower Mississippi.

The first troops sent forward from New Orleans were under the immediate command of General Franklin. General Banks, who had the superior command, followed later, while Sherman sent General A. J. Smith with some ten thousand men to assist. Porter's fleet co-operated with the land forces. General Steele was ordered to advance from Little Rock toward the point of attack. Some forty to fifty thousand men and a fleet of twenty vessels were, thus, moving toward Shreveport. The Confederates had a force of about thirty thousand men with which to meet them. They were commanded by Generals Kirby Smith and Richard Taylor. They were good soldiers, and well commanded.

The Federals advanced successfully to Natchitoches. From this place to Shreveport the way lay through an almost unbroken forest of pine. Suddenly on the 8th of April, when nearing a place called Sabine Cross Roads, Banks's army was attacked by the Confederates hidden in the forest, and was driven back in great disorder. Reinforcements under General Emory came up and checked the Confederate onslaught. With this the battle ended. The Federals lost three or four thousand men and a very large amount of supplies in this short battle.

Banks now retreated to a place called Pleasant Hill, where he was again attacked by the Confederates, on the 9th. The attack was repulsed, but Banks resolved to retreat to Grand Ecore, in order to bring himself into connection with the fleet. He succeeded in effecting this, but his army was so dispirited by the heavy losses already sustained that both the men and the commander were willing to abandon the expedition. They retreated down the river to Alexandria, which place was reached in the last days of April.

The water in the river now fell so fast that the fleet was caught above the falls at Alexandria, and was for a time in imminent peril; but the ingenuity of Colonel Bailey, one of the best engineers in the army, contrived a way of escape by means of a series of dams for raising the water high enough over the falls to allow the vessels to pass.

Banks's army now returned to New Orleans, and Porter's fleet steamed into the Mississippi, while Steele was forced to retreat to Little Rock, leaving all of South-western Arkansas in the hands of the Confederates commanded by Price.

The attempt, made a little before this, to occupy Flor-

ida was equally unsuccessful. The expedition went in February from Hilton Head. It consisted of some five or six thousand men under the immediate command of General Seymour. The division landed at Jacksonville and marched inland. It was ambushed at a place called Olustee and completely routed. Seymour returned to Jacksonville with what was left of his little army, and the expedition was abandoned.

The year 1864 did not thus begin very auspiciously for the Union cause. These movements were all, however, of minor importance, and were soon forgotten in the great campaigns led by Grant and Sherman, which now opened. From the date of Grant's appointment to be Lieutenant-General of all the armies of the United States, March 2, 1864, he had been revolving the plan for the combined movements of all of the forces of the Union. The purpose which he had in view was the destruction of Lee's army in Virginia and of Johnston's army in Georgia. All movements must contribute to, or be subordinated to, these results, and the blows were to be struck simultaneously in all quarters in order to prevent either of the Confederate armies from going to the assistance of any other.

The main orders issued by Grant for the accomplishment of these objects were directed to Banks, Gilmore, Butler, Sigel and Sherman. Banks should return Sherman's troops to the latter, and should himself retire with his forces to New Orleans, abandoning all Texas, except the Rio Grande district, and make ready for an attack on Mobile. Gilmore should join forces with Butler and the army thus constituted should operate from Fortress Monroe along the south side of the James River against Richmond. Sigel should move from his position in West Virginia against the railroad running from Knoxville to

The Florida expedition.
The comprehensive plans of General Grant.
Grant's orders for the accomplishment of his plan.

Lynchburg. Sherman should move direct upon Johnston, while Grant himself would undertake battle with Lee.

The three armies commanded by Meade, Butler, and Sherman, all now under the supreme command of Grant, started forward almost at the same moment.

Meade and Butler took up their line of march on the 4th day of May, while Sherman set out

The beginning of the movements.

only two days later. Sherman's movement was, however, successful first, and we will, therefore, follow him first.

His army consisted of the three old armies of the Cumberland, the Tennessee and the Ohio, and numbered about one hundred thousand men. The

distinction between the old armies, as grand corps, so to speak, continued. Thomas com-

Relative strength of the forces of Sherman and Johnston.

manded the first, McPherson the second, and Schofield the third. Opposed to this force Johnston had from fifty to seventy-five thousand men, immediately commanded by Hood, Polk, and Hardee.

As we have just seen, Sherman put his troops in motion on May 6th. The first point of attack was Dalton, the Confederate stronghold. It could not be

taken by a front movement, and Sherman sent McPherson down the west side of the ridge

Sherman's capture of Dalton.

covering Dalton to Snake Creek Gap, through which he could threaten Resaca and cut the railroad communication between Dalton and Atlanta. Thomas made a strong demonstration on the 8th and 9th, in order to cover McPherson's movement. McPherson succeeded in passing through the Gap, but found the Confederates so strongly intrenched around Resaca that both Thomas and Schofield had to go to his aid. When Johnston discovered that his left was being turned, he abandoned Dalton in the night of the 12th, and retreated with his entire force to Resaca.

On the 13th, the Federal army arrived in front of Resaca. Sherman now adopted the same tactics to force the evacuation of Resaca that had been successful at Dalton. He laid pontoons across the Oostenaula some four miles southward from the town, and threw a strong division of troops across the river to threaten the railroad between Resaca and Atlanta, at Calhoun. On the 14th, a little after midday, Sherman attacked the Confederates in front of Resaca. At first the Confederates held their ground and the Federals were compelled to fall back; but, finally, being heavily reinforced, McPherson succeeded in throwing a strong detachment into a position which commanded the chief part of the Confederate works, and also the bridge across the river. On the next day the struggle was renewed, and although the Confederates fought desperately, the Federals succeeded in capturing their most important works. Driven in on the front and threatened in the rear, Johnston abandoned Resaca during the night of the 15th, and retreated along the railroad southward. The Federals had paid heavily for their victory. They had lost some three thousand men killed and wounded. The Confederates had escaped with about half as many.

They retreated behind the Etowah River. Sherman thought that they would make a stand at the strong position of Allatoona Pass, some five miles south-eastward from the Etowah. Sherman again repeated his flank movement, and marched rapidly toward Dallas. Johnston had divined Sherman's purpose. He did not, therefore, make any real stand at Allatoona, but endeavored to anticipate Sherman at Dallas. The two armies met at New Hope Church, some three miles to the north-east of Dallas, and a sharp engagement was fought. It was now the 25th

The occupation of Resaca.

The battle of New Hope Church.

of May, and the Federals had not been halted in their advance. The battle at New Hope Church was, however, indecisive, although the Confederates gave way, and the Federals held the battle-ground. But the Confederates succeeded in placing themselves in a good position between Dallas and Marietta, which they fortified strongly, and seemed determined to hold.

Sherman now resolved to shift his flanking movement over to the other side and turn the Confederate right. He planned to strike the railroad behind them at or about Acworth. During the first week of June he was occupied with this movement, ^{The battle of Kenesaw Mountain.} and with the reconstruction of bridges over the Etowah necessary for the maintenance of his communication with Chattanooga. Johnston, meanwhile, retired his line somewhat, and rested it now more strongly on Lost Mountain westward from Marietta and on Kenesaw Mountain northward from the place. The main difficulty of the line was its length, and the Confederates finally abandoned Lost Mountain and the other knobs and concentrated on Kenesaw. These movements were attended with constant skirmishing, in which there were considerable losses on both sides. The Confederates lost one of their chief officers, General Polk. It looked, however, as if they had now made their stand and were determined to defend the country against any further advance on the part of the Federals. The Federals, however, pressed continually forward. On the 22d, while Hooker's men were working around the Confederate left, Hood's soldiers made a fierce attack upon them at a place called Kulp's House. The attack was at first successful, but finally the Federals rallied and drove the assailants back. Sherman now decided to attack the positions on Kenesaw Mountain in front. On the 27th, the attempt was made to carry the Confeder-

ate works by Thomas and McPherson, but the loss inflicted upon their advancing columns was so dreadful that they were compelled to withdraw.

Sherman returned to his old tactics of flanking his enemy out of position. Leaving a division of cavalry under General Garrard in front of Kenesaw ^{Retreat of the Confederates from} to cover his movements, Sherman directed his columns toward Turner's Ferry on the Chattahoochee, turning the Confederate left again. This was the 2d of July. So soon as the Confederates detected the movement, they abandoned Kenesaw; and so soon as Sherman learned of their retreat he ordered Thomas to pursue vigorously, with the purpose of bringing on a battle while the Confederates should be engaged in crossing the Chattahoochee. But Johnston handled his army with so much real military skill that he succeeded in making the passage of the river with the great bulk of his army during the night of the 5th of July. He now posted his troops in a strong position on the south side of the river, with a deep ravine, called Peach Tree Creek, protecting his right. He, also, still held the work on the north side of the river covering the railroad bridge.

Sherman now so manœuvred his forces as to make Johnston think he was endeavoring to cross the Chattahoochee at Turner's Ferry on the left flank ^{Crossing of the Chattahoochee by the Federals.} of the Confederates, and then threw Schofield's troops across the river around the right flank of the Confederates, over pontoons laid across the river some seven or eight miles eastward from the railroad bridge. He also caused McPherson's troops to move around to near the same point, and to construct a second bridge. On the 17th (July) he succeeded in crossing his entire army over. Thomas crossed at points north of the mouth of Peach Tree Creek, and then

forced the passage of this ravine in a sharp fight. McPherson and Schofield went farther eastward, striking in at Decatur on the Atlanta and Augusta Railroad, and thus approaching Atlanta from the east, while Thomas advanced upon the place from the north.

At this juncture President Davis transferred the command of the Confederate army from Johnston to Hood, on account of the dissatisfaction with Johnston's inability to check Sherman.

Hood superseded Johnston.

The Federal army was now closing upon Atlanta. McPherson was on the left, approaching Atlanta from the east. Schofield's troops were in the centre, approaching from the north-east, and Thomas's troops formed the right, and were advancing nearly southward.

Federals closing around Atlanta.

Hood placed his forces so that Cheatham's corps confronted McPherson, Hardee's corps confronted Schofield, and Stewart's corps, Polk's old troops, confronted Thomas. The weak point in the Federal line was between Thomas and Schofield. Sherman was endeavoring to strengthen this part of the line by sending some of Thomas's divisions toward Schofield, when Stewart's troops issued from their intrenchments and threw themselves furiously upon this part of the line. It was Hooker's men chiefly that were attacked. They stood their ground, and after a sharp battle, the battle of Peach Tree Creek, drove the Confederates back. This was the 20th of July.

The battle of Peach Tree Creek.

Hood now drew a large portion of his army toward Decatur in order to allow Sherman to advance on Atlanta, and thus leave his left flank exposed. Sherman fell into the trap. Finding the works on Peach Tree Creek deserted, he pushed on toward Atlanta, now only a few miles distant. Near midday of the 22d, Hood began his attack on Sherman's left flank. This was the

position of McPherson's troops. The brave General rode down his lines to discover the meaning of the firing on his left, and rushed straight into the advancing Confederates. He was almost unattended, and was shot down before he could turn away from the approaching foe. The death of McPherson was an exceedingly great loss to the army and to the country. He was one of the most capable soldiers developed in the school of Grant and Sherman, and one of the most manly characters America has ever produced.

The attack on the left developed into a general battle of a very serious nature. At one time the pressure of the Confederates upon this part of the line was so strong that Sherman felt it necessary to go there in person. Under his guidance, and with the aid of some of Schofield's artillery, the left flank was now able to restore its line of defence. With this the battle turned against the Confederates at every point, and they were repulsed, with great loss, all along the line. Nearly eight thousand of them were placed *hors de combat*. The Union loss was only about half that number.

Sherman now sent Garrard, with his cavalry, to destroy the railroad between Atlanta and Augusta, and Stoneman to destroy that between Atlanta and Macon. Garrard's expedition was successful, but that of Stoneman was substantially a failure. At the same time Sherman began his movement for flanking Atlanta by the west and south.

The Army of the Tennessee, now commanded by Howard, was moved from the left around to the extreme right. On the 28th, the Confederates, having discovered the movement, came out of Atlanta, and sought to strike Howard's flank while his forces were performing the evolution just mentioned. The Federals were, however, prepared for

The battle
of Ezra
Church.

them. They had not only succeeded in facing their line eastward, but had thrown up some intrenchments to protect themselves. The Confederate attack was repulsed repeatedly. This conflict, which is known as the battle of Ezra Church, lasted some four or five hours, and ended in the complete discomfiture of the Confederates, who lost nearly five thousand men, while the Federal loss was less than one thousand.

Sherman now continued his movement around Atlanta by the west, endeavoring to reach the railroad between Atlanta and Macon. Down to the 25th of August he pursued this course, while still ^{The capture of Atlanta.} maintaining the siege of the city. Being now convinced that he must make a wider sweep westward and southward, he abandoned the investment of the city, in order to make this more extended movement. The Confederates thought that he was retreating, and failed to take precautions against his true movement. On the 29th, his forces struck the railroad from Atlanta to West Point at Red Oak, a place some ten miles south-westward from the junction of the Atlanta and West Point Railroad with the Atlanta and Macon road. He destroyed this road and pushed on for the Macon branch. On the 30th, Howard's forces, who now composed the right wing, were in sight of Jonesborough on this branch. After learning the true course of Sherman's movement, Hood sent Hardee's corps to Jonesborough. On the 31st, Hardee undertook to stop Howard's advance, but his own forces suffered a repulse. Meanwhile the right and centre of Sherman's army had reached the railroad above Jonesborough, and had thus inserted themselves between Hardee and Atlanta. The whole Federal army was now between the two parts of the Confederate army. As a result of this splendid manœuvre, the Confederates now saw themselves necessitated to evacuate both Jonesbor-

ough and Atlanta. The Federals turned on Jonesborough first, and Thomas and Schofield went down the railroad, destroying it as they passed along. Hardee retreated precipitately on the 1st of September, and on the 2d, in the early morning, Hood abandoned Atlanta, destroying his magazines, stores and railroad material. Sherman immediately occupied both places, but later withdrew from Jonesborough, and located his troops at Atlanta, East Point and Decatur. He now sent the people of Atlanta away from their homes, and burned the city, except the churches and private dwellings. He then settled down to rest and recuperate his forces. He had lost about thirty thousand men in the movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta. The Confederates had lost about ten thousand more.

CHAPTER XXX

THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN AND EARLY'S DASH FOR WASHINGTON

Strength of the Federal Armies in Virginia in Comparison with the Forces of the Confederates—Position and Organization of the Respective Armies—First Battle in the Wilderness—Second Battle in the Wilderness—Grant's Despatch to the President—The Cavalry Battle at Yellow Tavern, and the Advance of Butler's Army toward Richmond—The Third Battle in the Wilderness—The Fourth Battle in the Wilderness—The Crossing of the North Anna and the Critical Position of the Federals—Cold Harbor—Grant's Determination to Change his Base of Operations—Destruction of the Railroads Leading from Richmond into the Shenandoah Valley—The Transfer of the Army of the Potomac across the James—Relative Strength of the Armies on July 1st—The Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley again—The First Attack on Petersburg—The Beginning of the Siege of Petersburg—The Petersburg Mine—Early's Raid through the Valley toward Washington—Failure to Enter Washington—Early in Pennsylvania and the Burning of Chambersburg—Destruction of the Shenandoah Valley by Sheridan—The Battle of Opequon—The Battle of Fisher Hill—The Battle of Cedar Creek—Grant Tightening his Lines around Petersburg and Richmond.

As has been said, the movements against Lee's army in Virginia were contemporaneous with those of Sherman against Johnston, for the purpose of preventing either of the Confederate armies from sending aid to the other, and of thus reaping the benefit of superiority of numbers in each of the Federal armies. Grant, while personally present with the Army of the Potomac, wisely

left the immediate command of it to Meade. He thus secured the co-operation of a most capable lieutenant and quieted the jealousies of the Eastern troops against a Western commander. The Army of the Potomac, including Burnside's corps, numbered about one hundred

Strength of the Federal armies in Virginia in comparison with the forces of the Confederates.

and fifty thousand men, while Butler's force advancing up the James counted some thirty thousand more. The Confederate army under Lee numbered only about sixty thousand men, with from ten to fifteen thousand more on the James to face Butler.

On the 4th day of May the Federal forces, led by Meade and Grant, crossed the Rapidan, and entered the fatal Wilderness region. The Confederates,

Positions and organizations of the respective armies.

organized into three corps, were posted along the river, and at Orange Court House and Gordonsville. Ewell was at the first point; Hill was at the second; and Longstreet at the third. The Federal army was also organized into three corps of infantry commanded by Hancock, Warren and Sedgwick, and one corps of cavalry led by Sheridan. The cavalry was in the advance and the infantry marched in two columns. Hancock's corps constituting one column crossed at Ely's Ford, and the corps of Warren and Sedgwick crossed at Germania Ford.

The movement threatened to flank Lee by his right. Instead of retreating, however, Lee resolved to face eastward and strike the Federal army in the

First battle in the Wilderness.

flank while it was marching through the Wilderness. Ewell and Hill moved rapidly along the two parallel roads leading from Orange Court House to the Wilderness Tavern, called the Orange Turnpike and the Plank Road. On the morning of the 5th (May) Ewell ran up against Warren's corps, which composed the Federal right, and attacked it. At first

Warren's men were driven in, but, by the aid of reinforcements from Sedgwick, they were at last able to make a stand. Hancock's corps, which formed the Federal left, had been ordered to swing around by the Brock Road to the Plank Road. Getty's division of Sedgwick's corps had already occupied the position, and had met and halted Hill's men coming up the Plank Road. Getty held his position under heavy fire until Hancock arrived. After receiving Hancock's support, he undertook to drive Hill back, but was not successful. The Federals had now succeeded in establishing their line so as to meet the Confederate advance. Moreover, Burnside, with twenty thousand men, was rapidly approaching from the Rappahannock Bridge. On the other side Longstreet's corps was nearing the scene of action.

In the early morning of the 6th, the battle was resumed. The heaviest of the fighting was on the Union left, commanded by Hancock. Hancock attacked Hill's corps in front, and Wadsworth's division of Warren's corps attacked Hill's flank at the same time. The battle was severe, but the Confederates were finally routed and driven back until they met reinforcements from Longstreet's corps. The Federals had become badly scattered in the pursuit through the tangled woods, and when they struck the re-established Confederate line, they were brought to a halt, and then driven back in turn. It was at this juncture that the gallant Wadsworth fell, and that the able Confederate leader, Longstreet, was dangerously wounded. The Federal centre, under Warren, and the right, led by Sedgwick, had not met with any better success. The Confederates held their ground against large odds. They now advanced to attack Hancock's new line along the Brock Road, but they were repulsed with great loss. Taking advantage of some movements on the Federal right, which

exposed the flank of the troops, the Confederates made a sharp assault on this part of the line just at night-fall, and came very near turning the right wing of the army. It was at this juncture that Generals Shaler and Seymour were captured by the Confederates. Sedgwick finally succeeded however in restoring his line, and in checking the assault upon it. With this the battle ended. It had been simply a slaughter with no definite result. Twenty thousand Federals and ten thousand Confederates had been placed *hors de combat*.

Grant now resumed his movement for turning Lee's right and placing his army between the Confederates and their capital. During the night of the 7th (May) he headed his columns for Spottsylvania Court House, but Lee anticipated the movement, and when Warren's men approached the place, they found Longstreet's corps, now commanded by Anderson, in line of battle across their path. After sharp fighting Warren succeeded in forcing the Confederates back a little, but the Federals had received such a check as to make it necessary to delay their main attack for several days.

While establishing his lines for his movement against the Confederate position around Spottsylvania Court House, Grant sent Sheridan with the main body of the cavalry to strike at the railroads between the Confederate army and Richmond. By the evening of the 9th, Grant had finished his preparations for the battle. The evolutions performed by the troops were difficult and dangerous. The brave and capable Sedgwick was killed while superintending some of them. On the 10th the attack was made. The Union line was formed with Hancock on the right, Warren in the centre, and Wright, now in command of Sedgwick's old corps, on the left. Warren fell upon Lee's centre with such violence and

Second battle in the Wilderness.

persistence that the Confederates were finally driven out of their intrenchments, not, however, until they had inflicted terrible loss upon the Federals. Nearly thirteen thousand of them were placed *hors de combat* in this conflict. The Confederate loss was, indeed, not much less.

It was the day following this battle that Grant sent his famous despatch to the President announcing that the result of the six days of fighting was favorable to the Union army, and declaring that he should fight it out on that line, though it should take all summer. Sheridan's movement had

Grant's despatch to the President.

greatly aided Grant at this point in the struggle. He had succeeded in destroying all of the railroads behind Lee and in drawing off the Confederate cavalry in pursuit of him, and in a battle with Stuart at Yellow

Tavern, just outside of Richmond, he defeated the flower of the Confederate horse, and killed their famous commander. He even pierced the first line of the fortifications

The cavalry battle at Yellow Tavern and the advance of Butler's army toward Richmond.

around Richmond, and succeeded in placing himself in communication with Butler, who had arrived at Bermuda Hundred and City Point, and was pushing his troops out toward the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad. Fearing for the safety of the capital, the Confederate President now called Beauregard with a strong force from the Carolinas to its defence. Butler found himself obliged to call his troops back to Bermuda Hundred and await the movements of Grant on the north side.

In the early morning of the 12th (May), aided by a heavy mist, Hancock's corps on the Federal right made a sudden attack on the Confederate left.

The attack was unexpected and one of the divisions of Ewell's corps was very nearly destroyed by it. It seemed for a moment as if Hancock would break the Confederate line in two, but reinforce-

The third battle in the Wilderness.

ments came quickly from right and left, and enabled Ewell to ward off this danger and drive Hancock back. By this time the battle was raging all along the entire front of both armies. The Confederate assaults were very vigorous, but not successful. The struggle lasted during the entire day, and was stopped only by the coming of the night. It was again a slaughter without any definite result. From twenty to twenty-five thousand men were placed *hors de combat* in this day's work, about the same number on each side.

For seven days the two armies now lay in speaking distance of each other, watching and preparing for a renewal of the attack. On the 19th, the Confederates, led by Ewell, made an onslaught on the Federal right, but were repulsed with great loss.

Grant now made another effort to turn Lee's flank, and reach the line of the North Anna River. Lee again

The fourth battle in the Wilderness.
The crossing of the North Anna and the critical position of the Federals.

anticipated him, and reached and crossed the river first, and made it his line of defence. Grant succeeded, however, in forcing a passage at two points, one at a bridge about a mile above the railroad bridge of the Richmond and Potomac Railroad, the other at Jericho Bridge still farther up. Warren and Wright crossed at Jericho, and Hancock at the other point. But the Federal army now found that it was cut into two parts by a strongly fortified position held by Lee's troops and reaching down to the river between the two crossings. Burnside endeavored to cross and drive the Confederates from this position, but he was himself repulsed. Warren now made a movement against it, but was unsuccessful. At last Grant reluctantly gave the order for his troops to recross to the north side. The loss suffered in this movement was not at all so great as that of the preceding day, but

it was serious, reaching nearly two thousand men on each side.

After bringing his army back to the north side of the North Anna, Grant moved eastward, and around the Confederate right flank. His troops marched down below the junction of the North and ^{Cold Harbor.} South Anna, forming the Pamunkey, and then crossed the Pamunkey at Hanover Town, on the 28th (May). The whole army now pressed forward, fighting continually, until it reached Cold Harbor, which place was entered by Sheridan with the cavalry on the 31st. Grant now made his final attempt to bring the Confederates to battle before they could get into the fortifications around Richmond. On the 1st of June, before Grant's arrival in person at Cold Harbor, Wright's corps and the troops brought over from Bermuda Hundred under General W. F. Smith made an attack upon the Confederates, and drove them out of their advanced works, but could not break their second line. The Confederates, on their side, delivered several assaults, but were repulsed with severe loss.

Grant himself now arrived on the scene, and on the next day, June 2d, drew up his army in battle array for the decisive conflict. Burnside's corps was placed on the right of the line, then came Warren's corps, then Smith's, then Wright's, while Hancock's troops formed the left. It was an enormous force, nearly, if not quite, one hundred and fifty thousand men, while the Confederates had scarcely half so many with which to oppose them. On the morning of the 3d, the battle of Cold Harbor began. Grant threw the corps of Hancock, Smith and Wright against the Confederate works on the right of their line. At first the attack promised success, but at last it failed. The Federals were repulsed. The battle did not last an hour, but in that short period

the Federals lost between seven and eight thousand men. The Confederate loss had not been half so many. From the 3d to the 13th, the two armies lay eying each other across the narrow space separating their works.

Grant was now at last convinced of the almost insurmountable difficulties in the way of entering Richmond from the north side, and he resolved to cross the James, join Butler and operate from City Point against Petersburg, and, by way of Petersburg, against Richmond and the rear of the Confederate army.

Grant's determination to change his base of operations.

Before making this movement, however, Grant felt it necessary to destroy the railroads between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley, in order to prevent any sudden advance of the Confederates toward Washington. He sent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to do this work.

Destruction of the railroads leading from Richmond into the Shenandoah Valley.

The Confederate cavalry soon discovered this movement and followed Sheridan northward. Several sharp collisions occurred, in which the Federals gained the advantage, and accomplished their purpose of severing railroad communication between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley. Sheridan now returned to Grant, although the plan had been to proceed farther and join the Federal troops operating around Charlottesville. This was the second week in June.

Sheridan's expedition and other minor diversions enabled Grant to conceal his intention of transferring his army to the south side of the James. He accomplished this critical movement most successfully between the 15th and 20th of the month (June). The crossing was made at Windmill Point some eight or ten miles below Bermuda Hundred. The Appomattox River now lay between

The transfer of the Army of the Potomac across the James.

Grant's forces and Richmond, though not between them and Petersburg.

After the junction thus of the Army of the Potomac with Butler's forces at Bermuda Hundred, Grant found his army to number about one hundred and fifty thousand men. The Confederates had Relative strength of the armies on July 1st. about half that number in Richmond and Petersburg with which to oppose him. During the campaign north of the James, Grant had lost some sixty thousand men, and the Confederates had lost some forty thousand. Grant was simply giving two men for one, a thing which he could do and still have some left after the last Confederate should have perished.

At this juncture Grant learned that the Confederates under Breckenridge had forced the Federal troops out of the Shenandoah Valley and had opened this line of advance toward Washington The Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley again. again. Grant now determined to make a very strong diversion to the south of Richmond immediately. He went in person up to Bermuda Hundred while his troops were crossing the James, and ordered an assault to be made at once on Petersburg by Butler's troops. Late in the afternoon of the 15th, Smith's corps made the attempt. The Feder- The first attack on Petersburg. als rushed gallantly forward and captured the fortification on the north-east side of the town. Had they continued to advance they could probably have taken the place. Hancock's corps had come to Smith's support, and the way seems to have been open. But Smith resolved to delay further operations until the next morning. During the night strong reinforcements for the Confederates arrived from Richmond; and when the Federals renewed the attack they met with repulse.

It was now seen that the works around Petersburg could not be carried by assault, but that a regular siege

must be resorted to. The Federals advanced to Deep Bottom on the north side of the James about a dozen miles from Richmond, and established a good connection between the troops located here, and those at Bermuda Hundred. They then made an attempt to cut the Weldon Railroad a few miles below Petersburg. In this they were not successful and suffered a loss of from three to four thousand men. The troops used in this movement were infantry. Between the 22d and the 29th Grant made another attempt upon the Confederate lines of communication. This time he sent the cavalry divisions of Wilson and Kautz. They succeeded in destroying parts of the three railroads leading from Petersburg southward and south-westward.

Then followed on the morning of the 30th (June) the attempt to make a breach through the Confederate works, by exploding a mine, which had been dug under them at an important point in their line. The plan was to assault through the breach in the moment of confusion caused by the explosion, and reach a certain commanding position which had been designated, and from which the city, it was thought, could be easily captured. After a little difficulty with the fuse, the mine exploded, blowing up the fortifications above it, together with some pieces of artillery, and quite a number of men. The Federal assaulting column rushed into the opening, but as they did not advance promptly enough, the Confederates succeeded in bringing troops forward to meet them, before they could press through. The Confederates poured a murderous musketry fire upon them in their embarrassed position, and finally drove them to retreat with very heavy loss, some four to five thousand men being placed *hors de combat*.

Lee now conceived the idea, or rather felt that the moment was opportune for the execution of the idea, of relieving Petersburg and Richmond by a diversion against Washington. He selected for this purpose General Jubal Early, one of his most capable lieutenants, and the fine division of troops under his command. The movement was by way of the Shenandoah Valley. On the 3d of July, the Confederates drove Sigel out of Martinsburg. The retreating Federals crossed the Potomac at Shepards-town, while the garrison at Harper's Ferry withdrew to Maryland Heights. The Confederates crossed over, occupied Hagerstown on the 6th, and pushed on immediately for Washington. They now numbered some fifteen or twenty thousand men. On the 9th, they met and defeated a considerable Federal force, led by General Wallace, in the valley of the Monocacy. On the 10th, they were within a very few miles of the city. They did not, however, push forward promptly, and the two corps sent by Grant to Washington reached the city in time to defend it against any attack which might be made after that day. On the 11th, the danger was over, and the Confederates were retreating from their perilous position, before the advance of General Wright. On the 20th, they got back across the river into the Valley and were gathered about Winchester.

Early's raid through the Valley toward Washington.

Failure to enter Washington.

Grant now ordered Wright to bring the two corps back to the position before Petersburg. So soon as Early learned of their departure, he marched his troops back into Maryland. He advanced to Chambersburg in Pennsylvania, and burned the place, in default of the payment of a contribution of two hundred thousand dollars in gold levied upon it. This occurred on the 30th.

Early in Pennsylvania and the burning of Chambersburg.

Early now found himself in a perilous position, with Federal troops gathering around him and threatening to cut him off from Virginia. He therefore beat a hasty retreat from Chambersburg. General Kelly succeeded, however, in striking him at Cumberland and in inflicting a severe blow upon him. Early escaped, however, to Winchester, while General Hunter was waiting for him near Frederick.

Grant now transferred the command of the troops opposing Early from Hunter to Sheridan, and ordered

Destruction
of the Shen-
andoah Valley
by Sheridan.

Sheridan to destroy what he could not consume in the Shenandoah Valley, so as to make any future raids through that Valley impossible. It was not, however, until after the middle

of September that Sheridan was in position to strike the Confederates at Winchester. He learned, about the 17th, that Early had divided his force, and had sent nearly half of it to Martinsburg. He determined, at once, to attack the part left at Winchester. Early, however, divined his purpose, and, before Sheridan began the attack, marched his troops headed for Martinsburg back to Winchester. When the battle began the entire strength of the Confederates was present. The firing opened about the middle of the forenoon of

The battle
of Opequon.

the 19th, and lasted until about the middle of the afternoon. The fate of the day was long undecided. At last, however, one of the Federal divisions succeeded in striking the Confederates in the left flank, and in throwing this part of their line into complete confusion. The pressure on the front was renewed at the same time with great vigor. The Confederates now gave way all along the line, and retreated in great haste and disorder to Fisher Hill, some ten miles south of Winchester. This battle, called the battle of Opequon, from the creek on whose banks it

was fought, was a bloody contest. It cost the Federals some five thousand men, and the Confederates about a thousand more.

On the 22d, Sheridan attacked the Confederates in their strong position on Fisher Hill. He sent one of his corps around the Confederate left flank The battle of Fisher Hill. into their rear, and when he began his attack on the front of the Confederate line, these troops threw themselves with terrible force upon the rear of it. The defeat of the Confederates was instantaneous and complete. They fled to Staunton, and then through the passes of the Blue Ridge toward Richmond. Half of Early's force had perished or been captured. After reducing the Valley to a waste, in order to prevent future raids through it on Washington, Sheridan drew his troops back to Strasburg. Early gathered the remnants of his scattered forces together, and being reinforced by Kershaw's entire division, sent from Lee's army, pursued Sheridan down the Valley.

On the 19th of October Early took the Federals quite by surprise at Cedar Creek. The battle began in the morning a little after daylight. Both the first and second lines of the Federals were forced The battle of Cedar Creek. back in great confusion. The commander on the field, General Wright, strove manfully to bring up reinforcements and rally the fleeing troops. Even after he was wounded he still directed the battle. He had succeeded partially in stemming the tide of defeat, when Sheridan himself, by the famous ride which has become poetry as well as history, brought himself from Winchester to the scene of the struggle. The Confederates had now become demoralized by their victory, and were plundering the Federal property which had been reached. It was at this juncture that Sheridan led the noted attack, which completely routed them and sent

them reeling up the Valley. Early's army was now completely wrecked. He had lost nearly twenty-five thousand men, in killed, wounded, and captured. The Federals had also suffered severely, but their losses hardly reached twenty thousand, and there was now no further danger of a raid on Washington by way of the Shenandoah.

During the campaign in the Valley, Grant had remained comparatively quiet. In the latter part of

Grant tightening his lines around Petersburg and Richmond. August he had succeeded in fighting his way around Petersburg to the Weldon Railroad, and in destroying this line of communication between Petersburg and the south. He also succeeded, during the latter half of September, in capturing Fort Harrison on the north side of the James, and in placing some of his troops in a position so threatening to Richmond as to make it very hazardous for Lee to send any troops away from the capital on outside expeditions.

After the battle of Cedar Creek, Grant determined to take a more decided offensive. He had extended his intrenched lines from City Point around Petersburg almost as far as he could without making them thin and weak, and still they did not reach quite to the Weldon Road. The South-Side and Danville Roads were still open, and Petersburg and Richmond were being supplied over them. Grant now, therefore, resolved to send a powerful column of troops across to these roads and destroy them. In fact, Grant and Meade led this column themselves. This was the last week in October. The expedition was, however, a failure, and the troops returned, with a loss of some two thousand men, into the intrenchments. The winter was now approaching and Grant resumed the work of extending and strengthening his fortified line, with the purpose of cutting communication as far as possible between Richmond and Petersburg and the south.

CHAPTER XXXI

SHERMAN'S MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA, AND HOOD'S MARCH TO NASHVILLE

The Confederate Movements in Georgia after Sherman's Capture of Atlanta—Sherman's Plan to Meet these Movements—Sherman's Disposition of his Troops—The Order of March—The March through Georgia to Savannah—The Investment of Savannah—The Opening of Communication between the Army and the Fleet off Savannah—The Evacuation of Savannah by the Confederates—Hood's Movements—Relative Strength of Hood and Thomas—Retreat of the Federals from Pulaski toward Nashville—The Battle at Franklin—The Battle at Nashville—The Rout of the Confederates.

DURING the period comprehending these last movements in Virginia, Sherman was making his great march through Georgia to the sea. The idea of it seems to have been suggested to Sherman by the movements of the Confederates after they abandoned Atlanta. They retreated to a point on the railroad about twenty-five miles below Atlanta, and in the latter part of September began to move westward around Sherman's right toward the Chattahoochee River with the purpose of going to Dallas, and from there striking the railroad back of Marietta, and thus destroying Sherman's communication with Chattanooga. Sherman's first step in meeting this movement was the sending of General Thomas back to Nashville to inaugurate a resistance to Hood's advance through Alabama into Tennessee.

The Confederate movements in Georgia after Sherman's capture of Atlanta.

During the first week in October the Confederates reached Dallas, and Hood sent his cavalry toward the railroad east of him. They captured both Acworth and Big Shanty with their garrisons, and cut Sherman's railroad and telegraphic communications with Chattanooga. On the 5th of October, French's division of Confederates attacked General Corse at Allatoona, but they were finally repulsed. Sherman himself had gone to Kenesaw Mountain, from which point he sent succor to Corse. On the 12th, Hood's forces approached Resaca, and Hood demanded surrender under threat of giving no quarter, if the garrison resisted. The Federals, however, refused to surrender and repelled successfully the Confederate assault. Hood now attacked Dalton, and captured the place and the garrison. He then marched westward around the south end of Lookout Ridge.

Sherman followed him as far as Gaylesville, and then seeing clearly that Hood would not fight him, but was only enticing him away from Georgia, he determined to destroy the railroad between Chattanooga and Atlanta himself, confide the task of destroying Hood's army to Thomas, and march his own immediate army from Atlanta to Savannah or Charleston. He would thus cut the Confederacy in two again, and lay the territory, which at this time was the remaining source of supply to the Confederate armies, in waste. He had already two weeks before this time written to Grant asking his opinion of the plan. Grant now approved it, after considerable hesitation, with the preference of Savannah over Charleston as the destination of the march.

Sherman now sent Stanley, Schofield and Wilson with their corps to report to Thomas, and gave Thomas command of all the troops subject to his orders, except the four corps which he reserved for the march through


Georgia and Kilpatrick's division of cavalry. He was at this date at Kingston, and from this place he issued his orders. He commanded the garrisons from Kingston northward to Chattanooga ^{Sherman's disposition of his troops.} to go back to Chattanooga, and report to General Thomas, destroying the railroad as they went. He then organized his own troops into two grand wings of infantry and a division of cavalry. Each wing was composed of two corps. Each corps numbered about fifteen thousand men, and carried about fifteen pieces of artillery. The cavalry division numbered about five thousand men. The command of the right wing was intrusted to General Howard, and that of the left to General Slocum. The cavalry was commanded by General Kilpatrick.

The order of the march was in four columns by roads as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at certain designated points. The army was com- ^{The order of the march.} manded to forage liberally on the country, but the soldiers were forbidden to enter any inhabited dwelling, or to commit any trespass. Destruction of property was also forbidden in districts where the troops should be unmolested, but in districts where they should be attacked either by the inhabitants or by bands of guerillas, the corps commanders were authorized to order the country devastated. Horses, mules and wagons might be taken, and negroes when they could be made serviceable.

This entire force, of some sixty-five thousand men, was back in Atlanta about the middle of November, and on the 16th, after thoroughly destroying the place, it set out for Savannah. The left ^{The march through Georgia to Savannah.} wing followed the railroad from Atlanta to Augusta, and the right followed the railroad from Atlanta to Macon. The cavalry was divided and moved

along both flanks. At Jonesborough, Howard left the railroad, and took the more direct route of the valley of the Ocmulgee River toward Macon. He then left Macon on his right, and struck the railroad from Macon to Savannah between Griswold and Gordon, some twenty-five or thirty miles east of Macon. A Confederate force was waiting for the Federals at Macon, and while Howard's men were engaged in tearing up the railroad, this force advanced from Macon and attacked them. It consisted, however, of not more than six thousand men and was easily beaten off. Slocum followed the Atlanta and Augusta Road to Covington and Madison, and then struck into the valley of the Oconee, which leads toward Milledgeville, at that time the capital of Georgia. On the 21st (November) his troops entered the town on the heels of the fleeing legislators. Howard continued to march along the road from Macon to Savannah. He found some opposition at the bridge over the Oconee, but he quickly overcame it.

Slocum's columns now converged toward Howard's line of march, and on the 27th, the two wings met at Sandersville on the Macon and Savannah Railroad. From this point the Federals moved in the direction of Millen, the place where the railroad from Macon to Savannah is intersected by the railroad from Augusta to Savannah. Wheeler, the chief of the Confederate cavalry, who was attempting to hinder the advance as much as possible, was made to think that the Federals were aiming at Augusta; and when he marched his men toward Augusta, the Ogeechee River was left free for Sherman to cross without molestation, which he did most successfully. The whole Federal army now moved straight on Millen, and when it reached this point, it swung around to the south, and struck out for Savannah, leaving the Confederate cavalry behind it in the direc-



Atlanta to Savannah.



tion of Augusta. It was now the 3d of December, but the weather was good and the men were in good health and high spirits. The march was from this point down the tongue of land lying between the Ogeechee and Savannah Rivers. The Confederates now for the first time discovered the true destination of the Federal army. General Hardee was in command at Savannah, and had some twelve or fifteen thousand men. The Confederates undertook to make a stand at the canal which connects the two rivers, but they were quickly beaten back, and the canal promptly bridged and passed over.

The Confederates now retreated into the works around the city, and on the 10th of December the city was fairly invested on the north and west. Both the Savannah and Charleston Railroad and the Savannah and Gulf Railroad were held by the Federals, who were now stretched around the city from the Savannah River to the Savannah and Gulf Road, forming a line from three to ten miles distant from the city.

The fleet was now notified of Sherman's arrival before Savannah by the enterprise of Captain Duncan and two companions, who succeeded in slipping down the Ogeechee River, past Fort McAllister, into Ossabaw Sound. Sherman at once resolved to open communication between the army and the fleet at the mouth of the Ogeechee. In order to do this he must capture the, to that time, impregnable fortress of Fort McAllister. This fort was located on the west bank of the Ogeechee some five miles above its mouth. His troops must, therefore, cross the river above the fort. A bridge was constructed in a single night, and the troops selected for the assault passed over. Sherman intrusted this hazardous undertaking to General Hazen, in whose ability and courage he had the greatest confidence. Hazen made the attack

The investment of Savannah.

The opening of communication between the army and the fleet off Savannah.

with his division about sundown in the afternoon of December 13th. In less than half an hour from the time the charge was sounded, the brave General had planted the Union flag on the fortress, which had so long defied attacks from the sea. Sherman now went down the river in person and boarded Dahlgren's vessel. The fleet and the army could now operate together against Savannah.

Siege guns were immediately brought over from Hilton Head, and Hardee was summoned to surrender. He declined to do so, but when the Federals began to put their siege guns in position to bombard the city, he evacuated the place during the night of the 20th of December and retreated across the Savannah River toward Charleston. Sherman immediately occupied the city, and the great march to the sea was ended. The army had marched over three hundred miles in a little more than a month's time, and had laid waste a region thirty miles in width from Atlanta to Savannah, destroying, thus, the only remaining railroad connection between Virginia and the Carolinas and the country west of Georgia. Sherman reported that he had taken about twenty millions of dollars worth of property and had destroyed about eighty millions of dollars worth more, and had brought away with him thousands of negroes. It was the severest blow which the Confederacy had received. Its last great source of supplies was nearly completely destroyed.

During this same period, Hood pursued his course northward through Northern Alabama. He reached the Tennessee River at Decatur in the last days of October. He met with such stout resistance here, however, that he was compelled to seek another crossing. He succeeded in the neighborhood of Florence. In the first days of November General Scho-

The evacuation of Savannah by the Confederates.

Hood's movements.

field, with his corps, took position at Pulaski in Tennessee, near the Alabama border, with the purpose of hindering Hood's advance. He was ordered by Thomas not to engage in battle with Hood until largely reinforced. The Confederate army remained for some days at Florence, gathering men and supplies.

Hood succeeded in organizing an army of some forty thousand men for his enterprise of expelling the Federals from Tennessee, while Thomas had, as yet, only about thirty thousand with whom to oppose him. Thomas's plan of action was, therefore, delay and slow retreat toward Nashville, where he expected to be able to gather a much larger army before the end of the month.

Schofield held his position at Pulaski until the 23d of November, when he withdrew toward Columbia, while Granger gathered the garrisons eastward from Florence into Stevenson, where they could take rail for Nashville. On the 25th, Hood was in front of Columbia fighting with Schofield's outposts. Schofield crossed over to the north side of Duck River, on which the town is situated. The Confederates succeeded in forcing their way across the river also, and Schofield retreated toward Franklin. The Confederate cavalry made a bold attempt to cut off the line of retreat and capture the Federal trains at Spring Hill, a place about half way between Columbia and Franklin, but they were finally beaten off, and the troops succeeded in getting safely into Franklin on the morning of the 30th.

Hood reported that this was the great mistake of the campaign, and threw the blame of it on his corps commanders, Cheatham and Stewart, who had orders to support the cavalry, and throw their troops across the turnpike in Schofield's rear, but re-

Relative
strength of
Hood and
Thomas.

Retreat of
the Federals
from Pulaski
toward Nash-
ville.

The battle at
Franklin.

mained inactive in plain sight of the retreating Federals. It is quite possible that, outnumbering Schofield so greatly as they did, they could have captured his small army of twelve or fifteen thousand men, if they had obeyed strictly the orders of their chief commander. As it was they pressed Schofield so hard that he felt obliged to stop and give battle at Franklin. He formed his little army in line of battle in front of the town, the Harpeth River behind it protecting his flanks, and waited under cover of the earthworks with the main body of his men for the attack. Two small brigades only had been thrown out in front of the works. The attack began in the middle of the afternoon of the 30th. The two brigades in front of the fortifications quickly gave way. They were in the centre of Schofield's line, and the confusion caused here threatened the Federals with complete disorder. At this juncture the brave and capable General Opdycke assumed the responsibility of ordering his brigade to charge the advancing Confederates. His example, courage and good judgment saved the day. The Confederates were repulsed, Schofield's line of battle was restored, and the Confederates threw themselves against it with desperate valor, but with no effect. It was midnight before they desisted from their fierce attempts to break the Federal line. They seemed to understand that this was their last opportunity. Five of their generals, among them Cleburne and Gist, were killed, six were wounded, and one was taken prisoner. More than five thousand of their men were placed *hors de combat*. Schofield had lost heavily also, but not the half of this number. The Confederates had received such a staggering repulse that Schofield was able to bring his army with all its trains and supplies safely back to Nashville, where Thomas had gathered a considerable force for the defence of the capital.

On the 1st of December Thomas formed his line of battle. He had between fifty and sixty thousand men. The line rested along the hills around Nash-
ville on the south, Schofield on the left, Wood ^{The battle at Nashville.} in the centre, and A. J. Smith on the right. The Confederates advanced to Montgomery Hill about half a mile south of Thomas's line and formed their line from the Hillsborough Pike to the Granny White Pike. Stewart's corps was on the left, S. D. Lee's in the centre, and Cheatham's corps was on the right.

Thomas soon saw that the Confederate left could be easily turned, as the distance between its extreme point and the river below Nashville was so great that the Confederates could not prevent the passage of troops around it. From the 3d to the 15th of December the two armies lay eying each other. On the 15th, at last, Thomas made his attack. He began with a diversion toward Hood's right drawing his attention in that direction, and then threw the troops commanded by Smith and Wilson around the Confederate left, striking Stewart's corps in the flank. Wood at the same time assaulted the Confederates on Montgomery Hill. The movement was successful at all points, and the Confederates were forced back to a second line along the Harpeth Hills. Cheatham's corps was now sent over from his position on the Confederate right to the left of Hood's line, where the Federal attack had been most severe. The strong point in the Confederate line was now Overton Hill. It covered the road to Franklin. Thomas desired to reach this road in order to cut off the Confederate retreat. On the next day he ordered that, while the movement should be continued against the left of the Confederate line, Overton Hill should be carried. Two brigades of Wood's corps, commanded by Post and Streight, were selected for the purpose. The attack was at the outset

repulsed, but Smith and Schofield moving forward at the same time broke the left and centre of the Confederate line, and Wood's soldiers renewed the attack on Overton Hill with entire success. The Confederates were now

The rout of
the Confeder-
ates.

routed all along the line, and a scene of confusion and flight followed. Only the corps commander, General S. D. Lee, stood and rallied around himself a handful of brave men and formed a rear-guard to protect the retreat. He was strengthened some hours later by Forrest's cavalry, and they succeeded in so hindering the Federal pursuit as to save a remnant of Hood's army. There was but one way out for the Confederates, and that was the Franklin Pike; all others had been closed. Through Franklin, Columbia, Pulaski to Bainbridge on the Tennessee, the fleeing Confederates went, suffering untold hardships and horrors on the way. Their ranks were depleted at almost every step, until at last scarcely a moiety remained. Hood had lost over twenty thousand men. His army was hopelessly ruined. After getting the remnant of his troops across the Tennessee, he retired in disgrace from the command. The Confederacy west of the Alleghanies was destroyed.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE LAST BLOWS

The Plan for Ending the War—The Capture of Fort Fisher and Wilmington—The Occupation of Mobile—The Beginning of Sherman's March through South Carolina—The Crossing of the Salkehatchie—The Fight at Orangeburg, and the Crossing of the Edistos—The Capture and Burning of Columbia—The Destruction of Charleston, and its Occupation by the Federals—Sherman's Entrance into North Carolina—The Fights at Averysboro and Bentonville—The End of the March—The Movements of Grant around Petersburg—Lee's Communication of the 2d of March to Grant—Grant's Answer—Confederate Attack on Fort Steadman—Five Forks—The Assault on Petersburg—The Abandonment of Richmond by the Confederates—The Occupation of Richmond by the Federals—The Pursuit of Lee's Army—Sheridan's Occupation of Lee's Line of Retreat toward Danville—Lee's Columns Headed for Lynchburg—The Capture of Ewell's Corps and Pickett's Division—Grant's Demand of Surrender—The Reply of Lee, and the Terms Offered—Lee's Proposition—Appomattox—The Surrender—Johnston's Movements, and Sherman's Counter-movements—The Assassination of Lincoln—The Meeting of Sherman and Johnston—The Sherman-Johnston Memorandum—The Repudiation of the Memorandum by the Washington Authorities—Johnston's Surrender—The Surrender of the Last of the Confederate Forces under Taylor and Smith—The Capture of Mr. Davis.

DURING the winter of 1864-65, Grant and Sherman were preparing to give the Confederacy its final blows. The plan was for Sherman to march through the Carolinas, and join Grant south of Richmond. It was felt that a necessary preliminary to the accomplishment of this purpose was the

The plan for
ending the
war.

capture of Wilmington, the last Confederate port of any importance, the last point of communication with the outside world.

The place was defended from the side of the sea chiefly by a strong work called Fort Fisher. This work must, therefore, be taken. In November of 1864, Admiral Porter collected a strong fleet at the mouth of the Chesapeake, and General Butler gathered a land force with which to operate in conjunction with the fleet. These forces started from Hampton Roads on the 13th of December. They approached Fort Fisher on the 15th. The fleet bombarded the fort on the 24th, and reduced it to earth heaps. These were, however, still protection for the garrison, and Butler, after examining the situation, decided that he could not take the place by assault, and ordered his troops to re-embark, and then to return to the place of departure. The fleet, however, remained, and Porter informed General Grant that the fort could be taken, if an able commander of land forces should be sent to do the work. Thereupon Grant ordered Butler's troops back to the neighborhood of the fort, and reinforced them a little. The command of them was now given to General Terry, a most capable and courageous officer. On the 13th of January these troops were landed, under the protection of Porter's guns, on the neck of the peninsula, on which the fort was located lower down toward the inlet. The plan was to assault the works at two points, simultaneously ; on the north-east by the troops, and on the south-east by the marines. In the middle of the afternoon of the 15th, the troops and the marines having worked themselves up to within about five hundred feet of the fortifications, the signal for assault was given and both rushed bravely forward. The marines were repulsed, but the troops, under the lead of the in-

The capture
of Fort Fisher
and Wil-
mington.

trepid Ames, and covered by Porter's guns, pressed forward, gained a foothold, and in an almost hand-to-hand struggle, of five or six hours' length, succeeded in capturing the works and the garrison. It numbered about two thousand men, under the command of General Whiting. The Federals lost about one hundred killed and about five hundred wounded in the engagement. The blow to the Confederacy was heavy. The entrance to the Cape Fear River was now lost to it, and the last channel of intercourse with foreign countries was at last blocked. Wilmington was now at the mercy of the fleet. The town was occupied on the 22d of February by Schofield's troops, sent from Nashville for that purpose.

It was now thought that the time had come for the occupation of Mobile also. It had long been at the mercy of the fleet, but the Washington Government had to that time thought best to keep a Confederate corps occupied with its defence, rather than use a Federal corps in holding it. The destruction of Hood's army now left several Federal divisions unemployed, and the authorities at Washington ordered the occupation of Mobile. On the 27th of March, General Canby, who was charged with the enterprise, sent Generals Granger and A. J. Smith with some twenty-five thousand men to make the assault on the Spanish Fort, the work which defended the city on the east side. General Carr succeeded, however, in planting a battery in such a position as to force the evacuation of the Fort without an assault. This was the 8th of April. The troops of Granger and Smith now joined those of Steele, who were operating against Fort Blakely. On the day following the evacuation of the Spanish Fort, Fort Blakely was carried by assault, and the garrison, consisting of nearly four thousand men, was captured. The Confederate forces, commanded by

The occupation of Mobile.

General Maury, now evacuated the city and retreated toward Meridian. The Federals occupied the place on the 12th.

Meanwhile Sherman was making his way through the Carolinas toward Goldsboro, the point selected as his objective. It was Grant's idea that Sherman's army should be brought from Savannah to City Point by sea, but Sherman protested against this, as being demoralizing to his troops, and as preventing him from carrying the war into South Carolina. His views prevailed, and after a good rest in Savannah, he set out on his second great march. It was the 1st of February when it began. The army numbered about sixty thousand men, and was still marched in two wings, Howard commanding the right and Slocum the left. They could no longer follow the water-courses, as on their way to Savannah. They must now cross them. This made their work much more difficult. The country was, moreover, for some distance from Savannah one vast marsh, so that the soldiers were often obliged to wade in water up to their waists, and sometimes to their armpits. Wheeler's cavalry was the chief Confederate force in front of them, and its principal work was felling trees across the roads and making all kinds of obstructions to the Federal advance. By a clever diversion toward Charleston, Sherman made the Confederates think he intended an attack on that city, and thus prevented the Confederate troops there from coming out to molest him in his march.

The Confederates undertook to make a stand on the bank of the Salkehatchie and dispute the crossing, but Howard drove them off in a combat on the 3d of February. They then retired to the line of the Edisto, to prevent the passage of the Federals over the river. The whole army now

The beginning of Sherman's march through South Carolina.

The crossing of the Salkehatchie.

concentrated on the South Carolina Railroad between Midway Station and Graham's. They destroyed the railroad for a long distance and kept the Confederates in utter ignorance of their destination. Hardee was expecting them to come toward Charleston; Hill and Smith, on the other hand, were awaiting them at Augusta. But Sherman turned his columns from Branchville toward Columbia. He struck the Confederates at Orangeburg. A vigorous charge from Blair's corps drove them off, and opened the way into Orangeburg. The Edisto, south and north branches, were crossed without much difficulty, and on the 16th (February), the Federal advance arrived in front of Columbia.

The fight at Orangeburg, and the crossing of the Edisto.

The Congaree, however, lay between them and the city. Sherman ordered Howard to go up above Columbia and cross the branches of the Congaree. Slocum followed the same course, and naturally went still higher up, in order to cut off the Confederate retreat. These movements were successful, and on the 17th, Columbia surrendered. The mayor was the official who delivered up the place. The Confederate troops escaped. Hampton's cavalry left the town last. They cut and fired hundreds of bales of cotton in the town before leaving. There was a high wind at the time, and the burning cotton was blown in every direction, setting fire to the houses in many quarters at once. The Confederates accused Sherman of burning the city, but he declared that the charge was false. He ordered generally all public buildings to be burned, but he solemnly affirmed that before the torch had been applied to one of them in Columbia, the city was ablaze from the flying cotton which Hampton had fired. He affirmed that what was saved of Columbia was done by the exertions of his own troops.

The capture and burning of Columbia.

Hardee now quickly abandoned Charleston in order to prevent his retreat being cut off. He applied the torch to all the cotton in the city, and to the buildings in which it was housed. This started a terrible conflagration, which raged until the city was almost entirely destroyed. On February 18th, General Gillmore occupied the place, and restored order.

The destruction of Charleston and its occupation by the Federals.

Sherman's march from Columbia was toward Cheraw beyond the Catawba or Wateree River. The river was successfully passed without much opposition, and the town was reached on the 3d of March. The army arrived at the North Carolina boundary on the 8th of the month. The army now ceased devastating the country through which it passed, since North Carolina had never played the rôle in secession history that South Carolina had done. Fayetteville was the next objective point of the march. With only a cavalry skirmish to impede, the army arrived at that place on March 10th. The Confederates now began to concentrate their forces on Charlotte, and General Johnston was again put in command, displacing Beauregard. At Fayetteville Sherman was able to communicate with Schofield at Newnam. Sherman informed Schofield that he should threaten Raleigh, but should march on Goldsboro, where he desired the forces commanded by Schofield and Terry to meet him.

On the 15th Sherman's army started from Fayetteville for Goldsboro. On the 16th, the left wing struck the Confederates in the neighborhood of Averysboro and had a sharp contest, but drove them away. On the 19th Slocum struck the Confederates again at Bentonville. This time they nearly equalled him in numbers, and were commanded by Johnston himself. But the Federal commander formed

The fight at Averysboro and Bentonville.

his line quickly, and drove the Confederates away again, with considerable loss to them. In a few days more Sherman made his junction with Schofield and Terry at Goldsboro and along the Neuse. The great march was accomplished, and Grant and Sherman could now operate together. On the 27th Sherman was at City Point with Grant arranging for the final blow at the Confederacy.

Meanwhile Grant had been gradually extending his lines around Petersburg by the south. The Confederate commanders were becoming conscious of the fate which was surely impending over them.

The end of the march.

The movements of Grant around Petersburg.

On the 2d of March, Lee, who had a month before been promoted to the command of all the Confederate armies, wrote to Grant asking him for an interview to consider a settlement of difficulties, declaring that he was fully authorized to act in the premises. Grant submitted the letter to Stanton asking instructions. Stanton replied that the President directed him to say that he wished General Grant to have no conference with General Lee, except in regard to the capitulation of Lee's army or some purely military matter. Grant declined Lee's proposal, therefore, on the ground that the matter referred to by General Lee belonged to the President alone to consider. Grant was also directed by the President to press his military advantages to the utmost.

Lee's communication of the 2d of March to Grant.

Grant's answer.

Lee now saw that he must evacuate Richmond and Petersburg and join Johnston, and must do so before Grant should reach the Danville Railroad. Grant knew that Lee would make this move and prepared to foil it. Lee tried to cover his movement by attacking Grant's right in order to draw troops from the Federal left, and

thus let the Confederates out. In the morning of March 25th, before daylight, a number of Confederates, pretending to be deserters, came over into the Federal picket lines in front of Fort Steadman. They had their arms, but they were not suspected of treachery. Once inside, however, they overpowered the sentinels, and before anybody could recover from the surprise, the Confederate General Gordon, with a force of five thousand men, rushed into the works, and took possession of them, capturing a considerable number of prisoners. Gordon was not, however, supported as he expected to be, and his men found themselves massed together in the advanced works with the Federal artillery on the heights behind playing upon them. They could go no farther, and they simply remained there until more than half of them were killed or wounded. The remainder at last fled in every direction open to them. The Federals now pressed forward, and captured the first line of the Confederate intrenchments.

On the 29th of March, the army renewed its movement around to the southwest of Petersburg, in order to entrap Lee. It was now about one hundred and twenty-five thousand strong, while the Confederates numbered only about half as many. Sheridan with about ten thousand cavalry was on the extreme left, and was directed to get into the Confederate rear, that is to cut off their line of retreat toward the southwest or the west. To meet this movement, the Confederates extended their line a little distance beyond Five Forks, a place which was still some three miles eastward from the South-Side Railroad, but they had not the troops to prolong their line any farther. It was Hill's men who were in this position. Gordon's troops were in the trenches at Petersburg ; Longstreet's occupied the line

from Petersburg to and across the James below Richmond ; and Ewell's men were holding the works around Richmond.

On the 30th Sheridan, followed by Warren's corps of infantry, pushed on from Dinwiddie Court House to Five Forks and struck the Confederates. Lee now thought that Grant was aiming at the railroads still farther west. He, therefore, sent troops from Petersburg to reinforce Hill. Petersburg was thus left weak. The Confederates now attacked Sheridan at Five Forks and drove him back toward Dinwiddie Court House. Grant sent Warren's corps to support Sheridan, and the Confederates retreated back to Five Forks. The next day, April 1st, Sheridan and Warren attacked the Confederates at Five Forks. Sheridan, with the cavalry, went around one flank, and the infantry went around the other. The Confederates were deceived by the movement of the cavalry and were fairly bagged. A desperate battle ensued, in which the Confederates were overpowered and routed, with the loss of nearly half of their force of fifteen thousand men. Sheridan's loss was not a fifth part of that of the Confederates.

The Federals were now nearly in the only line of Lee's retreat southward or south-westward. He must now act with great promptness or the Danville road would be closed to him. Grant sent ^{The assault} on Petersburg. more men to Sheridan to hold his position, and in the early morning of April 2d ordered the grand assault all along the line. The onslaught was terrific and successful everywhere. By noon the whole line of outer works had been taken and the Confederate army was a routed wreck.

President Davis was informed of the situation while at church, and began preparations at once for the abandonment of Richmond by the Confederate Government.

He ordered all the coin in the banks to be sent to Danville, and the archives of the Government to be sent to the same place or destroyed.

The abandonment of Richmond by the Confederates.

The tumult raised in the capital by the news of the great disaster increased from moment to moment, and the mob burned and pillaged while the soldiers of the Confederacy were fleeing. Against the protest of the municipal government and many of the best citizens, Ewell ordered all the storehouses and bridges to be burned. The whole city seemed to take fire from these. It was a terrible conclusion of the four years of Confederate reign in the fair city on the James. The Federals entered on the

The occupation of Richmond by the Federals.

morning of the 3d, and succeeded in quenching the flames and quelling the disorder. Petersburg was occupied about the same time. The Confederate troops abandoned the place, and the municipal authorities surrendered it to the Federals.


Lee's plan of retreat was for the forces from Richmond and Petersburg to unite at Chesterfield Court

The pursuit of Lee's army.

House, a place about half-way between the two, and a little to the west of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad, and then move westward to Burksville Junction, the point where the railroad from Petersburg to Lynchburg crosses the Richmond and Danville Road. From here he might reach Johnston. Grant understood the plan, and he immediately set his army in motion for Burksville Junction to intercept the Confederates. Sheridan was some twenty miles west of Petersburg with the cavalry, and upon him devolved the chief work in the pursuit. The infantry of the Army of the Potomac was pushed on after him, while Ord's corps marched along the railroad from Petersburg to Lynchburg.

GENERAL MAP OF THE FIELD OF OPERATIONS.

1864-5.





On the 4th of April, Lee reached Amelia Court House, a place on the Richmond and Danville Road about twenty miles northeast of Burksville Junction. His army had now dwindled to about fifty thousand men. He expected to supply his troops at this point, but when he reached the place, he found that the train containing the supplies had gone on to Richmond several days before by order of the Government, and had done so without unloading the food for his starving soldiers. This necessitated his remaining for twenty-four hours at Amelia to forage. The halt of the Confederates gave Sheridan his opportunity. He reached Burksville ahead of Lee. The infantry led by Meade soon arrived on the line of the Danville Road, and Lee found, on the 6th, any further advance in this direction impossible.

Sheridan's occupation of Lee's line of retreat toward Danville.

Lee now undertook to march around the Federal left and go toward Lynchburg, crossing the Appomattox River at Farmville. But Sheridan was immediately on his track again. He at once informed Grant of Lee's new move. Grant directed Ord to move from Burksville to Farmville, and, dividing the Army of the Potomac into three columns, he sent one north of Lee, one south of him, and the third in direct pursuit while Sheridan was to gain his front. Crook's brigade of the cavalry struck the staggering Confederate column at Deatonsville, and, supported by Custer and Devin, cut Ewell's corps and Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps off, and forced them to surrender. Lee's army was now in a most deplorable condition. Not more than thirty or thirty-five thousand men remained, starving, in tatters and perfectly demoralized.

Lee's columns headed for Lynchburg.

The capture of Ewell's corps and Pickett's division.

Ord's advance reached Farmville in time to strike

Lee's column, but the Confederates fought desperately to reach the bridge and cross, and succeeded in doing

so. Lee's generals now advised him to surrender. At the same time Grant sent him

Grant's demand of surrender.

a note demanding the surrender of "that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia." This was April 7th. The Federal advance, under Humphreys, now crossed the river, the Appomattox, in hot pursuit, and came upon the Confederates a few miles north of Farmville, where they had stopped and thrown up some earthworks. Humphreys attacked them but was repulsed.

It was under the influence of this little success, that Lee answered Grant's letter, and, instead of offering to surrender, asked terms. Grant replied, on the 8th, that his terms were surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, on the condition that "the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified from taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly ex-

Lee's proposition.

changed." Lee's reply was substantially a declination, and a proposition to treat for peace. Grant answered this proposition on the 9th, declaring that he had no authority to treat for peace.

Sheridan now pushed his cavalry forward for Appomattox Station, on the railroad to Lynchburg; and the

Appomattox.

troops of Ord and Griffin followed him rapidly, urged on by Sheridan's request. In the middle of the night of the 8th-9th, Sheridan's advance arrived at the station ahead of the Confederates, captured the trains waiting for Lee there, and cut off the retreat to Lynchburg. By daylight of the 9th, Sheridan's entire corps, supported by Ord's and Griffin's infantry, were posted square across the line of retreat of the Confederates. Thinking that he had only cavalry

in front of him, Lee ordered Gordon to charge and clear the way. But when Sheridan drew his cavalry aside and revealed the line of infantry behind him, the Confederates gave up, at last, in despair and raised the white flag.

Lee now requested an interview with Grant for the purpose of arranging terms of surrender. They met at the house of a Mr. McLean at Appomattox Court House, where Grant put his terms in writing. ^{The surren-} der. They were surrender, and release on parole not to take up arms against the United States again until properly exchanged; the arms, artillery, and public property to be delivered up to officers designated by himself; the Confederate officers to retain their side arms and their private property, horses and baggage. Lee immediately accepted these terms in writing. Grant afterward allowed the men, as well as the officers, to retain their horses where they were their private property. This was highly appreciated at the time as a genuine act of mercy and kindness.

On the 12th of May, the stipulations were formally executed. A few more than twenty-seven thousand men, not more than the third of them having arms in their hands, a few pieces of artillery and three or four hundred wagons, were surrendered, the last of the proud Army of Northern Virginia, which for nearly four years had kept the forces of the Union at bay. Grant himself had lost an army of nearly one hundred thousand men in destroying it. It was, however, at last accomplished, and the Confederacy was now in ruins.

Johnston's army was at this moment at Smithfield, North Carolina, covering Raleigh. On the 10th of April, Sherman set his troops in motion from Goldsboro to attack him. Johnston immediately began retreating. Crossing the Neuse, he went to Hillsboro. In the midst

Johnston's
movements
and Sher-
man's coun-
ter-move-
ments.

of this movement the news of Lee's surrender reached both armies, and Johnston decided to make overtures to Sherman. On the 14th, Sherman received Johnston's letter, asking cessation of hostilities and terms of surrender. Sherman immediately replied that he was willing to confer and would offer the same terms accorded by Grant to Lee. Sherman was at Raleigh when he received the letter, and Johnston was at Hillsboro.

On the morning of the 15th Sherman set out to meet Johnston. Just as he was starting a telegram was handed him informing him of the assassination of President Lincoln, which occurred the night before at Ford's Theatre in Washington, by the hand of the actor J. Wilkes Booth. Ordering the telegraph operator who had given him the despatch to keep silent, he put the fatal message in his pocket and went on to meet Johnston. He went by train to Durham Station, and then rode some six or seven miles farther toward Hillsboro, when he met Johnston. They went into a small farmhouse, and requested the use of a room from its owner. When they were alone behind closed doors Sherman handed Johnston the telegram announcing the President's assassination. Johnston was deeply affected and spared no words in denunciation of the foul deed. Johnston told Sherman that he could procure the surrender of all the Confederate troops everywhere, and asked for time to find Mr. Davis, and secure the orders to that effect. Sherman wanted Johnston to surrender, at once, the troops under his command, but consented to delay matters one day. On the next day Sherman repaired again to the place of conference. Mr. Davis had not been found, but the Confederate Secretary of War, Mr. John C. Breckenridge was brought in, and John-

The assassination of Lincoln.

The meeting of Sherman and Johnston.

ston declared that Breckenridge's order would be universally obeyed. Sherman, however, was not satisfied. He even objected to the presence of Breckenridge, as being a civil officer. Johnston urged that Breckenridge was a major general also, and Sherman withdrew his objection.

Johnston insisted on putting things into the agreement which were political rather than military. He wanted to secure some pledges in regard to the political future of the South. At last ^{The Sherman-Johnston memorandum.} Sherman agreed to draw up a memorandum providing not only for the surrender of the Confederate troops, but agreeing to the deposit of the arms held by the Confederates in the capitals of the several "States" forming the Confederacy, recognizing the existing "State" governments in the "States" forming the Confederacy upon the taking of the oath of allegiance by the executives and legislators of these several "States," to the United States, and guaranteeing the political rights and franchises of the people of these "States."

Sherman signed this memorandum with Johnston, and sent it to Washington for approval. He also sent a letter urging its acceptance. The date of the paper was April 18th. It was sent directly to General Grant, to be submitted by him to the President. The President, Mr. Johnson, instantly disapproved it, and Grant in transmitting the President's reply ordered Sherman to notify Johnston of the termination of the armistice, and to resume military operations against the Confederates. The position taken by the President was undoubtedly correct. The matters contained in the memorandum, beyond the surrender of the troops and their parole, were matters for Congress and the President as legislators to determine,

^{The repudiation of the memorandum by the Washington authorities.}

and were not proper subjects for a military capitulation. Sherman had been unwittingly led too far in his desire to see peace and good-will restored to the country, but he was entirely honest and patriotic in his purpose and actions, and the denunciation of him by some of the more radical newspapers, and the actions of some of the authorities, especially of General Halleck, toward him, were outrages upon the grand old soldier, who had done more than all of them put together to uphold and maintain the Constitution and the Union.

Grant went in person to Raleigh to see Sherman, and talk over the situation with him. After this interview, Sherman immediately notified Johnston of Johnston's surrender. the failure of the memorandum and demanded his surrender on the same terms accorded by Grant to Lee. Johnston now felt obliged to yield, and on the 26th of April, the agreement was signed between them and approved by Grant.

The fear that the remaining Confederate forces would break up into guerilla bands and wage partisan war indefinitely was happily not realized. On the 4th of May, General Richard Taylor surrendered all of the remaining Confederate forces east of the Mississippi; and on the 26th, General Kirby Smith surrendered all remaining west of the great river. The last shot of the war was fired on the 13th of May, at a point on the Rio Grande.

In the early morning of the 10th of May, the fugitive President, or rather now ex-President, of the Confederacy was captured near Irwinville, Georgia, by some detachments of cavalry commanded by Colonels Harnden and Pritchard, sent out by General Wilson from Macon. He had made his way from Richmond to Danville, and thence to Greensboro, and seeing that Johnston's surrender was inevitable,

The surrender of the last of the Confederate forces under Taylor and Smith.

The capture of Mr. Davis.

he had proceeded toward the Gulf attended at first by a troop of cavalry, and at last by a few friends. He was taken with his family, consisting of his wife and infant daughter and his wife's sister, to Savannah, and thence alone to Fortress Monroe, where he was kept in rigorous, not to say severe, confinement for two years, and then liberated on bond. He was popularly accused of complicity in the assassination of Lincoln, and the President of the United States repeated this libel, for such it doubtless was, in his proclamation offering one hundred thousand dollars for his apprehension ; but he was never tried for this alleged offence, nor for treason against the United States. The war was over. The South was exhausted and ruined, and it remained for the Government of the United States to do what it would in the establishment of a new order of things in that section.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS DURING THE LATTER YEARS OF THE CIVIL WAR.

Seward—Unfriendliness of Two of the Leading Governments of Europe—The Two Serious Questions of a Diplomatic Nature Arising During the War—Diplomatic Situation at the Beginning of the Year 1862—Mr. Bulloch's Mission to England—The Foreign Enlistment Act of Great Britain—The Interpretation of this Act by British Lawyers—The Building of Ships for the Confederates in Great Britain—The Proceedings against the *Alexandra*—Gist of the Contention between Mr. Adams and the British Ministry—The Case of the Attorney-General *vs.* Sillem—The Decision and its Effects—The Steam-Rams—Earl Russell's Views—The French Invasion of Mexico—The Situation of Mexico in the Period between 1820 and 1860—The Advent of Juarez—European Demands against Mexico and the Seizure of Vera Cruz—The Interposition of the United States in the Question—The French Occupation of the City of Mexico—Mr. Seward's Reticence—The Empire of Maximilian—Seward's Continued Patience—The Hope of the Confederates—Seward's Answer to the French "Feeler"—The President's Firm Stand—Maximilian's Acceptance of the Throne—The Sending of Sheridan to the Texan Border—The Policy of President Johnson—Seward's Note of the 16th of December, 1865, to the French Government—The Departure of the French Troops from Mexico, and the Downfall of Maximilian's Empire—The Success of the Diplomacy of the Administration—Mr. Seward and the Monroe Doctrine—France and the United States—United States and Great Britain—United States and Canada—United States and Russia—United States and the German States.

THE genius of the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, was pre-eminently diplomatic. He was so courteous and

conciliatory in manner and character as to impress many with the idea that his mental structure was a composition of craft and cowardice. Whatever it may have been, it was certainly just what Seward. the United States needed at the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs in the momentous period between 1861 and 1865. Nothing could have been more fatal to the interests of this country, at that time, than to have a bullying chauvinist in that position.

There can be no reasonable doubt now that two of the then three leading governments of Europe were rather inclined to the view that the success of the Confederates in their attempt to destroy the American Union would be beneficial to their interests. Let it be remarked that it is not said that the mass of the people of Great Britain or of France were of this opinion, or felt any sympathy with the Confederate cause. Its identification with the interests of slaveholding repelled them, more than the radical democracy of the North did. The proposition applies only to the existing governments of these countries, the one of which was exceedingly aristocratic in its character, and the other that curious mixture of democracy and despotism, which is termed Cæsarism or Bonapartism. While they probably intended to preserve generally the attitude of neutrality between the parties to the great contest, they certainly felt a strong impulse, in all doubtful cases, to give the Confederates the benefit of the doubt, and they felt no scruples of conscience in taking advantage of the embarrassments of the United States to realize plans of their own unfavorable to the interests of the United States.

Under such circumstances and conditions, and with such a disposition animating the diplomacy of Great Britain and France, it was certainly most fortunate for

this country that just such a character as Mr. Seward directed its business with foreign states. If, for example, the Secretary of the Navy, who so instantly and highly applauded the action of Captain Wilkes in the Trent affair, had occupied Mr. Seward's chair, there can be little doubt, so far as the wit of man can forecast anything, that this country would never have passed through the Civil War without suffering under the disaster of foreign war at the same time.

As it was, and with all of Mr. Seward's judgment, learning, urbanity and conservatism, the country emerged from the Civil War with two most serious for-

The two serious questions of a diplomatic nature arising during the war.

foreign complications with which to deal : viz., the violations of neutrality permitted by the British Government in the creation of a Confederate navy in the ports of that country, and the attempt of the French Government to establish imperial government in Mexico. It is the purpose of this chapter to deal briefly with these two subjects. The other questions of a diplomatic character belonging to this period, while all of more or less importance in diplomatic history, are too secondary in their character and results to demand attention in the general review, which the concise nature of these volumes makes necessary.

The recognition of the belligerency of the Confederates by the European states has been already referred to

in a preceding chapter of this work, and the so-called Trent affair has been treated at some length. We have therefore to begin

Diplomatic situation at the beginning of the year 1862.

here with the diplomatic situation at the opening of the year 1862, which was, briefly, recognition of the belligerency of the Confederates, and an attitude of neutrality between the Federals and Confederates by, and on the part of, the European states, with some irritation on the part of the British Government as

the result of the controversy over the Trent affair, some chagrin on the part of the United States over the outcome of this matter, and a general disposition on the part of both the British and French Governments to favor the Confederates so far as the rather loosely constructed rules concerning neutrality would allow, and to make use of the domestic embarrassments of the United States to further their own interests in so far as these same rules would permit.

Immediately after the governments of Europe recognized the belligerency of the Southern Confederacy, that is, in the summer of 1861, Mr. Davis sent a naval officer, one James D. Bulloch, to England for the object of procuring warships and naval supplies in the ports of Great Britain. This very intelligent man began his work, as he himself tells us in his book on the "Secret Service of the Confederate States," by an inquiry into the neutrality laws of Great Britain with the purpose of going to the very limits of those laws without overstepping them. He procured eminent counsel, who submitted a series of propositions in interpretation of these laws to two of England's most able barristers. The law to be interpreted was the Act of Parliament of 59th George III., chapter 69, entitled, in common parlance, the Foreign Enlistment Act. Its exact title is "an Act to prevent the enlistment or engagement of His Majesty's subjects to serve in foreign service, and the fitting out or equipping in His Majesty's dominions of vessels for warlike purposes"; and its seventh section provides that if any person within the United Kingdom should equip, furnish, fit out, or arm, or attempt or endeavor to equip, etc., or procure to be equipped, etc., or should knowingly aid, assist, or be concerned in equipping, etc., with intent

Mr. Bulloch's mission to England.

The Foreign Enlistment Act of Great Britain.

that such ship should be employed in the service of any foreign state, etc., as a transport or store ship, or with intent to cruise or commit hostilities against any state, etc., with whom His Majesty shall not then be at war, every person so offending should be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Mr. Bulloch says that these learned British lawyers advised him that it was no offence, under the act, for British subjects to fit out and equip a vessel *outside* of Her Majesty's dominions, even though it was intended for warlike purposes against a state friendly to Great Britain; that it was also no offence, under the act, for any person to fit out and equip a vessel *within* Her Majesty's dominions, if it were not with a warlike intent against a state friendly to Great Britain; and that the mere *building* of a ship *within* Her Majesty's dominions by any person was no offence, under the act, no matter what might be the intent with which it was done. He says, furthermore, that they drew the conclusion that "*any* shipbuilder may build *any* ship in Her Majesty's dominions, provided he does not equip her within Her Majesty's dominions, and he has nothing to do with the acts of the purchasers done *within* Her Majesty's dominions without his concurrence, or *without* Her Majesty's dominions even with his concurrence."

Armed with this legal opinion from high authority, Mr. Bulloch found little difficulty in persuading the shipbuilders on the Mersey and the Clyde to undertake the construction of war-vessels for the Confederate navy. The first ship built was the *Florida*. She was constructed during the latter part of the year 1861 and the first part of 1862, by Laird & Sons, at Birkenhead on the

The interpretation of this act by British counsel.

The building of ships for the Confederate States in Great Britain.

Mersey. It was pretended that she was being built for the Italian Government. Her real destination was, however, suspected by the United States Consul at Liverpool, Mr. Dudley, who immediately imparted his suspicions to the United States Minister, Mr. Charles Francis Adams. Mr. Adams drew the attention of the British Government to the work being done at Birkenhead, but the Government did not see its way to interfere on the ground of mere suspicion. It wanted facts which would be accepted as evidence in a court of justice. The *Florida* left Birkenhead during the latter part of March, 1862. She cleared for the Italian waters with a British crew on board. She had no guns or munitions on her. These were shipped from Hartlepool on the steamer *Bahama*. The two vessels met at Nassau according to agreement, and the *Florida* received her armament in the waters near that place. The British crew now clearly understanding the situation refused to serve longer, and her commander, after trying in vain to ship another crew in Cuba, ran her through the blockading squadron off Mobile into that port.

At the same time that these events were occurring the Lairds were building another ship of the same pattern as the *Florida*. This was the famous, ^{The *Alabama*} or rather the notorious, *Alabama*. Although the builders kept her destination a strict secret, the United States Consul at Liverpool was on the watch, and he reported his well-grounded suspicions to Mr. Adams in regard to her ownership and purpose. Mr. Adams immediately requested the British Government to detain her. The ministers consulted the crown lawyers. After considerable delay, caused by the illness of the chief advocate, a legal opinion was furnished the Government advising the detention of the vessel. Mean-

while, under pretext of a trial trip, she had slipped away in the latter part of July. She was not equipped with her armament and munitions when she left Birkenhead, but they were conveyed to her from the waters of the Mersey in two other ships. The three vessels met by arrangement in the waters of the Azores. Here the *Alabama* was armed and equipped, and Semmes took command of her. She immediately began her destructive cruise against the commerce of the United States. She robbed and burned the merchant vessels captured, without any regard to the rules of condemnation by prize courts. At last, in the summer of 1864, she was brought to bay just off the French port of Cherbourg by the United States war-ship *Kearsarge*, commanded by the brave and skilful Winslow, and was sunk.

A third ship, the *Georgia*, contracted for by Mr. Bulloch, was, about the same time, being constructed on the Clyde. She, too, escaped the watchful United States consuls on account of the slowness of the British officials, and sailed in the early part of the year 1863. She left the Clyde without her armament. But it was conveyed to her from Liverpool on the steamer *Alar*, and transferred to her near the French coast. After cruising in the Confederate service for about twelve months, she steamed into the Mersey and was sold by Mr. Bulloch to parties in Liverpool.

At last the representatives of the United States were successful in bringing the British officials to action. A vessel, named the *Alexandra*, was in process of construction at Liverpool for the Confederate service, during the winter of 1862-63. Mr. Dudley secured sufficient evidence of this to ground a case upon before the courts, and the British officers were thus driven, on the basis of their own interpreta-

The proceedings against the *Alexandra*.

tion of their duties, to proceed against the builders, Messrs. Sillem & Co.

Mr. Adams and Mr. Dudley had, all along, in their controversies with the British ministers, contended that the general principles of international law made it incumbent upon neutral states to prevent either belligerent from making any place subject to their jurisdiction a base of hostile operations against the other. But the British officials said that the British Parliament was the exclusive interpreter of the principles of international law for the British executive, and that what were called the general principles of international law had no validity for the British executive unless expressed in an act of Parliament. This was sound jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of the United States had long before this decided that there is no international law for the United States except as formulated in the acts of Congress. Mr. Adams contended, however, that if the Parliamentary statute was not sufficient to give force to the general principle, the ministers of the crown could always procure from Parliament the proper amendment of its act. The ministers thought, on their side, that the act was sufficient for everything that could be reasonably required of the Government, and that the representatives of the United States had only to offer evidence instead of suspicions and it would be shown that it was.

This last contention was now to be tested in the case of the Attorney-General against Sillem and others, more popularly known as the "*Alexandra* case." The seizure of the vessel was made on the 6th of April, 1863, at Liverpool, by an officer of the British customs, and the Attorney-General immediately filed an information against the defendants, charging them with "furnishing," "equipping," and "fitting out" the vessel, but

Gist of the
contention be-
tween Mr.
Adams and
the British
ministry.

not with "arming it." The defendants promptly entered their plea of not guilty, and the case came to trial before the Chief Baron of the Exchequer Court, Baron Pollock, and a jury specially drawn for the occasion, in the last days of June, 1863. In summing up the case Baron Pollock said that the evidence showed that when this vessel was seized she was simply in course of *building*, and that it was no offence under the neutrality laws of Great Britain to *build* a vessel for a belligerent power; that, in his opinion, the words of the Parliamentary act, "equip," "furnish," "fit out," or "arm" meant the same thing; and that unless the jury could find that the intent was to equip or arm the vessel at Liverpool or on British territory, he did not think the neutrality laws had been violated in any manner or degree. This was simply an instruction to the jury to find for the defendant, unless they should decide that there was sufficient evidence of an intent to arm the vessel on British soil. There were naturally no specific facts in proof of such an intent. There was only the suspicion, however well grounded. While this was sufficient to justify a demand for greater watchfulness on the part of the police, it was not evidence in a court of justice.

The jury found, therefore, for the defendant. The Attorney-General first prepared and tendered a bill of exceptions, and when this was not allowed, The case of the Attorney-General vs. Sillem. he moved for a new trial on the ground that the judge had misdirected the jury, and the jury had found against the evidence. Rule *nisi* for a new trial was granted, and argument was had before the full bench, in the latter part of November, on the question as to whether the rule should be discharged or made absolute. The court was equally divided on this point, and according to the practice of the court in such a division, the junior member withdrew his judgment, and the rule for a new trial was thus discharged.

The Attorney-General took an appeal from this decision to the court of error in such cases, the Exchequer Chamber ; and early in February of 1864 the appeal came up for argument. The counsel for the defendants now challenged the jurisdiction of the court on the technical ground that the Court of Exchequer had no legal power to invent the rule under which the appeal had been taken to the Exchequer Chamber. The argument went off on this point and the merits of the question were entirely lost sight of. After long and able argument from counsel on both sides in regard to the powers of the Court of Exchequer to create by its rules rights of appeal, the Exchequer Chamber decided, four to three, that they could not hear the appeal.

The Attorney-General appealed against their decision to the highest court of law known to the British judicial system, the House of Lords. The question before the Lords was in regard to the power of the Exchequer Chamber to hear the appeal from the decision of the Court of Exchequer discharging the rule for a new trial of the case. After long and able arguments from counsel on both sides, the Lords rendered their decision on the 6th of April, 1864, by a majority of four to two. They held that the judges of the Court of Exchequer did not have the authority, under the power to regulate the practice of their court, to invent new rights of appeal, and that such power had not been conferred on them by any act of Parliament ; that the appeal which they had allowed in this case was a novel procedure ; that the Exchequer Chamber was correct in refusing to hear it ; and that, therefore, the appeal from the decision of the Exchequer Chamber should be dismissed.

Thus ended this famous test case in discussions and

decisions in regard to the technicalities of judicial practice. The practical outcome of it, however, was a notice to the Confederate agents that they might, under the neutrality laws of Great Britain, procure all the vessels and munitions of war which they had the means to purchase, provided they would only bring the vessels and their war equipment together somewhere without the dominions of Her Majesty.

The decision and its effects.

Still, it can hardly be questioned that the British Government did all that it could under existing statutes and judicial practice to convict and punish the defendants in this case. Its members had come to see more clearly that the United States Government was going to conquer the rebellion against its authority, and that neutral duties must be more strictly enforced. They had resisted the importunities of the Emperor Napoleon to join with him in recognizing the independence of the Southern Confederacy, and they had recognized the lawful validity of the Federal blockade, despite the fact that it was not well maintained in a number of places, and in the face of the suffering caused in the manufacturing districts of England in consequence of it. It is true that the Act of Parliament in regard to neutrality was not sufficiently strong and wide to enable the Government to cope with the commercial greed of British subjects, but it was the statute under which the Government had long acted, and it was by no means directed specifically against the United States. Moreover, it must be remembered that the neutrality laws of the United States were not much, if any, stricter. In this very case of the *Alexandra* Baron Pollock quoted both Kent and Story in justification of the proposition that it was not a breach of neutrality by a State for its citizens to sell contraband of war to belligerents. The articles were

simply subject to the right of seizure in transit, and to confiscation.

About the time of the hearing of the *Alexandra* case, the British Government gave another proof of its good faith. It was brought to the attention of the ministers that the Lairds were building ^{The steam-}rams. a number of steam-rams. The representatives of the United States charged that they were intended for the Confederate service, and, although they could not furnish the Government with any very good evidence of it, yet the ministers caused them to be seized.

They were pretty severely arraigned for it in Parliament, and finally escaped further embarrassment by purchasing the vessels for the British navy. ^{Earl Russell's} It was during the debate in Parliament upon ^{views.} this subject that Earl Russell, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the Palmerston Government, said that he was convinced that the steam-rams, which had been declared by the builders to be for the French Government, were intended for the Confederate service, and that he agreed with Mr. Adams that the arming and equipping of vessels in the Queen's dominions, and sending them forth to attack a power with which Her Majesty was at peace, would be an infringement of Her Majesty's proclamation, and a virtual participation in hostilities in behalf of the Confederate States. Earl Russell has been very severely criticised by the Americans both North and South, which is some evidence, at least, that he was striving to walk the straight and narrow path. He and his colleagues were also exposed to severe criticism, from both points of view, in the Parliament. While Sir Thomas Baring, Mr. Bright, Mr. Cobden and Mr. Shaw Lefevre accused them of winking at the violations of the Queen's neutrality proclamation, in the matters of the furnishing of ships and war materials to the Confederate govern-

ment, and allowing the Confederate war-vessels to enter British ports almost at will and supply themselves to almost any extent, the Earl of Derby, Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. Roebuck accused the Government of unwarranted interference with the rights of British citizens and of cowering before the insults offered them by the United States Government.

Such was, in substance, the status of the question at the close of the rebellion ; and the victorious Union had no reasons to fear any serious difficulty in its settlement. If there were any in 1865, they were all removed by the accession of the liberal party to power in 1867. From this moment forward the adjustment of the claims made by the United States upon Great Britain through arbitration became from month to month more and more certain. The history of its consummation belongs, however, to a later volume of this series.

The second important question of the foreign relations of the United States during the Civil War was the

French invasion of Mexico and the establishment of the Maximilian Empire over that unhappy country. For forty years, *i.e.*, from the date of Mexican independence to the outbreak of the Civil War in the United States, Mexico had been practically in a condition of revolution, rebellion and anarchy. It had suffered almost annual

The situation of Mexico in the period between 1820 and 1860.

upheavals and almost semi-annual changes in the head of the Government. It had become impoverished and bankrupt, both politically and financially. The reign of law was almost entirely set aside, and the public peace was almost destroyed. Thieving, robbery and murder were the order of the day, and the nation seemed on the point of breaking up. During this long period of lawlessness, citizens and subjects of foreign states, residing or sojourn-

ing in Mexico for pleasure or for business, were exposed to outrages of every kind, and suffered severely. The foreign officials were not even protected. It is a well-authenticated fact that robbers entered the British embassy in the city of Mexico and carried away more than a half million of dollars. During the war between the United States and Mexico in the last half of the fifth decade of the century, the idea had been broached of a dismemberment of the miserable sham of a state.

Nevertheless Mexico had succeeded in borrowing some money from the citizens and subjects of foreign powers, and these debts, together with the ^{Mexico's} claims for damages by foreign powers, ^{debts.} amounted in 1860 to nearly one hundred millions of dollars, a sum entirely beyond the ability of the poverty-stricken country to pay.

During the period between 1857 and 1860 the Liberal party under the leadership of Comonfort had succeeded in vanquishing the conservative or clerical party and in forcing their chief, Miramon, to seek refuge in flight from the country, and, when Comonfort was apparently on the point of assuming dicta- ^{The advent} ^{of Juarez.} torial powers again, had recognized Comonfort's Minister of the Interior, Benito Juarez, as leader, and under his direction had expelled Comonfort also. Juarez was a full-blooded Indian, born in poverty and ignorance, but by the aid of a discriminating and generous-minded Spanish gentleman, whom he served faithfully in his youth, he had been highly educated, and when he was proclaimed President of Mexico in January of 1858, he was undoubtedly one of the strongest characters, both intellectually and morally, that Mexico possessed. He succeeded during 1859 and 1860 in suppressing the rebellion against his Government, and in holding regular elections in the spring of 1861, both for the presidency and

for the members of Congress, and was himself chosen president thereof. The Treasury was now, however, so completely exhausted that the Congress enacted a law suspending for two years the payment of any foreign obligations, either principal or interest.

It was this act that gave the foreign powers a fair occasion for intervention. In the autumn of 1861, plenipotentiaries of the three interested powers,

The London agreement against Mexico.

Great Britain, France and Spain, assembled in London and agreed to make a joint demand upon Mexico for the discharge of its obligations to the three countries so represented and for better protection of the persons and property of their respective subjects in Mexico. They at the same time, however, disavowed any intention of acquiring any territory from Mexico or any undue advantage, or any control over the internal government of Mexico. What they demanded was simply their pay, and the reasonable protection of their subjects in Mexico by the Mexican Government.

European demands against Mexico and the seizure of Vera Cruz.

In the early part of the year 1862, the fleet composed of vessels of the three contracting parties appeared off Vera Cruz, and the officers respectively representing the three governments made their demands upon the Mexican Government. The latter could, of course, promise better protection for the subjects of the respective powers in Mexico, but it could not pay anything, and the foreign forces proceeded to take possession of Vera Cruz for the purpose of satisfying the claims of their respective governments by collecting and appropriating the customs duties.

Down to this point, the Government at Washington, while watching with much concern the movements of the allies toward Mexico, had not felt itself able, or called upon, to interpose. These powers had made

only legitimate demands on Mexico, and had disavowed any ulterior purposes, and the Government of the United States had its hands full with the rebellion at home. In the middle of the spring of 1862, however, things occurred which put a very different phase upon the matter. The

The interposition of the United States in the question.

Mexican Government had at last met the demands of the powers in such a way as to satisfy Great Britain and Spain. France, however, would not settle on the terms offered, although they were identical with those accepted by Great Britain and Spain. The representatives of the two latter powers now began to suspect that the French were entertaining purposes in which they could not honorably join. They quickly settled matters with Mexico, and withdrew their forces from Mexico altogether. The French, however, remained, and now began

to press their scheme for seizing the government of the country. They demanded

The scheme of the French Government.

twelve millions of dollars in payment of damages which French citizens were claimed to have suffered ; and they espoused the famous Jecker bond swindle, which was a bond issue of fifteen millions of dollars made by the Miramon Government and taken by the Swiss banker Jecker at five cents on the dollar. Notwithstanding this well-known fact the French demanded the payment of these bonds at the full face value. The Mexican Government could not pay, if it had been willing to do so, and the French troops were headed from Vera Cruz toward the capital. They did not have so easy a time, however, as General Scott did fifteen years before. It took them more than a year, with an army three times the size of Scott's, to reach the gates of the city.

The French occupation of the city of Mexico.

This year, from June, 1862, to the same month in 1863, was, as we have seen, the period of greatest de-

pression in the fortunes of the Union during the Civil War. It behooved the Government at Washington, therefore, to move very discreetly in its diplomacy with France. If the "Monroe Doctrine" is to be regarded as a continuing principle in the conduct of our relations with the European states, and not as a special declaration to meet a specific situation, here was certainly a plain and palpable violation of its principle. Here was the attempt of a European state to impose a government of its own making upon an American state. Mr.

Mr. Seward's reticence.

Seward still held back, however, although it was entirely evident that no other theory would explain the French movements after the spring of 1862. During all this time, he simply inquired, in a mild way, of the French Government what its intentions in Mexico were, saying indeed that the United States could not remain indifferent to intervention in Mexico by any European power for political purposes, but professing satisfaction with the French assurances.

So soon, however, as the French army was established in the Mexican capital, the French commander, General

The provisional government established by the French.

Forey, and the French Minister to Mexico, Count de Saligny, proceeded to set up a provisional civil government for Mexico,

composed of less than fifty persons chosen by themselves. This government then elected three regents. The regents selected some two hundred persons as members of a national constituent assembly;

The empire of Maximilian.

and this assembly voted the establishment of a Mexican empire with Maximilian, one of the archdukes of Austria, as hereditary emperor.

The Government at Washington must act now, or acquiesce in this utter disregard of the "Monroe Doctrine."

Still Seward delayed to take a decided position. He simply would not endanger the life of this Union at the moment of great crisis in its affairs for the sake of maintaining a stubborn adherence to the "Monroe Doctrine." He did not even assume the offensive in the diplomatic correspondence about the matter. It was nearly six months before a distinct utterance was made by him, and then it was in reply to a "feeler" from the French Government itself in regard to recognition of the Maximilian Empire in Mexico by the Government of the United States. The French Government held out, as an inducement, the continuance of cordial relations and an early withdrawal of the French soldiers from Mexican soil.

Seward's
continued pa-
tience.

There is no question that the virtual silence of the Government of the United States between July and December had encouraged the French Government to give this intimation of its wishes. It is hardly to be believed that the French Government wanted war with the United States, if it could secure its aims in Mexico without it, but it is pretty certain that if the United States had undertaken to thwart those purposes, the French would have seized upon the advantages of the moment to strike down any opposition which the Union might have undertaken.

The Confederates were, of course, on the tip-toe of expectancy, and were doing everything in their power to excite the French against the United States, hoping to have thus the aid of the French in defeating the military power of the Union. The Confederates did not see how the United States could fail to come to blows with France, without a cowardly backdown from a long-established policy. But Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward were both

The hope of
the Confeder-
ates.

men who looked far ahead. They were both calm and cool and self-contained. The order of conduct to which they both adhered was "one thing at a time and the big things first." If the "Monroe Doctrine" could not be upheld at the moment without endangering the success of the Union arms in maintaining the integrity of the country, then the "Monroe Doctrine" must wait until a more convenient time for vindication.

Mr. Seward, therefore, answered the intimation from the French Government evasively. He said the United States would still maintain its neutrality in regard to the conflict between France and Mexico, and would recognize the sovereignty of the people of Mexico under any governmental form which they might see fit to give themselves. He reiterated the opinion that it would be found very difficult, if not impossible, for a foreign government to establish itself in Mexico, or for a monarchical government to exist there permanently, and he repeated his declaration that either of these would be disagreeable to the United States, but he did not say a word about the "Monroe Doctrine," and he refrained from giving the slightest intimation which could be interpreted as a threat.

Naturally the Confederates sneered and jeered at the arrant cowardice, as they viewed it, of the Washington Government, and quite unnaturally for sensible loyal men many of the strongest Unionists in and out of Congress did the same thing. At the beginning of the year 1864, it seemed as if the Congress would take the matter out of the hands of the President, and declare war on France. Resolutions were introduced to this effect in both Houses. The Senate resolutions proposed an immediate demand upon France to remove her troops from Mexico, and

Seward's
answer to the
French "feeler."

The unpopularity of Seward's position.

the assumption of an obligation by the United States to protect Mexico against European intervention in her internal affairs. The House resolutions declared the erection of a monarchical government, by European intervention, upon the ruins of an American Republic, to be in entire disaccord with the traditional policy of the United States. The House passed its resolutions, but the friends of the Administration in the Senate succeeded in tabling the propositions presented in that body. The feeling everywhere was that the United States was on the point of delivering an ultimatum to France, and Mr. Seward felt it necessary to call the attention of the French Government to the fact that the President was directing the diplomacy of the United States, and that the President would seasonably inform the Emperor of the French whenever he contemplated any change in the policy of neutrality. Had the President taken a less positive stand, there is little question that Congress would have committed the blunder of declaring war on France, the result of which upon the fate of the Union only almighty wisdom could then have foretold, and only eternal wisdom knows now.

The President's firm stand.

In the meanwhile, the French army had overrun a considerable portion of the country, and had placed garrisons in many of the chief places. The conquered people seemed to acquiesce in the new régime, and Maximilian, who had at first made his acceptance of the throne conditional upon a plébiscite in his favor, overcame his scruples, and on April 10, 1864, formally signified to the deputation of Mexicans who sought him at Miramar on the Adriatic his willingness to have the crown of Montezuma placed upon his brow. In June following he arrived in the City of Mexico, and assumed the government of Mexico,

Maximilian's acceptance of the throne.

no one can doubt, with a sincere heart, a liberal mind, and a noble purpose.

But he was a poetic dreamer, without statesmanship, administrative ability, or political tact. He tried a policy of conciliation, and lost thereby friends, without winning over enemies. Before the first year of his reign had passed, he found himself without any sufficient Mexican support, and dependent upon both French bayonets and French money; and before this first year had passed the United States had emerged triumphantly from the long rebellion of the Confederates, and had free hand to deal with the threatening foreign question on the southern border.

The United States Government now sent Sheridan to South-western Texas. He quickly put an end to the remnant of the rebellion there, and gathered a large army about him for the invasion of Mexico. The victorious army could hardly be restrained.

Johnson, who had just succeeded Lincoln in the presidency, was confident, however, that he and his astute Secretary of State would be able to get France out of Mexico without a war with her, and was determined not to have war. He concealed his determination, of course, from the French Government. He

The policy of President Johnson. even went so far as to send a military man to Paris to act with the American minister there in bringing pressure upon the French Emperor to withdraw his troops from Mexico. As the summer of 1865 passed without any result, however, the President and Mr. Seward began to grow restless. Public opinion was most decidedly demanding a stern policy toward France in the Mexican question. Under its pressure Mr. Seward began, in September of 1865, to make representations to the French Government looking toward

a withdrawal of the French forces from the American continent. Still the Emperor evaded these mild remonstrances. By the end of the year patience had ceased to be a virtue, even in Seward's mind. On the 16th of December, he sent the French Government a note, which informed France that she must withdraw from her attempt to set up a foreign government in Mexico. The

Seward's
note of the 16th
of December,
1865, to the
French Gov-
ernment.

Emperor now saw that the time for final determination had come. He procrastinated a few days more, and at last gave in. He announced his intention of withdrawing his troops in three detachments. The first should go in November of the current year, 1866, and the other two in March and November of 1867. When November arrived, the Emperor still procrastinated, and announced that he would withdraw the whole army the following spring. The Government at Washington remonstrated, and insisted that the French should go at once. Napoleon saw his danger in further delay, and yielded to the inevitable. In the early part of March, the French army evacuated the City of Mexico, and set its face toward the seaport where it was to embark for home.

The depart-
ure of the
French troops
from Mexico,
and the down-
fall of Maxi-
milian's Em-
pire.

Maximilian was now left to his Mexican support, which proved to be entirely worthless in the face of the impetuous advance of the forces of Juarez from the North. It required only a few weeks to destroy the Maximilian Empire, and to make away with the Emperor and all his Mexican advisers. On the 19th of April, 1867, the last scene in this tragedy was enacted in the execution of the Emperor, if so fair a name can be used to designate so foul an act. Thanks to the astuteness of Mr. Seward and the firmness of the President, the diplomacy of the United States in this critical period

was entirely successful. It did not suit those military men, naturally, who were thirsting for more blood, but

The success of the diplomacy of the Administration. it was an immense boon to the people of the country, although the people themselves were ready to incur new burdens and dangers.

It showed what a President and a Secretary of State, who are able and firm, can do in preventing the country from entering upon a foreign war. It raises a strong presumption that such a President and Secretary can always do so, if they will.

Mr. Seward had not used the phrase "Monroe Doctrine" at all in this controversy, but had simply fallen

Mr. Seward and the Monroe Doctrine. back upon the general principle that the interests of the United States were threatened by the creation of a monarchical government

on the ruins of a neighboring republic by European armed intervention. This was a well-recognized warrant for interference, and Mr. Seward had the good sense to base himself upon it, and not invoke a doctrine which was not recognized by any of the European states, except perhaps Great Britain. He, therefore, forestalled any controversy in regard to his right to interfere between France and Mexico, and no controversy was attempted by any foreign state.

The amity which had existed for so long a period between France and the United States received, notwithstanding the final compliance of the Emperor

France and the United States. with the wishes of the Washington Government, a rude shock. The conduct of Spain, and especially of Great Britain, stood out in bold contrast with the insincerity and the craft of the French in this whole matter. It cannot be said that the uprightness of the British diplomacy and conduct at this juncture disarmed the traditional ill-will of the people of the United States against Great Britain, but, with

the soon manifestly increasing willingness of that power to arbitrate the claims of the United States upon her, it operated powerfully in that direction. At any rate, the whole experience in the Mexican crisis served to convince the people of the United States, ^{United States and Great Britain.} fully and finally, that their European friends in time of need were no longer to be found where they were thought to be. It certainly cleared the way for new friendships in the future.

The final action of the Canadian Government in regard to the St. Albans raid tended in the same direction. From the beginning of the war, Canada had been a willing asylum for Copper-^{United States and Canada.}heads, Confederates, and traitors. At last, in October of 1864, the crisis in the relations of the United States to its northern neighbor was reached. A number of men in the garb of ordinary travellers, and conducting themselves as such, came together at the village of St. Albans in Vermont, near the Canadian line. They robbed the banks, killed a man, and attempted to fire the place. Failing in this, they fled before the rapidly gathering force of citizens into Canada, taking their plunder with them. Some of them were arrested on Canadian soil by Canadian police. The Government at Washington took the ground that these men were common criminals and requested their extradition. The Canadian court, on the other hand, decided that the deeds committed by them were acts of war against the United States, and refused to surrender them to the officials of the United States. The court even ordered the police to return the money to them which they had taken from the St. Albans banks, and which the police had seized. There was not the slightest evidence that the Confederate government had ordered this movement, or given anybody discretionary powers in re-

gard to it. It was never shown that anyone connected with it held a regular commission from the Confederate government, or was regularly a soldier in the Confederate service. They were probably simply freebooters, that is, common criminals. The Canadian Government soon became convinced of this fact. Its courts had released the men under the view, as we have seen, that they were soldiers in the Confederate service, making regular war, but the Canadian Parliament commanded the money, which by order of the court had been restored by the police to the thieves, to be made good to the St. Albans banks in gold coin; that is, the Canadian Government repudiated the action of its courts, in so far at least as the action of the court affected the disposition of the money captured from the thieves by the police.

In decidedly severe contrast with the conduct of Great Britain and France stood that of Russia and of the states of the German Confederation. From the United States and Russia. time, in the spring of 1861, when Russia revealed to the United States the movements of France and Great Britain to establish a concert of action of the European powers toward the United States in the impending struggle and her own refusal to have anything to do with such an understanding, this great Power had maintained as cordial relations with the Union as the principles of neutrality would allow. In fact, Russia seemed to follow the theory, in her dealings with the United States, that the Union was engaged in suppressing an unjustifiable rebellion against its own rightful authority. At last, in the early summer of 1863, when the fortunes of the Union seemed to be running very low, and it seemed only a matter of a little time when Great Britain and France would recognize the independence of the Southern Confederacy, the Czar

sent a fleet of war-vessels into the harbor of New York and another into the Golden Gate. This was understood by all parties to mean that Russia would regard such an act on the part of France and Great Britain as an intervention in American affairs, and that her influence and power in such a contingency would be thrown with the Union. After this manifestation, and the victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg, the possibilities of European intervention in the contest became practically zero. What were exactly the motives which influenced Russia to take the attitude which she assumed at the outset, and held consistently to the end, it is not easy to divine. The sympathy of the Russian Czar with the Government of the Union in its work of emancipation may have been the force from the ideal side, and the hope of getting American gold for the rocks and ice of Alaska may have been a financial motive. But it is probable that Russia had not recovered from the bitterness of the defeat which she had suffered at the hands of France and Great Britain in 1854-56, and that she saw great danger to herself in allowing the Anglo-French alliance for the protection of Turkey to develop into a general alliance upon many, if not all, subjects. This is the more rational explanation of her conduct in American affairs, during this period.

Likewise the German Confederation, and the States composing it, and especially the leading State of the Union, Prussia, maintained sincere and cordial relations with the United States through-
United States and the German States.
out the time of trial. Both principles for which the United States fought, namely, union and liberty, had the sympathy of the German heart, and tens of thousands of Germany's children bore arms in the great struggle, and many thousands gave up their lives for the cause represented by these principles. So

large, indeed, were Germany's contributions to the strength of the Union armies and to their military science and discipline that the complaint was frequently expressed by the defeated Confederates that the North owed its victories to its German "mercenaries."

When, by the close of 1864, the triumph of the Union became an assured fact, all of the European States grew much more respectful and cordial toward the United States, and the Union emerged from the great trial in possession of a naval and military power and prestige which secured it against any serious complications with any foreign State. France and England soon yielded, as we have seen, and despite the desires of certain army and navy officers to prolong the opportunities for their preferment and entertainment, the diplomacy of Seward was entirely able to cope with all foreign questions through the forms of peaceful adjustment.

CHRONOLOGY

Biggs's repudiation of Helper	April 5, 1858
Brown's raid at Harper's Ferry.....	October 16, 17, 1859
Democratic National Convention, Charleston, S. C.,	
	April 23, 1860
Constitutional Union Convention.....	May 9, 1860
Republican National Convention, Chicago, Ill. . .	May 16, 1860
Democratic National Convention, Baltimore, Md.,	
	June 18, 1860
Buchanan's message on secession.....	December 3, 1860
Manifesto of southern congressmen.....	December 13, 1860
South Carolina ordinance of secession . . .	December 20, 1860
Caucus of southern senators	January 5, 1861
President's special message.....	January 8, 1861
<i>Star of the West</i> fired on.....	January 9, 1861
Mississippi secedes	January 9, 1861
Florida secedes	January 10, 1861
Alabama secedes	January 11, 1861
Georgia secedes.....	January 19, 1861
Convention at Montgomery, Ala.....	February 4, 1861
Jefferson Davis inaugurated as president of the Confed-	
eracy	February 18, 1861
Fort Sumter attacked.....	April 12, 1861
First call for troops.....	April 15, 1861
Virginia convention adopts secession ordinance, April 17,	1861
Lincoln's first blockade proclamation.....	April 19, 1861
Troops mobbed at Baltimore, Md.....	April 19, 1861
Blockade extended to Virginia and North Carolina,	
	April 27, 1861
Lincoln calls for three-year volunteers	May 3, 1861
Arkansas secedes.....	May 6, 1861
Convention at Wheeling, W. Va.....	May 13, 1861

North Carolina secedes	May 20, 1861
Virginia secedes by popular vote.....	May 23, 1861
Engagement at Philippi, W. Va	June 3, 1861
Tennessee secedes	June 8, 1861
Engagement at Big Bethel, Va.....	June 10, 1861
Engagement at Vienna Station, Va	June 17, 1861
Special session of Congress.....	July 4, 1861
Engagement at Carthage, Mo.....	July 5, 1861
Engagement at Laurel Hill, W. Va.....	July 8, 1861
Engagement at Rich Mountain, W. Va.....	July 11, 1861
Engagement at Carrick's Ford, W. Va.....	July 14, 1861
Statute authorizing loan of \$250,000,000	July 17, 1861
Engagement at Blackburn's Ford, Va.....	July 18, 1861
Battle of Bull Run, Va.....	July 21, 1861
Statute authorizing 500,000 volunteers.....	July 22, 1861
Statute authorizing President to call militia....	July 29, 1861
Engagement at Dug Springs, Mo.....	August 2, 1861
Statute on confiscation.....	August 6, 1861
Engagement at Wilson's Creek, Mo.....	August 10, 1861
Capture of Fort Hatteras.....	August 28, 29, 1861
Engagement at Drywood Creek, Mo.....	September 2, 1861
Capture of Fort Scott, Mo.....	September 2, 1861
Engagement at Carnifex Ferry, W. Va....	September 10, 1861
Engagements at Cheat Mountain, W. Va..	Sept. 12, 13, 15, 1861
Engagement on the Greenbrier.....	October 3, 1861
Engagement at Ball's Bluff, Va	October 21, 1861
Davis chosen president of Confederacy at general election,	
	November 6, 1861
Battle of Belmont, Mo.....	November 7, 1861
Capture of Port Royal, S. C.....	November 7, 1861
The <i>Trent</i> stopped.....	November 8, 1861
Engagement at Fort Pickens, Fla.....	November 23, 1861
Battle at Mill Springs, Ky.....	January 19, 20, 1861
Capture of Fort Henry, Tenn.....	February 6, 1862
Engagement at Roanoke Island, N. C.....	February 8, 1862
Capture of Fort Donelson, Tenn.....	February 16, 1862
Engagement at Valverde, N. M.....	February 21, 1862
Davis inaugurated president under permanent constitu-	
tion.....	February 22, 1862

Engagement at Pea Ridge, Ark	March 6, 1862
Engagement at New Madrid, Mo.....	March 13, 1862
Engagement at Newberne, N. C.....	March 14, 1862
Engagement at Kernstown, Va.....	March 23, 1862
West Virginia adopts state constitution.....	April 3, 1862
Battle of Shiloh, Tenn.....	April 6, 7, 1862
Capture of Island No. 10.....	April 8, 1862
Capture of Fort Pillow, Tenn.....	April 14, 1862
New Orleans occupied by federals	April 28, 1862
Engagement at Eltham's Landing, Va	May 7, 1862
Lincoln's proclamation on Hunter's order.....	May 19, 1862
Battle of Winchester, Va	May 25, 1862
Engagement at Hanover Court House, Va.....	May 27, 1862
Corinth occupied by Grant.....	May 30, 1862
Battle of Seven Pines ; Fair Oaks, Va..	May 31, June 1, 1862
Pope given command of Army of Virginia.....	June 26, 1862
Battle of Gaines's Mill, Va.....	June 27, 28, 1862
Battle of Glendale, Va. ; Frazier's Farm.....	June 30, 1862
Battle of Malvern Hill, Va	July 1, 1862
Statute authorizing \$150,000,000 treasury notes..	July 11, 1862
Battle of Cedar Mountain, Va.....	August 9, 1862
Capture of Manassas Junction, Va.....	August 27, 1862
Battle of Groveton, Va.....	August 28, 1862
Second battle of Manassas, Va.....	August 30, 1862
Battles on South Mountain, Md	September 14, 1862
Engagement at Munfordsville, Ky....	September 14-16, 1862
Battle of Antietam, Md.....	September 17, 1862
Battle of Iuka, Miss	September 19, 1862
Battle of Corinth, Miss.....	October 3, 4, 1862
Battle of Perryville, Ky	October 8, 1862
McClellan removed from command.....	November 7, 1862
Battle of Fredericksburg, Va	December 13, 1862
Battle of Murfreesborough, Tenn....	December 31, 1862-
	January 2, 1863
Emancipation Proclamation	January 1, 1863
Statute on Currency and National Banks...	February 25, 1863
Statute on Writ of Habeas Corpus.....	March 3, 1863
Engagement at Port Gibson, Miss.....	May 1, 1863
Battle of Chancellorsville, Va.....	May 1-4, 1863

Arrest of Vallandigham	May 5, 1863
Engagement at Champion Hill, Miss.	May 16, 1863
Engagement at Winchester, Va.	June 13, 15, 1863
Lincoln calls for 100,000 volunteers	June 15, 1863
Battle of Gettysburg, Pa.	July 1-3, 1863
Fall of Vicksburg, Miss.	July 4, 1863
Surrender of Port Hudson, La	July 7, 1863
Draft Riots begin at New York	July 13, 1863
Capture of Fort Wagner, S. C.	September 7, 1863
Battle of Chickamauga, Ga.	September 19, 20, 1863
Battle of Perryville	October 8, 1863
Call for 300,000 volunteers	October 17, 1863
Battle of Chattanooga, Tenn.	November 23-25, 1863
Sherman enters Knoxville, Tenn.	December 6, 1863
Thirty-eighth Congress meets	December 7, 1863
Occupation of Meridian, Miss.	February 14, 1864
Statute authorizing loan of \$200,000,000	March 3, 1864
Nevada enabling act	March 21, 1864
Colorado enabling act	March 21, 1864
Engagement at Sabine Cross Roads, La	April 8, 1864
Massacre at Fort Pillow	April 12, 1864
Nebraska enabling act	April 19, 1864
First battle in the Wilderness	May 5, 6, 1864
Engagement at Dalton, Ga.	May 9, 1864
Second battle in the Wilderness	May 10, 1864
Third battle in the Wilderness	May 12, 1864
Engagements at Resaca, Ga	May 13-16, 1864
Engagement at Rome, Ga.	May 18, 1864
Fourth battle in the Wilderness	May 19, 1864
Engagement at Kingston, Ga.	May 24, 1864
Statute organizing territory of Montana	May 26, 1864
Frémont convention, Cleveland, O	May 31, 1864
Battle of Cold Harbor	June 2, 1864
Statute on Currency and National Banks	June 3, 1864
Engagements near Dallas, Ga.	May 25, June 4, 1864
Republican National Convention, Baltimore, Md.	June 17, 1864
<i>Kearsarge</i> meets the <i>Alabama</i>	June 19, 1864
Battle of Kenesaw Mountain, Ga.	June 27, 1864
Congress adjourns	July 2, 1864

Lincoln's reconstruction proclamation.....	July 8, 1864
Battle of Peach Tree Creek, Ga.....	July 20, 1864
First battle before Atlanta.....	July 22, 1864
Battle of Ezra Church, Ga.....	July 28, 1864
Capture of Mobile Harbor, Ala.....	August 5, 1864
Democratic National Convention, Chicago, Ill.....	August 29, 1864
Capture of Atlanta, Ga.....	September 2, 1864
Engagement at Ironton, Mo.....	September 26, 27, 1864
Battle at Allatoona, Ga.....	October 5, 1864
Lincoln reëlected.....	November 8, 1864
Battle of Franklin, Tenn.....	November 30, 1864
Battle of Nashville, Tenn.....	December 15, 16, 1864
Call for 300,000 volunteers.....	December 19, 1864
Evacuation of Savannah, Ga.....	December 20, 1864
Capture of Fort Fisher, N. C.....	January 15, 1865
Peace conference at Hampton Roads.....	February 2, 3, 1865
Tennessee ratifies new constitution.....	February 22, 1865
Occupation of Wilmington, N. C.....	February 22, 1865
Statute authorizing loan of \$600,000,000.....	March 3, 1865
Engagement at Averysboro, N. C.....	March 16, 1865
Occupation of Goldsboro, N. C.....	March 21, 1865
Battle at Five Forks, Va.....	April 1, 1865
Occupation of Petersburg, Va.....	April 2, 1865
Occupation of Richmond, Va.....	April 3, 1865
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
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